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I. 
INTRODUCTION 
Interest and profit are often difficult to distinguish 
from one another in practice. Interest may be looked 
upon as a payment for the use of capital, and profit 
as the reward of the entrepreneur for his services, or 
interest may be regarded as income from money capital,, 
and profit as income from real capital, but interest 
and profit are often inextricably confused by the 
Muslim scholars. The Qurlin forbids lenders to receive 
back from borrowers more money than is lent, because 
it considers it unjust. It does not, however, raise 
any objection, to the payment, of, rent for land although 
money may have been borrowed for the purpose of buying 
the land. 
This attitude to the payment of interest is, 
however, more readily appreciated if the difference 
between borrowers of today and borrowers of the Prophet's 
time is taken into consideration. At the present time, 
the most important lenders are banks, and a vast majority 
of the borrowers are those whose financial position is 
basically sound. The practice of pre-Islamic days against 
which the relevant passages of the Qur'; n were directeds 
2. 
involved a large majority of those borrowers w4o sought 
loans for purposes of consumption. The prohibition of 
interest reveals that Islam'looked upon the lender 
accepting an additional payment as taking advantage of 
another man's poverty or misfortune. 
The money-lenders of today who do business with 
the poor and exploit their poverty are no more respected 
members of society than those'of the early days of Islam; 
nevertheless, they-provide a service for those who 
would be unable to get timely financial assistance 
elsewhere. 
An Islamic state should establish co-operative move- 
ments, national insurance and national provident funds 
to ensure the poor, the minimum of the necessities of 
life. Since these essential services for a healthy 
society are not yet in existence anywhere, and since 
capital is scarce relative to the demand for it, and it is 
an adjunct to an advanced economic systemg payment of 
interest is unavoidable for its distribution among all 
the various users competing for it. 
The aim of this study is to show that credit is an 
essential human necessity, and that Muslims, in spite of 
3. 
the Qurlinic prohibitions have always borrowed money 
on interest, especially at the downfall of the Mughal 
sovereignty, when agricultur'alists could not get timely 
financial assistance elsewhere except, from Hindu 
usurers. 
In spite of the fact that the Qur'; n recognises 
the necessity of credit, Muslim scholars virtually 
banned such transactions, even if they did not carry 
interest. As a result of this, the theory of interest, 
which was intended to deal with an essential aspect of 
human existence, was completely divorced from reality, 
and what was left was only the dry bones of the subject. 
ItIwas, thus, probably, the growing need of commerce for 
money and credit in production that forced some of the 
jurists to reevaluate the theory. of interest and to 
establish the-institution of hiyal. On the whole, 
however, they prevented the growth of competitive large 
scale enterprises and widespread credit among the 
community. Loans remained'primarily to relieve distress, 
and a lender was to expect'no more than repayment of his 
capital. Taking advantage of the necessitous circumstances 
of a member of the commun'ity by accepting an additional 
payment over-and above the original loan was frowned upon. 
A lender was advised to advance a loan without investigating 
4. 
the character or repaying capacity of the borrower. 
The jurists touched upon economic phenomena only 
when incidental to religious problems, and, all subjects 
of study were to them merely different aspects of one 
comprehensive subject: religion. This outlook, while 
producing a consistent and logical code of law, tended 
to disregard some of the practical aspects of economicss 
which did-not always fit in conveniently with this code. 
In economics, it is usual for a lender, before advancing 
a loan, to confirm that the applicant intends to repay 
his loan even in adverse circumstancess that he has 
the capacity to pay and possesses a specific security 
for the protection of the lender's capitals if matters 
go awry. A large majority of lenders will prefer to 
keep cash in hand and refuse to loan it out Unless there 
is a reasonable return from the loan. -and adequate com- 
pensation offered for the risk of nonpayment. 
The second half of the thesis is a rehearsal of the 
facts and events which illustrate this aspect of economics. 
At the downfall of the Mughals prosperous Muslims refused 
to advance monetary help to the poor mrmbers of the 
community, perhaps because they were convinced that the 
borrowers had little capacity to repay their loanss mostly 
5. 
I borrowed for financing their agriculture or merely 
for meeting the needs of their daily life. In fact, 
there was a great risk of nonpayment to be set against 
no return, unless it was a reward after death. Hindu 
money-lenders, however, were willing to accept this 
risk, but naturally charged rates of interest anywhere 
between 100% and 150%, which ensured that a loan not 
quickly repaid grew rapidly to the point where it 
could not be repaid from the current income of the 
borrower. Ultimately only the transfer of the property 
of the borrower would wipe the slate clean. Consequently 
the money-lenders, in one village after another dis- 
possessed the Muslims of their farms for the payment of 
their debts. 
The introduction of civil courts contributed to this 
process. The courts provided the' money-lenders with 
regular facilities, of a kind hitherto unknown, for en- 
forcing the payment of debt, which resulted in the 
extensive alienation of land to the Hindu money-lenders. 
Had the community been taught to adapt the legal 
interpretation of its economic theories to the changing 
circumstancess it would not have faced the intense financial 
difficulties that it did. A large majority of British 
officers appealed to the Government for legislation to 
6. 
protect borrowers from the exploitation of money-lenders, 
and considered this problem a question of political 
danger. Arthur Brandreth and Septimus Smet Thorburn 
played a vital and creative role, and used their pens 
to influence the higher authorities who, at first, were 
not in favour of any legislative remedy on economic and 
poli, tical grounds. The Government, at last, passed 
legislation and threw the weight of the administration in 
favour of the borrowers as opposed to the money-lenders. 
Had the legal interpretation-, which had handicaped 
Muslims in investment matters, been changed with the 
change in circumstances and economic conditionss the 
economic development of the community would have proceeded 
on entirely different lines. The Government did its 
best by introducing drastic changes in the judicial 
administration and starting cooperative credit societies 
based on easy terms of loan and low rates of interest. 
The re-interpretation of the theory itself was a task 
beyond its duties. This was something that could only 
be done by Muslim scholars. The answer lay in re- 
examination and re-evaluation of the basic texts, but 
the large majority of the jurists of earlier periods had, 
disagreed with this and believed that everything prohibited 
or permitted by a text would remain prohibited or permitted 
7. 
for ever even if it was contradictory to the changing 
attitudes and customs of the times. 
The jurists lacked any sense of the necessity 
for evolution in the law as in everything else. A 
community that refuses to adapt its theories and 
principles to the requirements of the times ceases to 
evolve. By so doing, it dooms not only itself to 
stagnation and decline, but also the very theories and 
principles that brought about this state of affairs to 
disrepute and eventually oblivion. 
8. 
SUMMARY 
The practice of rib; in pre-Islamic days, against which 
the relevant passages of the Qur'; n were directed, 
appears to have consisted in charging interest on a 
mere loan. The earlier comm 
, 
yntators of the Qur'5n 
extended this concept to credlit transactions on the 
authority of the Successor Qatida, who is reported to 
have maintained that the practice of rib5 consisted in 
a person's selling a certain'article to another person, 
agreeing to receive the, -, sale-money at a certain fixed 
date. If the purchaser could not pay this-money within 
the prescribed period another easing-time'was allowed to 
him on stipulation of an additional amount payable with 
the dues. 
The idea of 'fixed term' repeatedly mentioned, by 
the-exegetic scholars from the earlier sources onwards, 
is not derived from any verse of the Qurlin in which 
interest is mentioned. It is derived from the verse 
of the Qur'in (2: 282) which recognises the necessity 
of contracting debts and discusses in detail the 
ordinance governing the recording of credit transactions. 
This marks a link which connects loans with credit 
transactions and thus permitted scholars in their dis- 
9. 
cussions to distinguish between hand-to-hand transactions 
and deferred transactions, itself a distinction 
acknowledged by the Qur'in (2: 282). 
This distinction is prominent in all the hadith I 
discussions, to such a degree that certain groups could 
even argue that delay in settlement was the exclusive 
factor in the system of ribi. Such an idea was embodied 
in the slogan : -Leý 
yý -v 
Another group of Traditionists developed and extended 
this concept to exchange of six commodities - gold, silver, 
wheat, barley, dates, salt - and demanded not only (a) 
an immediate delivery of the two commodities being 
exchanged, but also (b) absolute equality if they were 
of the same kind. 
The jurists extended these rules to exchange of 
other commoditiesvhich were deemed to possess the same 
essential characteristics as those specified in the 
T hadith, on the ground that the same effective cause 
which lay behind the original ruling, was 
present also in those new cases. 
The divergence of opinions as to the nature of this 
effective cause produce variant theories in the ancient 
10. 
schools of law. In the Shificiv and Hanball' schools, 
0 
the 'ribi rules' were applied to the exchange of all 
foodstuffs; in the MilikT school only to foodstuffs 
which can be stored; while in the HanafT school the 
0 
rules were extended to the sale of all commodities 
normally sold by weight or measurement. 
The Hanafi doctors were the most concerned to 
codify the doctrine, and it appears from their discussions 
on the topic of rib; that they were speculative and 
philosophical jurists. -that their system of law was 
not based upon the exigencies of day-to-day experience, 
and hence that it did not arise from an attempt to 
meet actual cases. It was a system of casuistry built 
upon scientific principles, and a set of rules which 
attempted to provide an answer on every conceivable 
question of law. At the same time it also appears that 
Abu HanTfa's legal thought was not regarded as final and 
his disciples had occasion to diverge from him. 
The theory of Interests as it had come to be 
understood, could not fail in its application to cause 
considerable hardship and inconvenience to the people; 
the jurists, therefore, acted to devise means by 
which to get over these dificulties while still keeping 
within the ShariT C a. They are given in various lawbooks 
ii. 
and are expressly permitted. One of the earliest 
transactions of this kind is the double contract of 
sale in which one person sells to another person who 
intends to borrow on interest something against the 
total sum of capital and interest which are to be 
due for payment at a fixed date, and at-the same time 
buys the article back for the capital which is at 
once handed over. 
We may conclude that the system of evading the 
SharT ca was the only method by which the theory of 
interest could retain some semblance of control over 
actual practice. We may also conclude that the theory 
represented less of actual practice than an ideal. 
The Mughals were Hanafi Turks from Central Asia; 
and their political state was based on Hanafi 
0 
jurisprudence. Likewise a large majority of the Muslims 
in Iddia followed this school. I 
Until the death of Awrangzib cAlamg'lr in 1707, a 
large proportion of the national wealth was concentrated 
in the hands of the Muslim community, and it was almost 
impossible for a Muslim family to be in such a state 
of penury as could lead him to borrow on interest. 
12. 
Awrangz1b, although faced with financial difficulties, 
depended on his usual sources, and Hindu bankers had 
no power during his reign. After his death the 
empire began to decline rapidly. His successors, in 
order to meet the expenses of internecine wars, took 
large loans from the great Hindu bankers at a ruinous 
rate of interest. This crippled the borrower, and 
when debts were repudiated, the bankers conspired 
against their authority and supported their rivals. 
Omi Chand, one of the representatives of the banking 
house to whom the Nawib--of the Bengal owed large sums, 
conspired against him with MT1r Ja c far Khin, his rival, 
and the East India Company, and helped not only the 
downfall of the Muslim sovereignty in the Bengal but 
also to the general disintegration of the Mughals. 
In 1757, the East-India Company which defeated Nawib 
Sirij al-Dawla with the help of the bankerss at 
Plassey, was, a hundred years later to try the Mughal 
Emperor, Bahidur Shah, for rebellion and high treason 
against its authority. Had the Muslims been permitted 
to receive and give a reasonable rate of interest, at a 
time of necessity, instead of borrowing at a high rate 
of interest from the Hindu bankers, Muslim sovereignty 
in India would have certainly proceeded on entirely 
13. 
different lines. 
The disintegrati. on of the Muqhal Empire had a 
direct and adverse effect on the economic prosperity 
of the Muslims which they had enjoyed for several 
hundred years. Loss of po 
' 
litical power in a pro. vince 
meant that the Muslims lost the benefits from that 
province. Every new loss meant an additional loss, 
and the already narrow field of employment was still 
further contracted. 
I, tI, 
The East India Company gradual1y gained political 
power, gradually did away with the'intermediary 
Muslim nobles and Jagirdars and removed Muslims from 
their service because they were distrustful 'of'those 
who had been in it previously. Consequently the usual 
source, of income of the Muslims was dried up by the 
new Administration. 
Cc Shah Abd al- AzT1z declared India Dir al-Harb, the 
abode of war, for'Muslims; and by doing so, he made it 
legal for Muslims to invest their capital in trade, 
industry, agriculture or other programs of capital 
development, without infringing theýprohibition of 
interest. Those'who were forced to borrow for their 
14. 
existence could borrow from a Muslim at a much lower 
rate of interest than that charged by the Hindu money- 
lenders. However, Shih cAbd al-cAzITz failed to per- 
suade the Muslim nobility to participate in interest- 
carrying commercial transactions, and the entire 
field of fiscal operation remained in the hands of non- 
Muslims. The nobility decided to live on their re- 
sources, and when thei r hoardings ran dry, then on 
money borrowed from Hindu money-lenders. As a result 
of this a large majority of the Muslim community were 
left at the mercy of the Hindu money-lenders who 
charged exorbitant rates of compound interest. This 
ensured that a debt not quickly repaid grew rapidly to 
the point where it could not be repaid from the usual 
income of the borrower. 
A new system of administration of justice provided 
the money-lender with regular facilities, of a kind 
hitherto quite unknown, for enforcing the payment of 
debts, just or unjust. The law guiding the courts pre- 
scribed that agreements, however loose, between a 
borrower and a money-lender, should be enforced, without 
detailed enquiry into the circumstances. This system 
of justice was a boon to the money-lender who being the 
only literate party, kept the accounts or had the bonds 
15. 
drawn up, and it could place much of the borrower's 
moveable and immoveable property at his disposal. 
Consequently, the borrower could be reduced to such a 
condition, socially and economically, as never to be 
able to regain his footing in society. 
Previously, money -lenders had never demanded a 
higher rate of interest than was sanctioned by usage 
and public opinion, and had no legal means of enforcing 
payment from their debtors. They could, however, refer 
any case of a defaulting debtor to the village court, 
panchayat, but since the members of this institution 
were recruited from the cultivators of, the village, it 
was inclined to give judgements which showed more than 
a legitimate concern for the interest of the borrowert 
and the money-lender had no chance of recovering his 
debt unless he could persuade some powerful-Zamind; r to 
intervene on his behalf. More frequently he had re- 
course to throwing himself on the'threshold of the 
debtor, and-refusing to budge till the debt was settled. 
The Judicial innovation introduced by the Company 
Government had a direct and adverse effect on the re- 
lationship of the cultivator and the money-lender. The 
16. 
courts not only diminished his judicial independence, 
by diminishing that of the panchýyat, but their 
judgement, based upon principles of equity, favoured 
the money-lender more than him. The Company's 
officers, who were practically involved in village 
administration, observed that throughout the country 
in one village after another the cultivators had been 
gradually dispossessed of their holdings by the Hindu 
money-lenders who thrived under the new dispensation. 
The officers reported to their higher authorities that 
if that course of affairs continued, a great part of 
the property of the cultivators would be transferred to 
a small monied class which would become disproportionately 
wealthy by the impoverishment of the rest of the 
population. Thornburn warned the Government: 
'The point to which I would draw attention 
at present is that nearlyýsix million of 
Muhammadan peasants and their dependents 
are under the operation of laws and a 
revenue system created by us within the 
last 36 years, being harassed and expro- 
priated in the interest of some 40,000 
Bunniah (sic) who contribute little to the 
17. 
expense of Government, and would be a 
source of weakness to it in critical 
times. I 
Despite their aware. ness of the magnitude of the evil, 
the British administrators who ruled the country were 
far too committed to laissez-faire principles to 
intervene between debtor and creditor. 
The process of land-transfer to the money-lender 
continued. Every year large numbers of estates were 
put to sale under the decree of the courts in payment 
of debts, which gave rise to widespread agrarian dis- 
content throughout the country. The cultivators took 
advantage of the distrubances of 1857 throughout the 
country, and in 1875 in the Deccan, to burn and destroy 
the houses and property of the money-lenders, and to 
seize and destroy those legal documents which pro- 
claimed their bondage to them. 
Although there was a considerable opposition to 
the view of Thorburn and other British officers who 
were thinking on the same lines, the Government, at lasts 
1. loc. cit. p. 43. 
18. 
decided to introduce legal reforms for the protection 
of those who could not protect themselves against the 
sophisticated money-lenders, and passed in 1879 The 
Deccan Agriculturalists'lRelief Act, and in 1900, 
The Punjab Land Alienation Act as a solution to the 
problem. 
19. 
CHAPTER I 
Interest and the Qur'in Literature 
The concept of additional payment made by the borrower 
to the creditor generally understood as interest in 
Economics, is represented in Arabic by the term rib5 
which literally means lexcess' 'increase' or 
L addi 
ti on tý,: 
jj VIS, L'. ýjj 
It is discussed 
in the following passages'of the Qur'in 
ýU Lr L_Lj I ji J_J 0- 
-L!. Jz &-U 
I )-t 
rA euj 
1_9 A-U I 
(And what you give in usury, that, it may 
increase upon the people's wealth, in- 
creases not with God; but what you give 
in alms, desiring God's Face, those 
they receive recompense manifold). 
2 
T 1. Al-Tabari, Tafsirro Cairo, 19549 Vol. VI, p. 7. 
2. The Qur'an, 30: 39 (English translation from 
The Koran Interpreted, A. J. Arberrys 
Karachi, 1964. ) 
2o. 
L... ý t Ltý, j ii 
_ýýL- 
A-u I 
(0 believers, devour not usury, doubled 
and redoubled, and fear you God; ý haply 
3 
so you will prosper), 
"S I C).., Jsl-, 
I LZI I J-j U rt ew j. 'JI 0, C) LL 
L!. pJ I (ýýj t-ý- A-U I at Ij L--, Pj I 
4-U 1 L4J 
It 
A-U '. 'ýýU 
L -LJI j , 
L-. ot 
J--! Jjt-o jLo 
L 
C is as L' V '-U I U. I. J I L"j I &-U I 
J-4 
Ut'j L'i LgLi 1, 1 
j-isj J-:, T O-eu II 
3j 'L-U IIII J-;, T , 0-1111 L;, J, 
I ý. j 3U10U 
AN 
r, I LVJ I 
Lrjý. j r5-U 0 jj A-U 1 0- 
0 Vi cjj ýIV 
(Those who devour usury shall not rise again 
lbid, 3: 125. 
21. 
except as he rises, whom Satan of the 
touch prostrates; that is because they 
say, 'Trafficking is like usury' God has 
permitted trafficking, and forbidden 
usury. Whosoever receives an admonition 
from his Lord and gives over, he shall 
have his past gains, and his affair is 
committed to God; but whosoever reverts - 
those are the inhabitants of the Fire, 
therein dwelling forever. God blots out 
usury, but freewill offerings He augments 
with interest. God loves not any guilty 
ingrate. Those who believe and do deeds of 
righteousness, and perform the prayer and pay 
the alms - their wage awaits them with their 
Lord, and no fear shall be on them neither 
shall they sorrow. 0 believers, fear you 
God; and give up the usury that-is out- 
standing, if you are believers. But if you 
do not, then take notice that God shall war 
with, yous and His Messenger; yet if you 
repent, you shall have your principalq un- 
wronging and unwronged). 
4 
4. Ibid, 2: 276-479. 
22. 
In, 30: 39,. the Qur"in contrasts the practice of 
ribi with the obligation of zakit. It affords some 
reason for assuming that people made loans and 
expected an additional amount at the, time of payment. 
This additional payment over and above the original 
loan-As called ribi. Later evidence corroborates 
this opinion. - 
Milik b. Anas-cites the following statement 
alleged to be-from Zayd b. Aslam, the Successor 
LIJ I 
5... j I Jt-_j. _U Zý. " Lt.. j I Ltý 
I t) LS 
tiUJ; zj 1 13 U a. 0 U 
J; ýj I LO 
(In the J5hiliyyal, LiLb-a operated in this 
manner: a person would owe another a debt 
for a specified period and at the time of 
its maturity the, creditor would ask the 
debtor, 'Will you pay off the debt or pay 
it with an additional amountV If the 
latter paid, the creditor took the payment, 
otherwise the debtor increased the debt of 
his creditor and the creditor extended the 
23. 
term for payment). 
It appears from this statement that a loan was 
made for a certain period. At the time of its 
maturity-the creditor would, 'in the view of Milik, 
ask the debtor, 'Will you pay off the debt or will 
you pay it in future with an additional amount in 
consideration of an easing time? ' If the debtor was 
unable to discharge the debt, he would communicate 
his. willingness to pay a certain amount with the 
original debt on the stipulation of a further term for 
payment. 
It seems reasonable to suppose that this 
additional payment'made, by the borrower to the creditor 
over and above the"original debt may be what is referred 
to as ribi in the Qur'; n. 
Zujj5j, a prominent grammarian of the third century 
of the Islamic eraq defines ribi in the following way: 
5. Malik b. Anas (d. 179 A. H. ),, Al-Mawatta, 
00 
Kitib al-buy; c, Bib al-ribi, Cairo, 1951. 
24 
-P ' 
- I 
L-ý' -ý-% 
(Every loan from which something more 
than the original amount is received or 
from which some benefit accrues is riba). 
6 
In other words ribi signifies that additional 
amount which is paid by the debtor to his creditor 
over and above his creditor's principal. 
Ab; Bakr Jass5s elaborates ribi as: 
060 
J; ýj I Jjj.,. Lý I Cjx.,, -U I 
(It is a loan payable-at a-specified 
date, plus an additional amount to be 
7 paid by the debtor)., 
It is again confirmed that ribi denotes interest 
payable at a certain time by the debtor to the creditor. 
t 6. ZuJj5j (d. 311 A. H. ) Taj al-cAr5s 
7. Jassis (d. 370 A. H. ) Ah-k5m Al-Qur'ing IstunbUl,, 
0000 
1335 A. H. 9 Vol. Is p. 469. 
25. 
Ibn Al-Athir gives a general as well as a technical 
definition of the term ribi as follows: 
j L-. j I 
(Al-rib5 means increase on the original, and 
in the Sharc, increase on original money). 8 
This again suggests that ribi corresponds in pre- 
Islamic terms to 'interest' and 'usury'. 
Al-Rizi gives a somewhat different description of 
the operation of rib5 
Jt. 4 J. 1; - 
I. 
-!. Cjt "IA L--j I Cj ". j 
I 
-., j 
LS 
CJ-j ai 1ý1 (I .jL.. j I CX 
tj Cj IS-j 
C) J. 31 . Ii II )I I 4L-. J-o C) U LJ6 
C, JA L! J II LS 
LqIJ 
I LýýJl it-; j 
(People gave money on condition that they 
should receive a certain amount every 
monthq while the original amount remained 
the same. At the expiry of the term of 
the debtq they demanded the principal of 
8. Ibn Al-AtOr. (d. 606 A. H. )q Nihayat fi GharTb al- 
Had'ith wal-Athir, Cairo 1322 A. H., Vol. 2. p. 66. 
26. 
the debtor. If the debtor was unable to 
pay, they increased the amount of the 
debt and extended the term of repayment. 
This is what was practised as ribi in 
the Jihiliyya). 9 
According to this, a loan was advanced for a 
certain period on payment of a certain amount of in- 
terest every monthq without reduction of the principal. 
At the expiry of the date of the payment, the creditor 
increased the principal and extended the term of re- 
payment. 
AI-R5zil's description of ribi is different from 
that of Milik. Owing to the g ýe`at distance of time and 
lack of contemporary historical evidence, it is hard to 
know which one is the exact kind'of ribi of the 
Jihiliyya. Therefore we may suppose, at least, that the 
term ribi discussed in Qur'; n 30: 39 and in the various 
statements means interest or usury as translated in 
English by Schacht, 10 
9. Al-R; z!, TafsTr, Vol. IV, p. 130. 
10. Schacht J., Encyclopaedia of Islam, [rLib-aj 
27. 
The internal evidence of the opening verses of 
S5ra 30 furnishes some basis for assuming that verse 39 
regarding interest might have been revealed in the early 
years of the Prophet's Mission. 
11 The opening verse: 
iII»I 
L>- * t. " Lo 
(The Greeks have bee'ný'vanquished in the 
nearer part of the land; andq after 
their vanquishing, they shall be the 
victors in a few years) 
refers'to the conflict of the Persians and Byzantines 
in Syria and Palestine. The armies of the Eastern Roman 
Empire had been, defeated by the Persians in the terri- 
tories near Arabia. In the year A. D. 614 Jerusalem and 
Damascus fell, and in the following year Egypt. A 
Persian army invaded Anatolia and was threatening 
Constantinople itself in the year A. D. 615 or 616. (The 
12 
sixth or. seventh year before the Hijra). 
11. Al-Tabarli, op. cit.; Noldek-Schwabley, 
4- 
Geschichte des Qora'nsl. 1909. 
12. Gibbon, E., History of the Decline and Fall of the 
Roman Empire, London 1819, Ch. XLVI. 
28. 
It is not astonishing that interest is condemned 
in so early a revelation; the absence of such early 
condemnation would have been astonishing because the 
verses of the Qur'in are full of: denunciations of 
economic injustices such as cheating in weights and 
measures etc. 
13 It is, then unlikely that the 
Qur'; n would have failed to condemn interest, which 
had been commonly declared as economic injustice by 
earlier religions. 
14 Here, howeverg it contrasts 
interest with zakit. It does not directly prohibit it, 
but passes only a stricture on interest. When the 
Prophet migrated to Medina, this. mild admonition was 
followed by an express prohibition of usury or. compound 
interest in 3: 125. 
This prohibition seems to have been revealed in 
Medina, as the Muslims' defeat at Uhud is referred to in 
0 
verses 134-135 of the same S; ra: 
4Ii- 
C7' Jj_.; r1 
13. The Qur in, 11: 129,188; IV: 29; V: 33,38,90 
. 
91. 
14. Ency clo paedia of Religion and Ethics, Cusury] 
29. 
(If a wound touches you, a like wound 
already has touched the heathen). 
Here, however, people are merely forbidden ex- 
cessive rate of interest on loans. , c_ 
Al-TabarT cites a statement from Zayd b. Aslam, 
the successor which supports this. The 
statement runs as follows: 
JI 
)-J I LS LZ I 
L*Li Ai0a LS C) u 
I LS 01 !U3t.;.! J I ý, j I L'i 
I 
cjýý 
a-! -; 
Lli I ; -;. i I Lo 0-ý-j I 
Wr: r 
u LLJ I wl cr; ri u u 
rj 
Lt t Lt ri ci u 
ai - jt . ýj I 4j jL 
uu., O L, I I )-j 
30. 
(Rib5 in the JAhiliyya consisted in doubling 
(in the case of a monetary loan) and age (in 
the case of a loan of cattle). Part of a 
debt owed to a man might be outstanding. He 
would approach the debtor, at the expiry of 
date of payment, and ask him: 'Will you pay 
it off or increase the amountV If-the debtor 
had something to repay him, he paid, otherwise 
he would advance the age of the animal to be 
repaid by a year. If a one-year-old she-camel 
was due, he would be required, in the second 
year to give a two-year-old she-camel. Then 
(if a further extension was granted) he would 
return a she-camel which has passed her third 
year but was not four years old, then a camel 
which has passed its fourth but was within its 
fifth year, then that which had passed its fifth 
year but was not six years old - so on. The 
same prevailed in money transations, that is, 
if the debtor was unable to'pay, the creditor 
would double the amount the next year, if he 
would not pay then, he would double it again. 
For instance, if 100 dirhams were due, in the 
following year, he increased it to 200 dirhams, 
and if he had not got it, in the third year to 
37 9 
400 dirhams, doubling it until the debtor 
paid the debt. This is what is stated in 
15 the verse: U L.. ý t L.. tý II JJSL- j 
L" L. " 
It is stated that if the debtor was unable to 
pay off the debt in due time, the loan was doubled, 
and another time for repayment was granted. If he 
could not pay again, the amount was doubled again. 
The process of doubling and redoubling went on until 
the borrower paid off whole the accumulated amount. 
Milik's quotation of Zayd b. Aslam differs 
from TabarT's in the respect that it did not specify 
any rate of interest while, according to TabarTI, the 
0 
debt was doubled every year until it was paid off. 
Milik also did not give any information, about a loan 
of cattle, which is discussed in detail in Tabar'I's 
quotation. 
The various descriptions of ribi in the Jihiliyya 
given by the exegetic scholars do not represent any 
historical situation. They rather reflect various 
attempts at suggesting the custom preparatory to what 
was thought to be the effect of the prohibition re- 
ferred to in the Qur'in. It is clear, however, that 
15. Al-TabarT. oe. cit., Vol. V, pp. 204-205. 
.1 
32. 
the Qurlin prohibits the charging of excessive in- 
crease on loans, even though we are not in-a position 
to say exactly what the terms of these loans were or 
exactly what the rates of interest were. The following 
statement of Al-RizT may be no more than'-an example, 
of this: 
L., V I 
Lr6 ii CJ 
LS 15 1 ;:, IA Jj I LS 
ci IH JL--j I u. -L. 13 L; Lv 
JUJI ju J LJI jili I J.,!. l 
Uj I J; ýj I 131 
Lj I J--L T j Lt. oi 1. Jj 3' 
L; L... ý t Ltj Li L"j, 
(In the JEhiliyya, if a person was owed 
100 dirhams by another person to be paid 
by a certain date, and the debtor could 
not find the money'at that time, the 
creditor would say: 'Increase the amount 
you owe me, and I will extend the term of 
payment. ' Accordingly many a time he made 
it 200 and when the second time of repay- 
ment expired, he doubled the amount again. 
So he went on (doubling the amount) for a 
number of periods with the result that he 
33. 
received the loan of 100 dirhams many- 
times over. This is what Lis. L., ý, Lg,,.. ýt 
means). 
16 
, According to this, an unpaid loan was doubled and 
then quadrupled if it remained unpaid at the second , 
date of payment. It could be redoubled'if'the debtor 
could not repay it. This rate of interest is not 
17 
mentioned'in the earlier statement of Al-Rizi. 
However Al-BayjM1 did not accept the earlier 
commentator's interpretations of La-. U L..;, t 
In the following statement he suggests a somewhat 
different meaning of these words: 
-W , d-, J LVJ I LV--J-. 
0 J-J IjL.. ,4i- i6 Io OtJ Lý - j, *-. 
W 
('Do not increase repeatedly (the 
principal)' perhaps refers particularly 
to what happens when a man advances a 
loan on interest for a certain term and 
then increases it again until by a small 
16. Al-R5z'l', op. cit. 
17. Seýe above p. 25. 
34. 
Aebt he swallows up all the property of 
18 the debtor). 
According to Al-Bayq; wl it might be the custom of the 
J; hiliyya that the creditor repeatedly increased the 
debt so exorbitantly that he, devoured all the property 
of the debtor. This is possible, because there is 
nothing in verse 30: 125 which would invalidate this 
interpretation. The prohibition is against an 
excessive rate of interest being added to the principal. 
In S; ra 2: 276-279, however, it was completely prohibited. 
These verses, which constitute an unprecedented 
threat against usurers, must have been revealed in 
Medina and are the last of the verses regarding interest. 
Here the Qur'; n strongly forbids interest trans- 
actions but allows trade since it rejects the view that 
interest is the same as profit. The usurers are per- 
mitted to receive back their original capital without 
accumulated interest. 
Al-TabarT, commenting on this verse, holds that 
0 
interest consisted in credit sale in which a purchaser 
agreed to make pecuniary payment at a fixed date in 
18. Al-Bayd; wT,, TafsTr, Cairo N. D., p. 89. 
0 
35. 
future. If he could not pay it off at, that date, he 
agreed to add some interest to the original amount and 
the creditor gave him another date for payment. 
Al-TabarT produced the following statement from Qatida, 
the Successor (e-, L, -Jl ) in support of his opinion: 
0 
Lvj I t'-j I 
L-6 L-ýj I j& t 
Us-. 
(In the Jihiliyya, ribiwas charged-in 
this manner: a man would sell something 
against ppyment at-, a fixed-date. If the 
purchaser could not pay the purchase- 
money on that date, the amount of, the 
debt was increased and he was given a-later 
19 date to pay). 
This is the third type of ribi alleged to be 
practised in the Jihiliyya: that a person who could not 
pay the sale-money at a specified date was given another 
date for payment but he had to pay a certain-amount of 
interest with the purchase-money. - One may argue that 
the process of charging interest on credit-sale as well 
19. Al-Tabar, 179 op. cit. 40 
36. 
as on loan is pretty much the same in principle. In 
both cases the creditors would advance-money or value 
for a definite period. If the debtor was unable to 
make pecuniary payment within the prescribed period 
the creditors would grant him another term to pay on 
the stipulation of a certain amount of interest. Thus 
we may believe that both the cases (i) interest on 
loans L'ý. "; and (ii) interest on credit 
sales .I . are considered to be closely 
related to each otherg perhaps on the ground that both 
dealings involving credit and those involving loans 
possessed the same essential'characteristics and, also, 
employed the same process of charging interest. 
c The term bay, sale, in its ordinary concept 
signifies a transfer of, property in consideration of a 
price in-money, but, the term has a more comprehensive 
meaning in Islamic law and is applied to every exchange 
of property for property with mutual consent. It. there- 
fore, includes barter as well as sale, and also loan when 
the articles lent are intended to be consumed and re- 
placed by a similar quantity of the same kind or by the 
price in money. 
20 Even to-day, the evolution of mone- 
20 Schacht, 7.9 Introduction of Islamic Law, Oxford, 1964, 
132; 
Hughes, T. P., Dictionary of Islam, p. 31. 
37. 
tary and credit institutions and of modern monetary 
theory has recognised credit-transactions as uniquely 
pecuniary. - Thus R. G. Hawtrey points out that credit,, 
in fact, is best understood as simply another name 
for debt. 21 We may conclude that the discussion 
seems to be quibbling over the words, and what was 
actually practised was that if a person owed another 
a debt, or purchase-money9 payable at a definite time, 
he would communicate his willingness to pay interest 
for use of the loan of money or goods-. If it was not 
settled at the fixed time, a'dditional interest was 
added to the debt with an extension of the term of 
payment. The process could be repeated until the 
debtor paid what was due with, the accumulated interest. 
This, is what seems to have been understood by. 
Zamakhshari: 
&L 
J" LI. LJ L! J-61 J 
(A man among them (having a loan) at the 
expiry of the term of payment of the debt, 
21. Hawtrey, R. G., Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, 
[creditl 
Halm, G. N., Monetary theoryg Philadelphia, 1940, Vol. 1, p. 320 
38. 
would extend the term of the payment to 
(another) term of payment. The whole 
property of the debtor would be 
swallowed up by a small matt I er). 
22 
The idea of fixed term I jr jII 
repeatedly mentioned from the earlier sources onwards, 
which plays a basic role in all the discussions on 
interest in the TafsTr literature is not derived from 
any verse of the Qur'in in which interest is mentioned. 
The expression ' ; ý, Lt on 
' marks a link which 
connects loans with sales and thus permitted scholars 
in their discussions on sale-tý-e introduction of the 
distinction between immediate and deferred transactions, 
itself a distinction acknowledged by the Qur'in (2: 282). 
This distinction is prominent, in all the-TafsTr and 
hadTth discussions to such a degree-that certain groups 
could even argue that delay-in settlement was the 
exclusive factor in ribi, Such an idea was embodied in 
the slogan: I L, 23 
The expression 
. ýrjf 
' is doubtless derived 
from the following verses of the Qur'inq which recognises 
22. Zamakhshari, Tafsir, Cairo 1967, Vol. 1. p. 302. 
23. Detailed discussions follow in the next Chapter. 
39. 
the necessity of contracting debts and discusses in 
detail the ordinance governing the recording of 
exchanges, treated under three categories, viz: 
immediate sale, deferred settlement sale, and loan 
proper. Hence the connection between loans and 
deferred payment, and between the two sorts of sale: 
LIJ I Cý,. Lt I LZ 131 1 
J. Lj L, LS 
I J-L. 
-!. 
Jj 4-u 1 L. S LS 
Lt... - A-L. -j A: "., L-lj 
1 
t5itij 
5--11 
V 2.1 ctj-r, C5. Li I C) Ls 
A-. Juj L.. 
Zjj LL-t-U A 
3-.., 
C) 
t 
U, tI 
rj 
L; 
FSJ 
L! 
-j 
L... 
& 
I 
-La- 
I 
_., 
S. L: 
-i 
U. 
% 
I 
J.,. 
II, I 
Lt. ZJ 
I 
c, -- 
tIVjI 
jýj L, I Lt..: 
J I 
I-t V 
rij 
'Autj ýIIJ.. t-4 - jt 
I 
-J-tý 
It 
.3tj;. j rot j &-u 
I 
40. 
LS ý Ut IjL!, - 13 11J. It. 4 I 
, -u II J-C I an 
uI 
(0 believers,, when youcontract a debt 
one upon another for a stated terms, 
write it down, and let a writer write-it 
down between you justly, and let not any 
writer refuse to write it down, as God has 
taught him; so let him write, and let the 
debtor dictate, and_let him fear, God his 
Lord and not diminish aught of it. And if 
the debtor be a fool, or weak, or unable to 
dictate himself, then let his guardian 
dictate Justly. And call in to witness two 
witnesses, men; or if the two be not men, 
then one man. and two women, such witnesses as 
you approve of, that if one of the two women 
errs the other will remind her; and let the 
41. 
witnesses not refuse, whenever they are 
summoned. And be not loth to write it down, 
whether it be small or great, with its term; 
that is more equitable in God's sight, more 
upright for testimony, and likelier that you 
will not be in doubt. Unless it be merchandise 
present that you give and take between you; 
then it shall be no fault in you if you do 
not write it down. And take witnesses when 
you are trafficking one with another. And 
let not either write or witness be pressed, 
or if you do, that is ungodliness in you. 
And fear God; God teaches you, and God has 
knowl edge of everything). 
24 
Three types of transactions are here envisaged; 
debt, immediate exchange and contracted exchange. The 
words Lo. ;. j L,!. -- were a reference to an 
immediate, on-the-ýpot transaction of the kind later 
to be referred to in a had-ith as L.. ' I L.. 
and their position in the verse suggests that the 
Qur'in here envisages two types of sale transaction: 
24. The Ourlin, 2: 282. 
42. 
the immediate exchange, and the agreement to sell with 
deferred payment. This latter would appear to be 
referred to in the words immediately following: 
LS VJ 
which certainly separate, such a deferred payment sale 
from the immediate sale. The transaction of the latter 
need not be recorded; the preparation of a document of 
agreement for the former is recommended. It will be seen 
presently that this differs radically from the terms of 
hadifth discussion with its emphatic prohibition of 
payment-deferred transactions, frequently summed up in 
the tag: ;1 -- -I L"; 
II L_tj I 
(it is not rib5, unless it is in a credit transaction). 
Commenting upon th- 
meanings of the words 
as xj 0 LS 
Lvj 
I -X-ý 
a debt one upon another 
is verse, Al-TabarT defines the 
L-!., - (present sale) 
(from hand-to-hand) and 
131 (when you contract 
for a stated term) as: 
rL'b -It r 
r3u. ' r; 
l;,. t 
3t 
(If you agree on a debt, or buy or exchange 
or take anything on credit with a specified 
43. 
date of payment). 
24 
In an attempt to support his opinion,, Al-Tabarl 
produced the following statement: 
LS j L; J t; 4 
LS Lj Lt.:, t FJ P U. cj I 
L-U I 
(Dahh5k says: if it is an on-the-spot 
000 
exchange, one is given the option of 
calling or not calling witnesses, but in 
the case of a transaction in which payment is 
deferred for a certain time, God has ordained 
that it shall be written down in the presence 
of Witnesses) . 
25 
This suggests that the Qur'Jn envisages two types of 
sale: hand-to-hand sale, and a contract of sale in 
which delivery is postponed for a certain period. 
The former need not be written down or witnessed; in 
the case of the latter, both are ordained because it 
may include interest which accrues as the result of-the 
transaction and which was not precisely calculable at 
24. The Qur'in, 2: 282. 
25. Al-Tabari, op. cit. 
44. 
the time the transaction was concluded. It also 
appears that the Qur*; n separates profit I CO-i I 
in hand-to-hand trade, from interest or gain L.. ' 
on loan, and seeks to avoid misunderstanding arising 
as the result of unwritten agreements of credit trans- 
action. 
After a careful study of the above-mentioned 
verses of the Qur'; n. (30: 39,3: 125,2: 276-279,2: 282) 
regarding interest and debt we may note at least that 
the custom of investing capital on interest at the time 
of the Prophet, against which the relevant passages of 
the Qurl; n were directed, was a system of loan in which 
the borrower would express his willingness to, pay a 
given amount of interest over and above the amount of 
the loan. The Qur'; n emphatically prohibits this, but 
it does not specify any punishment or penalty except 
punishment in Hell. It is as if it did not intend to 
lay down legal rules regulating the forms and effects 
of the contract, but to establish moral norms under 
which the practice was prohibited. 
The theory of on-the-spot sale and credit was 
further developed and re'stricted to certain types of 
transaction, as will be seen in the following Chapter. 
45. 
CHAPTER II 
Interest and. Hadifth Li, terature 
Hadirths give different answers to the question of 
what forms of business come under the Qur'; n pro- 
hibition of ribi. ' The general ignorance of the 
correct interpretation is emphasised in the best 
known hadith of the subject, attributed to the 
Caliph cUmar and recorded in the Musnad of Pmad b. 
ýanbal, the Sunan of Ibn I MNjah, Dali'il Al-Nubuwwa 
of Al-BayhaqT and other similar compilations of the 
traditionists of the later period, which runs as 
follows: 
LT 
LA 
fjj d-. --6 Ljj 
I 
L; 
6 A-u I 
L., I L-Li 
. Jj 
(It is related by cUmar that the last 
verse - to be sent down was that on ribi,, 
but the Apostle of God expired without 
explaining it to us. Therefore give 
up rib; and anything doubtful (resembling 
46. 
it) 
The report implies that the verse on ribi was the 
last revelation, and the Prophet did not explain 
the term of rib5. This seems to contradict the 
claim of the Qur'in 5: 5 rLLj I rJt 
(To-day I have perfected your 
religion for you, and I have completed My blessing 
upon you). The Caliph cUmar himself is reported 
to have said that the above verse was revealed on, 
the day of c Arafit during-the last pilgrimage of the 
Prophet. 2 Now if the verse on rib; was the last 
revelation, as stated in CUmar's report, the above 
verse must have preceded it, and therefore it could 
not be claimed at that time that 'the faith was 
perfected'. It is for this reason that Al-SuddT and 
some commentators have stated that after the revelation 
of the verse 5: 5. no verse was sent down relating to 
permission Jýý) and prohibition ). 
3 
cAli al-Muttaq-is Kanz al-cUmm2-1t Cairo, 1312 A. H. 9 
Vol. II, p. 321. 
2. Muslim, Sahihs Kit; b al-Tafs'17r; SuY; ti, Al-Ittiq; n TT 
CUI; m_al-Qur*; ng Cairo, 1390 A. H., 
Vol. I, p. 23. 
3. Suyuýif, op. cit. P. 35. 
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In spite of the report that the Prophet did not 
explain ribi, however, Us5ma reports the following 
statement attributed to the prophet:; i_ !Iu V; 
II 
LS " Lri L'. 0 jt 
(There is no ribi except in 
r*a-or there is no ribi in hand-to-hand transactions). 4 nasi 
The report implies rib5 as the additional payment 
which accrues in a credit transactions i. e. a person 
buys a commodity on credit and agrees to pay something 
over and above the original-amount. This additional 
payment payable in the future is called rib5; while gain 
in on-the-spot transactions is not considered rib;. 
T An another hadith, this notion is restricted to 
0- 
five commodities: gold, silver, wheat, dates and barley, 
as follows: 
w 
, L-A. Ij I ýLj -Lý A-u 
I A-u Ij 
_jjJ 
1jU 
_q o 
Loä 91 Lý 
.j 
(-.! . -U 1jo Lä joG 
11 L..! ýj 
ý. 4 4 ý41 j- Läj 
,- LA. 3 - L, % 11 Lj Le j-... ý- 1j, Lo.. j oU91 1-, ) 
(The Apostle of God said: (excess payment 
in the exchange of) gold for gold, silver 
4. Bukhiril, Sahlih, Kitib al-Tafslr 
00& 
48. 
for silver, wheat for wheat, dates for 
dates, barley for barley, is rib5 
unless payment is made on the spot). 
5 
This shows that additional payment made in on-the-spot 
exchange of gold, silver and staple foodstuffs was 
allowed but if the commodities for exchange belonged 
to the same kind and the transaction involved 
deferred payment, it came under the definition of rib;. 
This statement agrees with the Prophet's previously 
expressed disapproval of a time-lag in the transaction, 
but defines this more precisely in limiting the pro- 
hibition to the exchange of five commodities. 
These rules were further developed in a group-of 
had'i'ths to the extent'that the exchange of gold, silver 
and the staple foodstuffs for an unequal quantity of 
0 
the same kind was illegal even if it was bartered on the 
spot: 
5. Milik, op. cit., Kitib al-buy; c, Bib mi jal; fif 
al-sarf; .0 
Bukhir-i, op. it., Kitib al-buy; c'. Bib al-rib;; 
Muslim, op. cit., Kit; b al-buy; c. Bib al-rib; 
49. 
LAO . A-U 
I J-ý... j ju 
juL;. ) J.;. j I C: ýý 
-u I 
Cl-j 
Lt 
C7ý1 J J--, ýj 
Lý 
-)---7-j 
1JL! 
(AbU Sacid al-Khudar'l relates that the 
Apostle of God said: gold for gold, silver 
for silver, wheat for wheat, barley for 
barley, dates for dates, salt for salt, 
(may be bartered in such a manner, that 
they are) equal fo_r equal, hand to hand. 
If anyone gives more or asks for more, he 
has dealt in ribi. The receiver and the 
giver are equally guilty). 
6 
In this statement the view previously restricted 
to apply to the barter of five commodities, is extended 
6. Bukhari, op. cit; 
Muslim, op. cit; 
Nis; 'T. Sunan, Kit; b al-buy; c, B; b al-riba 
Ibn M; jah, Sunan, Abw; b al-tij; ra. 
50. 
to-the barter of six commodities: goldo silver, wheat, 
dates, barley, salt. On-the-spot exchange of unequal 
quantities-of the same commodities, lawful in the 
previous statements, is forbidden-here. 
The following statement restricts the barter of 
green dates for ripe ones. 
w 
A-u IjU Lr Uj 
j LL; , -1., -J 
L. 
-.! 
I 
t-5-1-4 L-U I 
3 Cý,. A I JJ U 131 "6. J. J 1 Ljo. -L. Ie 
t 
(Sacd b. Abir Waqis says: I heard the 
Apostle of God asked concerning the 
barter of dry dates for fresh. He said, 
'Do fresh dates diminish when they become 
dry? '- The questioners said, 'Yes. ', The 
Apostle of God prohibited it. 
7- 
This implies that a man intending to purchase 
7. Sh; fic-i, Risila, p. 277. 
Milik. ' op. cit. 
Nis; ll. op. cit. 
Ab6 Da'; d, Sunan, Kitib al-buy6c B; b al-rib; 
51 . 
dried dates and pay unripe ones in exchange, was not 
allowed to do so, on the ground that he did not know 
whether the quantity of the green dates would be equal, 
after they were driedg to the quantity of the dried 
dates which he was taking at that time. Ab; Han'Ifa, 
however, contrary to the opinions of Shaybani, 
Ab; Y; suf, Milikq Shificir-and Ahmad b. H4nbal, refused 
to take the report as authentic because to him, the 
transmitter of the report. was not trustworthy. 
8 
The same notion is mentioned in the following 
report: 
;. 
PtJA (5j. 1; 
j I J-tpýo 
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, L, 
J.. O A-U 
I 
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8. This is discussed in the next Chapter. 
52. 
(Ab; SacId al-Khudarl and Ab; Hurayra relate 
that the Apostle of God appointed a man 
governor of Khaybar. He brought selected 
dates to the Apostle of God who said: *Are 
all dates of Khaybar the same? ' The man 
replied, 'No! by God, 0 Apostle of God we 
purchase one sic of these dates for two sics 
(of the ordinary kind) and two for three. ' 
Said the Apostle of God, 'Don't do so again, 
sell the common dates for dirhams and then 
purchase with thoseýselected ones. ) 
9 
This A$ again implieý that the barter of unequal 
quantities of dateSjs-ebv-en-`if the transaction is made 
on the'spot. 1 1. "T. . 
The exchange of gold and silver for the same 
commodity is mentioned in the following report 
J-4 
t 
L-u i jjj/ j L; 
je. ýt * ri 
U- Z-.. -; T 
3s 
-9 
t L. I.. tX. Lt 
J_. (>- 
4iJ 
9. Bukhirl", op'. cit. 
Muslim, op. cit. 
NisPT, op. cit. 
I: H 
53. 
_LJ I JJ I LJ JW 
4JJ. 
(Yahyi b. Sacild narrates that he said: 
0 
the Apostle of God ordered the two sacds 
(Sacd b. AbI Waqis and Sacd b. cAbbida) 
to sell articles of gold or silver from 
the booty of Khaybar. They sold every 
three (articles) for four, or every four 
for three,, of the same kind. The Apostle 
of God said to them, 'You have dealt in 
ribi; return (the exchange)). 
10 
On-the-spot transactions of unequal quantities of 
gold and silver for the same commodity are prohibited, 
and any excess paid by one of the contracting parties 
in favour of the other it declared as rib5 in this 
statement. 
One observes a clear tendency of gradual development 
in the definition of ribi in the hadith literature. The 
view mentioned in the statement 
(there is no rib; except in nas-I'a) was developed and 
10. Milik, op. cit. 
54. 
extended to the five commodities. " 
Then another group of hadi'ths defines ribi as an 
additional payment made in an on-the-spot transaction. 
Time-lag in such a transaction is completely prohibited 
in the following way: 
___ AIII' 
(If he asks You to wait until he enters 
his house, do not wait for him). 
12 
However, the Quroin acknowledges credit trans- 
actions and-orders the agreement to be written down in 
the presence of witnesses, It also allows hand-to-hand 
transactions and refers to them as: ; J. 'x U. ;. j L-,!. -- - 
13 
Ibn cAbbis, Ibn Masc; d, Ibn Musayyib and cUrwa b. Zubayr 
are reported to have refused to accept the reports from 
Ab; SacTd al Khudari?, Ab; Huraira and Sa cdb. AbT1 Waqis 
as genuine and propagated the earlier view reported by 
Usima. 
14 
11. See above Pp. 47-49. 
12. Milik, op. cit. - 
13. See aboves Chapter I. pp. 
14. ShificiT. Ikhtilif cAITI wa c Abdullah Ibn 
Masc6d, p. 12. 
55. 
The two sets of, had-irths are inýconflict,, which 0 
was not overlooked by the early experts on this subject. 
They harmonised them. The most famous and popular 
attempt to resolve this contradiction is that of 
ShificT who says: 
&-U I L; 
L- 4-u 1 t-- 
t 
i-; 4j 0.1r. 
jt 6 
4 s, u LL Ij Lýu jt 
jt 
(it is possible that Uslama heard the Apostle 
of God asked about hand-to-hand exchange, with 
additional payment of two different kinds of 
commodities; for instance, (the exchange of) 
gold for si ver, of dates for wheat and other 
articles of different kinds. The Apostle of 
God said: Iribi occurs only in credit trans- 
actions'; (or it may be that) that a question 
56. 
had already been asked (when Usima arrived) 
so he (Usima) heard only the reply. He re- 
ported the reply, but did not remember the 
question, or he may have had doubts about it 
because there is nothing in his had-ith that 
prevents this being in Usimals hadith, so, 
in this way, there is aT, possibility of 
harmonising the two (contradictory sets of) 
hadTths). 16 
C, Thou'gh Shifi 1 attempted to harmonise the contra- 
diction, yet the fact remains that additional payment 
in hand-to-hand transactions, which is accepted as 
profit and acknowledged by the Qurlin 2: 282, is hardly 
to be considered as interest. This is why the report 
I L,; 
31 L.. %J is clearly protesting against the 
opposite opinion, that the additional payment is ribi 
even if it occurs in on-the-spot transactions. 
It eventually happened that additional payment 
was considered riba when it appeared in a transaction 
of gold, silver, wheat, barley, dates and salt when 
these items were bartered for their like. So the ex- 
change of a commodity was completely banned unless it 
was exactly equal in weight, and payment was made on 
16. Shaficir,, op. cit. 
57. 
the spot. This concept seems totally inappropriate 
to day-to-day commercial dealings., in that it was out 
of touch with practical needs and circumstances. It 
is hard to see a realistic commercial point or purpose 
in a transaction in which-a person takes a certain 
amount of something in exchange for the same quantity 
of the same thing from another person at the same 
meeting. Transactions other than these unrealistic 
ones, however, could be carried out only by evading 
the law; and this is perhaps the prime reason for the 
institution of the hiyal, (devices), that are discussed 
in Chapter IV. 
58. 
Purchase and Sale of Animals 
Anotherexample of the contradictory hadiths T 
0 
concerning interest is that which relates, to the- 
barter of animals for animal 
One view repeatedly expressed, but also challenged, 
that the sale of animals in exchange for animals, with 
additional payment, does not come under the definition 
of rib;. 
Milik b. Anas reports from CAl'i that he sold one 
of his camels and obtained in exchange twenty camels. 
He also represents c Abdullih b. cUmar, Ibn Shahib and 
cr Sa id b. Al-Musayyib as according sanction to such 
a transaction. 
18 The statements run as follows: 
-i L6 uml 
(Hassan b. Muhammad b. cAIT b. AbIT Tilib 
00 
C narrates that Ali-b., Abi-Tilib sold a 
r 
0 
camel of his called cUsayfir on credit 
for twenty camels), 
18. M; lik: op. cit, Kit; b Al-buy; c,, Bib mi Yaj; z min 
bayc al-bayawin. 
59. 
This shows that additional payment in the exchange 
of camels is not considered ribi even if it accrues 
in a credit transaction. 
L6.1 jIc, -. &-u I A-. A ýtt.; L, C, 
.0 4-1-j L- Lt-ý L-- 
.0L.. 
(Nific says that cAbdullih b. cUmar 
purchased one camel for four on credit 
and agreed to give the four camels to 
the seller at Al-Rabadha). 
This statement again shows that the profit gained 
from the exchange of animals was not considered ribi 
even if it was in. a deferred payment-transaction. 
Bukhgr'i', in his SahTh, devotes a whole chapter to 
establishing the permissibility of such transactions. 
The chapter is entitled: 
(Chapter on the sale of slaves and animals for animals). 
In this chapter a number of companions of the Prophet 
and their successor, all of whom were eminent jurists, 
e. g. cAbdullih b. cUmar, cAbdullih b. cAbbis, Rific b. 
KhadTj,, SacTd b. Al-Musayy'ib and Ibn STrTin, accord 
sanction to such transactions. The conclusion of all 
such reports is that: 
A e_ t'- Lr 1.. e 
60. 
(there is nothing wrong in the exchange of one camel 
for two on credit). 
19 
The Sunan of Ab; Da; d, the Musnad of'Ahmad b. ' 
Hanbal and the'Sunan al-Kubra of BayhaqTI also record 
0 
a hadith from the Prophet which runs as follows: 
0- 
Jj-. j t Ljo 
L-j I ci-- d-ul -1 .- 
4-tar. &-u I 
C) 
LSj 
U. J I J...! l uJ 
I 
cp-! J-. -J 
L! 
c Abdull5h b. c Amr b. Al-% reports that the 
Apostle of God told him to equip for an army. 
The camels were deficient, so he told him to 
take camels given as alms. Therefore, he 
effected a transaction at the rate of one 
camel for every two to be received in alms. ) 
20 
This shows that the companion of the Prophet, with 
the approval of the Prophet, received one camel instead 
19. Bukhari,, op. cit., Kitýb al-buy; c, Bib bayc 
Al- c abTid wa-91-hayaw'Nn bi-11 hayawin nisl'$a 
20. Ab; Dal; d, op. cit., Kitib al buy; c, Bib fT-01 
rukhsa; 
Ahmad b. Hanbal, Al-Musnad; 
Al-Bayhaqi,, op. cit. 
61 . 
of two to be received in future. This also indicates 
that an additional payment in the exchange of animals 
was not considered as interest by the Prophet himself. 
In contrast to the opinion held by the traditionists 
of the earlier periodq like Milik and others cited above, 
their successors displayed a gradual increase of 
strictness in interpreting the SharTca. The J'5mic 
al Tirmidhir contains the following hadTth: 6 
w 
(Jibir reports that the Apostle of God 
said: 'The exchange of one animal for 
two on credit is not permissible. 
However, if it is a hand-to-hand trans- 
action it does not matter. ') 
21. 
An additional payment on-the-spot transaction is 
permitted, but if it is in a deferred-payment trans- 
action, it is regarded as ribi and so prohibited. 
21. Al-Tirmidhi, Jimic, Kitib al buyýc, Bib mi jilla 
fi Karihiyya bayc al-hayawin nasi I 'a. 
62. 
The compilers of the Sunan works later on 
collected hadiths which totally prohibited the 
0- 
exchange of animals, on credit: 
A-u I ; L- : r-'J I 
",. j L! 
(Samura says that the Prophet prohibited 
the exchange of one animal for another 
on credit). 
22 
The same hadi7th also occurs in the Musnad of 
Ahmad b. Hanba;. The significant point is that it 
is found not in the main text of the Musnad but in 
the supplement added to it by one of his sons and 
so was not transmitted by him himself. 
23 
In short, hadTth collected in the later period 
reflect more strictness in interpreting the sharivca 
than those of the former period. If we go back to an 
earlier period we find that the exchange of animals on 
credit is permitted. ShificT and Ab; HanTifa hold this 
24 
v ew. 
-C 22. Ab; Dal; d,, Sunan, Kitib al-buyu Bib al-hayaw5n. 
23. Ahmad b. Hanbal, op. cit. 
24. Shifici, op. cit. p. 241 
Also see p -7 3 -"7 4. 
63. 
CHAPTER III 
Interest and HanafT jurisprudence 
0 
The hadith related by Ab; Sacid al-Khudari' was generally T 
accepted by the founders of the ancient schools of 
Islamic law as genuine: In this it is stated that an 
additional payment in an exchange of gold for gold, 
silver for silver, wheat for wheat, barley for barley, 
dates for dates and salt for salt, constituted rib;. 
These transactions were allowed only when the quantity 
of both the commodities being exchanged was exactly the 
same weight and the delivery was on the spot, The- 
exchange of unequal quantities was permitted when the 
commodities belonged to different kinds such as gold for 
silver, wheat for dates, etc., provided the transaction 
did not involve credit, 
1 Some of the earlier jurists, 
however, did not agree with the doctrine. 
2 
Da9; d CAIT b. Khalif, the Im5m of the Z5hirT School 
0 
confined the rules given in the had! -th: 'equality of 
weight and measurement' and 'the transaction on the spot' 
1. See above P. 49. 
2. See above p. 56. 
64 41, 
to the exchange of the six commodities specified in 
the statement. 
3- Milik ibn Anas, al-ShificIr and 
Ahmad b. Hanbal applied these ribi rules to the exchange 
of all foodstuffs as well as gold and silver. This 
notion is summed up as L. 6 L,; jf 
(there is no ribi unless it (the additional payment) 
is made in the exchange of gold, silver or of foodstuffs). 
4 
Ab5 HanTfa extended these rules, on the basis of personal 
opinion to the exchange of all fungible 
merchandise normally sold by weight or measurement: 
)L. j I 
-Li 
cl-J 
I 
j 
U-Jej 
a. -A c--. -L». j , 
. ". 1 a, J-L" 
L. týI 
3. AI-Shattl', Fi Masi'il al Im5m Da*; d al-Z5hir-l, 
Damascus, 1330 A. H., p. 135. 
4. Milik ibn Ans, op. cit.; Al-Shific-1. op. cit.; 
Ibn Al-Ukhuwwa al-Sh; ficT, Mac; lim Qubra; 
Al-rM'Aýcarrj DaIll al-T; Iib, Kitib al-buy-uc, Bab 
al-rib; 
65. 
i Uli 11 JA jr, zi_iii. 3 
(Interest is unlawful on all commodities 
sold by weight or measurement, when sold 
for the same commodity with additional 
payment. The ground for the prohibition, 
in our opinion, is 'measurement for the same 
commodity' or 'weight for the same 
commodity'. It is (also) said 'quantity 
for the same commodity', which is more com- 
prehensive. The origin of this is the well- 
known hadirth of the Prophet: 'Wheat for 
wheat,, like for like, hand to hand, and the 
additional payment is interest. ' He 
enumerated six articles to be regarded in this 
way: wheat, barley, dates, salt, gold and 
silver). 
5 
For example if a person lends I lb gold which is to 
be returned (in the form of gold) together with an 
additional quantity, either in the future or on the 
5. AlmShaybani, Kitab al-Asl, ed. Shafiq 
Shahata,, Cairo,, 1954, pp. 1-2. 
66. 
spot, this additional quantity over and above the 
original quantity constitutes interest. 
According to Abu Hanifa, in a transaction where 
an article, the quantity of which is not measurable 
or weighable, is exchanged for an article of a different 
kind (e. g. eggs for shoes) additional payment and 
credit are both allowed, and the additional payment 
is not interest, because the grounds of the pro- 
hibition of interest 'the sameness of kind' and 'the 
quality of being measurable or weighable' do not exist. 
Where both the grounds appear, as in an exchange of 
gold for gold or wheat for wheat in unequal quantities, 
additional payment as interest and deferred payment are 
both prohibited, but in a transaction where only one 
of the two causes exists, such as the exchange of gold 
for silver or wheat for barley, in unequal quantities, 
additional payment does not constitute interest; this, 
however, should be a hand-to-hand transaction: 
L-i-: i I : ý- -) C) t-ý-qj Ir 
xr. 
L3 IIZ: Lj I fi,, i 
131 ZLj II Lýl LL-. j I 
67. 
(When both the qualities, '(sameness of) 
kind' and '(equal) quantity', are absent, 
additional payment and credit are both 
lawful.. because of the absence 6f the 
ground for the prohibition. The basis of 
this is the permission (given in the 
hadTth)* where both (the grounds for pro- 
hibition) exist, additional payment and 
credit are both prohibited, because of the 
existence of the cause; when one of the two 
exists andýýthe other is absent, additional 
payment is permitted but deferred payment is 
unlawful). 
6 
According to this if Lr_L,. J1(kind) and J J-U I 
(quantity) differ, additional payment is lawful but 
credit prohibited. If v--L, . ýJl 
but not. . a-Ul differs,, 
additional payment is again lawful but credit pro- 
hibited. IfO. _L*. J1and_). LU1 are both the same, additional 
payment prohibited as well as credit. The rules are 
operative only in barter sales. Credit is unlawful. 
This suggests that the interest rules originally do 
not refer to sales but only to loans. 
6. Al-Mar2hjninT. Al Hidaya, Vol. III,, p. 46. 
see above p. 49. 
68-. 
Gypsum, iron or other metals cannot lawfully 
be exchanged for their like with additional payment. 
This additional quantity will constitute interest: 
UL L5 )LO 
U. -"j Ij (If a measurable or a weighable commodity, 
which is not edible, is exchanged for its 
like, with an additional payment such as 
gypsum and iron, this is unlawful according 
to us, because of the presence of '(equality 
of) quantity' and "(sameness of) kind'). 
7 
We have observed that in the HanafT School 
additional payment is interest and is unlawful when it 
accrues in an exchange of commodities of the same kind 
capab le of being weighed or measured. Additional pay- 
ment in an exchange of commodities which are not 
customarily estimated by weight or measurement, like 
animals for animals or eggs for eggs, does not con- 
stitute interest: 
w #0 U. LiL.. e 1. UL. -ilj p. -. 
e Z', j42! i». 1 
lbid 
69. 
Jiý r alli 
.: &-t .jL, ei t 
(It is lawful to sell one handful for 
two, and one apple for two apples, 
because of the absence of a criterion 
of measurement; additional payment is 
not established. It is lawful to sell 
one egg for two eggs, one date for two 
dates and one nut for two nuts because 
of the absence of a criterion of 
measurement; interest is not established). 
8 
It seems unlikely that this rule arose from an 
attempt to meet actual cases. It is one of the 
scholastic subtleties which are the marked characteristic 
of the HanafT School. 
0 
It is also observed that if a man sells a certain 
quantity of unripe dates for the same quantity of ripe 
ones, the transaction is perfectly legal, according to 
Ab5 HanTfa, because the equality in quantity of the 
0 
8. Ibid. p. 47. 
70. 
commodities is established at the time, of the sale. This 
is contrary to the hadith of the Prophet generally 
accepted as genuine. 
9 Abý Y; suf and Shaybani, however, 
maintained the illegality of such a transaction: 
N Lrl-"-j I 
IJ t 
j 
J-Li 6.1 j 131 v 
! SA 
-. z asj t -ý A. 'i I j L$ . 16 f I- )Lil 
L-*j. j 
L-j J111", L- Ijf 
CJ Ijý I, J; I... t ti IAL.. I Pz C; LS -ý. 
j Zý j 
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)Lj I J-6 J-4j C) LS 
oj-& 
mo LO 
. 
IAJ U, 
L;!. p &- -Lo 
(The sale of a certain quantity of green dates 
9. See above p. 50. 
Tl . 
for the same quantity of ripe ones, is 
lawful- according to Ab5 HanTfa. The 
two di: ciples say: it is*unlawful, 
because of what the Prophet said when 
he was questioned (about this trans- 
action): Do the green dates diminish 
when they dry? The person answered: 
'Yes. ' The Prophet said, 'No (this 
transaction is not lawful). ' According 
to Ab5 HanTfa: ratb is (used) for 
tamr in a had-ith of the Prophet, 
when ratb were presented to him, he said, 
'Are all tamr of Khaybar like this? ' 
The Prophet named 'ratb' tamr. So if 
ratb is (considered) tamr. The sale of 
its like is lawful (according to the 
hadirth) as we have reported* So if ratb 
is (considered) tamr the sale is lawful 
according to the first part of the hadTth, 
and if it is not, it is lawful according 
to the last part of the had7ith which is the 
statement of the prophet: 'If the two 
kinds are different, then sell as you like. ' 
72. 
The statement made by the two disciples 
rests on (the report of) Zayd b. Ayyjsh 
who is considered a weak authority by 
traditionists). 
10 
Here we see that a hadith not accepted by Abu 
0 
Haniffa is taken as genuine by his two disciples and 
also that Ab5 Han-ifa's legal thought was not blindly 
0 
0 
accepted and considered as final. His students had 
occasions to diverge from him. 
The exchange of flesh for a living animal is 
lawful according to Ab; HanTfa and Ab; Y; suf, and any 
additional payment on either side does not constitute 
interest. According to Shayb; nT, however, it is un- 
lawful. 
--u 
I 
131 j L; 
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I, Z%j I, 
10. AI-MarghTninls OP- cit. p. 48. 
73. 
ý, j Lr-. J ýý t -.. 
LS-. 
(It is lawful to exchange flesh for an 
animal according to Ab; Han'lfa and Ab; 
Y; suf. Muhammad says: when exchanged 
for flesh of the same species, (it is) 
unlawful except when (the quantity of) 
the slain flesh is more (than that of the 
living flesh) so that (a certain quantity 
of) the flesh may be set against the 
flesh (of the living animal), and the 
remaining (part of the slain flesh) set 
against what is not flesh. If it is not 
like this, rib5 occurs. According to Ab; 
HanTfa and Ab; Y; suf, (the case in question 
is) the sale of an article, which is sold by 
weight for one which is not sold by weight, 
since it is not customary to weigh an 
animal. And it is not possible to ascertain 
74. 
its weight by weighing it because it 
becomes lighter sometimes (when hungry) 
and heavier sometimes (when filled with 
food)). 11 
An additional payment in an exchange of flour 
for flour is interest but the exchange of flour for 
wheat or gruel for wheat is completely banned on the 
ground that measured quantities of flour and gruel 
are not directly comparable with measured quantities 
of wheat: 
j.. t ý. j L.. t vj L; ý-. Ij L, -- 6-,.. 1 
,6 -ft I oI ; -. -; L, ý. -, Lp... J I 
1-ts C) LS 0 11 
X-ts Ltj 
(The sale of wheat for flour or gruel is unlaw- 
ful, because similarity (of kind), to a certain 
11 . Ibid. 
75. 
degree, remains. Flour and gruel are 
products of wheat. (Although) these 
commodities are all sold by measurement, 
the measure for the former two is not 
equal to that for wheat, since flour and 
gruel are close-packed in the measure but 
wheat has space between its grains. So in 
spite of the fact that these are measured 
commodities, it is not lawful. It is 
lawful to sell flour for flour, provided 
the quantities are equal by measurement, 
because the condition is fulfilled). 
12 
According to Ab; Han-ifa and Shaybani the commodities 
0 
normally sold by measurement like wheat, dates, barley, 
etc., and the commodities sold by weight such as gold, 
silvers etc. 9 at the time of the Prophet, will always 
be considered measurable or weighable commodities, even 
if the tradition of measuring wheat, barley and dates, 
and weighing of gold, silver is given up by mankind. 
Ab; Y; suf holds the contrary: 
12. Ibid. 
76. 
L"J-o ýL j A-ý , -Li I .: L, A-u I ji- j L; ý-; - L.,.. : ýs 
: ýSj CJJ I -..,.:. 
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A-u I Lq; Lo Ljj IL 
Lij I J. 
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3 
Lvj-c L; 
ý-j I 
(Everything for which the Apostle of God 
provided a text prohibiting the charging 
of additional payment on it, as a measurable 
commodity, such as wheat, barley, dates and 
77. 
salt, it is to be considered a measurable 
commodity for ever even if people give up 
the tradition of measuring it. Everything 
for which the Apostle of God provided a text 
prohibiting the charging of additional 
payment on it, as a weighable commodity, 
such as gold and silver, is to be considered 
a weighable commodity for ever, even if 
people give up the tradition of weighing it.. 
For the text is stronger than custom, and 
the stronger cannot be superseded by the 
inferior. What is not prohibited by a text 
is permissible according to the customs of the 
people, for they are an indication. Ab5 
Y5suf says that custom should be considered 
as opposed to what has textual authority, for 
the text concerning that acts in place of the 
custom; the latter was looked at and has been 
replaced by the text). 
13 
Interestq understood in the Qurlan as an additional 
payment made by the debtor to the creditor at a certain 
time, is defined by the Hanafi doctors as an agreed 
0 
13. Ibid. 
. 78. 
monetary advantage in respect of one of two homo- 
geneous weighable and measurable commodities; 
14 
this links interest with the sale of all weighable 
as well as measurable commodities. The Qur'in, 
however, separates the two commercial gains: an 
additional amount on loan ( Lj ) and an additional 
amount in normal trade it allows sale and 
prohibits interest ( Ltýl rý'. j Ctj I A-U I 
af 
This definition is developed on the authority 
of the had7th of Ab; SacTd al-Khudar-i in which credit 
0- 
transactions are completely prohibited even if they 
do not carry interest. * This is against the 
Qur'an 2: 282. The hadith also bans gains in cash 
0- 
sales, which are also allowed in the Qur'; n. The 
HanafT doctorss by employing personal reasoning 
extended I the rules mentioned in the had7th to the sale 
of all things normally sold by weight or measurement. 
14. Al Shaybini,, op. cit. p. 3. 
See above p. 39. 
See above p. 49. 
79,. 
Cash Transactions 
The term sarf indicates an exchange of commodities 
both of which constitute a medium of exchange, such 
as gold for gold, or silver for silver. 
15 The 
usual objects of this transaction are dirhams and 
dinars. 16 Delivery on the spot is essential for its 
legality, and the items must also be exactly equal 
in weight, without-taking account of the quality: 
. Ljj-ij ijftj I L-Li--.. - I C) I 
-.. &.! J I )Lj I A. Iurl 
j joý- 
I ci II J-91-j 
(If silver is purchased for silver or gold 
for gold, this (transaction) is lawful 
except like for like, even if they differ in 
quality and workmanship, according to the 
15. Shaybin'll, op. cit. 
16. Sarakhsi, op. cit. 
80. 
Prophet's saying: gold for gold (is 
allowed) on the basis of like for like 
and weight for weight. Any additional 
payment constitutes rib5. Mutual seisin 
is essential before the separation of 
parties, according to c Umar's statement: 
'If he asks you to wait until he enters 
his house, do not wait for him. ') 
17 
According-to this a contract in which a person 
borrows a certain amount of dirhams or dinars on 
I. 
condition that he pays back the same amount in the 
future* is totally prohibited. Such contracts are, 
however, acknowledged by the Qur*5n 2: 282. 
This also prohibits cash transactions in which 
a man purchaseý an articlelof gold 
q-uett-i-ty and pays the price of it in dinars, amounting 
to more than the quantity of the article. It is 
essential that the quantities'of both the article and 
dinars must be the same. This is also contrary to the 
Qur'in's teaching regarding cash trade. 
18 Miliki 
doctors, however, allow the exchange of bullion for a 
17. Shaybini,, op. cit. p. 5; 
Al-Mar, qhL'ininT, op. cit. 
18. The Qur'in, 2: 282. 
1 
smaller amount of coin of the same metal so as to 
cover the minting expenses. 
19 
If the metals for exchange are of different 
sorts, such as gold and silver, additional payment in 
quantities is not interest, provided the exchange 
takes place on the spot: 
: 
)L. J 1 u"L. L-JI 
i u.. ýa-; i Li , Lt. Lt. 
14J-9 LA-A-Lil JA. 3 ii- 1 L.. A. L». f -gf 
1 .6 
(Additional payment is lawful in the 
exchange of gold for silver because 
the sameness (of kind) is absent, and 
(mutual) seisin is essential according 
19. Milik ibn Anas, op. cit. 
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to the Prophet's saying: 'Gold for 
silver is ribi unless the exchange is 
on the spot. In a sarf sale, if the 
parties separate before seisin takes 
place of one or both of the things being 
exchanged, the contract is invalid 
because of the breaking of the condition 
Iseisin'. Accordingly it is not lawful 
to stipulate 'an optional condition' in 
the transaction at fixed term of payment' 
because seisin can no longer be required 
for one of the two things). 
20 
An additional amount in the exchange of different 
metals is not interest, but if a person intends to 
borrow dinars on condition that he pays back dirhams 
in the futureg this is not permitted. This, is, 
probably$ to avoid interest. The Qurlin, however, allows 
this sort of contract (2: 282). 
The opinions of Shificil, Ahmad b. Hanbal and Ab5 
Dal5d regarding sarf sale as summed up as follows: 
0 
20. ShaybinT. op. cit; 
Al-MarghTninT. op. cit. 
83. 
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(The money changer must avoid credit and 
additional payment, as far as credit is 
concerned, this means that he may only 
exchange any quantity of the two monetary 
metals for another amount of these in a 
hand-to-hand transaction. Money changers 
are forbidden to deliver gold to the mint 
and buy dinars coined from it, because of 
the delay, and because it is likely to 
involve additional payment since the coined 
money will not be returned equal to the 
84. 
original weight). 
21 
We have seen that the jurists prohibited credit 
transactions as well as any gain resulting from a 
cash transaction of gold, silver and certain foodstuffs 
on the basis of a hadirth of AbG Saci'd Al-Khudar17. 
0- 
The Qur'; n, howeverg does not prohibit transactions of 
this kind but rather acknowledges them as a legal form 
of commercial transactions (2: 282). 
The rib; rule's adduced from the badi-th literature 
0 
are contradictory'to the Quranic prohibition of any 
additional payment on a loan repaid by the debtors to 
the creditor at a certain time. 
The Hanafir doctors. in formulating these rules were 
0 
probably more concerned with academic points of law than 
with actual cases. The"result of their formulations, 
however* was certainly to make it difficult for those 
who wished to take part in any normal commercial activities. 
To overcome a number of these difficulties, jurists 
devised certain expedients, whereby they could circumvent 
the law without actually transgressing it, this will be 
discussed in the following Chapter. 
C- 
21. Ibn al-Ukhuwwa Al-Shifi i, op. cit. 
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CHAPTER IV 
Devices ( and the prohibition of interest 
Hila LIt. ) singularg plural Hiyal means artifice, 
device or strategem for evading a thing. In 
Islamic law, legal devices can be described as legal 
-C means provided by the Shari a to achieve certain ends. 
These tricks and devices enabled those who would 
otherwise have had no choice but to act against the 
-C provisions of the Shari a to arrive at the desired 
resul ts . 
Commerce and civil transactions in the Muslim 
Empire of the Middle Ages were no t/ Wwe`Ný--rv entirely 
controlled by the theoretical rules of Islam, but also 
by a customary law, which had been called into being 
by the normal needs and necessities of commercial 
life. 2 This law was created by the commercial elements 
in the great cities of Islam and was elaborated by the 
Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition. » See Hiyal 
2. Schacht 3.. Die ärabische eiyal 
Literatur Der Islam, p. 212. 
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specialists in Islamic law. It did not put itself 
-c into, direct opposition to the Shari a; on the con- 
trary, it maintained its main features, such as the 
prohibition of interest, which it never dared to 
challenge openly, but it nevertheless managed to 
evade most of its restrictions through certain 
devices. As we have said above, the Qur'in prohibited 
the practice of charging interest on loans but allowed 
3 
credit transactions. At the same time there was an 
imperative demand for loanable funds on interest to 
meet commercial needs. In order to satisfy these 
needs,, and-at the same time to observe the legal pro- 
hibitiong a number, of devices were developed to evade 
the rigidity of the law. One of these devices is the 
'double sale': L (the lender) would purchase an object 
from B (the borrower) for an-agreed price of X, payable 
immediately in cash. B would then contract to re- 
purchase this same object from L for a price of X+Y (Y 
representing the agreed rate of interest) payable by a 
future specified date, Muftif Ahmad Ridi Bralwi recorded 
the following devices, attributed to'Ab5 Y5suf, Shayb; n1T 
4 
and Abu Layth: 
3. Ibid. 
4. Bralwi, Ahmad Ridi, Kifl al-FaqjT9ah, 
00 
Mecca, 1324 A. H., pp. 76-77. 
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(A person owing another person ten 
dirhams Wants to make it thirteen at 
a fixed date-*, he should buy some- 
thing for ten dirhams from the debtor 
and sell it back to the seller for 
thirteen dirhams payable at a future 
date. ' What is forbidden is thus 
evaded). 
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(A man asks another man to lend him a 
hundred dirhams; the borrower should 
put something in front of the creditor 
and say: 'I sell this thing to you for 
a hundred dirhams. ', The creditor should 
buy it, pay the dirhams, and take the 
thing. Then the borrower should say: 
'Sell me this thing for a hundred and 
twenty dirhams payableat a future date. ' 
The creditor should sell it to the 
borrower; thus the borrower will obtain 
a hundred dirhams, the creditor will have 
his thing returned to him and will be owed 
one hundred and twenty dirhams by him. ) 
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(If the article belongs to the creditor, the 
borrower had nothing, and the creditor intends 
to loan him ten dirhams in orderAo-receive 
thirteen at a certain date, he should sell this 
article to the borrower for thirteen dirhams 
payable at a future date. The borrower should 
sell it to a stranger for ten dirhams, and the 
stranger sell it to the creditor for ten 
dirhams and receive the amount which he had 
paid to the borrower. The creditor is then 
owed thirteen dirhams by the borrower, to be 
paid by a certain date). 
It is clear from the above quotations that in order 
to meet the demand for loanable funds on interest, credit 
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, Ytransactions were employed. 
The-SharTca regarding 
interest was thus not challenged openly. These 
passages refer only to minor-transactions but it is 
likely that these devices (credit transactions) were 
also employed in major commercial transactions 
during the early centuries of Islam. The earlier 
Muslim legal sources Justify the assertion that in 
the second and third centuries credit arrangements 
of various types constituted an important feature of 
both trade and industry. 
5 Credit arrangements, which 
would both facilitate trade and provide a framework 
for the use of credit as a means of investment in 
trade, are already found in a developed form in some 
of the earlier Islamic legal works. " Buying and selling 
on credit, as we have seen above, was an accepted and 
apparently widespread commercial'practice, whether a 
merchant was trading with his own capital or with 
capital entrusted to him by an associate. In ShaybinIT's 
Kitib al-Asl a provision entitling each of the parties to a 
a 
partnership to buy and sell on credit 
isi ncl uded in the very text of the 
suggested contract formula. 
6 
5. Shayb; nl?, op. cit, 
6. ShaybinT. op. cit; 
Sarakhsir, op. cit., vol XI, p. 177. 
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References to the widespread use of credit in 
commerce continue to appear in all the subsequent 
literature of the early schools of law. Sarakhs"I 
declares that selling on credit is an absolute 
feature of trade, 
7 
and Kasinli, referring to merchants, 
states that it'is their custom to sell for cash and 
credit. 
8 According to Sarakhsl, credit dealings 
were almost indispensable to successful and profitable 
trading. In discussing the right of the agent or 
managing partnerg he says: 
j L. J I Lo jj. A-" J..., La z LVJ 
I 
LZ I 
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7. Sarakhsi, op. cit. vol. XXIII, p. 38. 
8. Kas5n% Bad; Ii al-SaniA f"i Tarti*b al-SharTca, 
Cairo. 1910, Vol. VI, p. 68. 
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(We hold that selling for credit is part 
of the practice of merchants, and that it is 
the means most condusive to the achieve- 
ment of the investor's goal which is profit. 
In most cases, profit can only be achieved 
by selling for credit and not selling for 
cash. Proof that selling for credit is an 
absolute feature of trade is found in God's 
statement: 'Unless it be local trade that 
you are conducting amongstyou (2: 282)'. This 
shows that trade can also be long-distance 
and this latter type of trade cannot come 
about except by selling on credit). 
9 
We have attempted to translate the Quranic passage 
quoted by Sarakhsi as he understood it, and not as it 
is usually rendered in English translation. The passage 
reads : 
11Z 
;j 
dý 
LO, ;jL! 
41ý C) 01 
11 
Bell translates: 'Unless it be present merchandise that 
1,10 ye are circulating amongst you and Arberry 
9. Sarakhsi,, op. cit. 
10. Bell, R.,, The Ourlin translateds Edinburgh,, 1937,, 
Vol. I, p. 42. 
93. 
renders it: Unless it be merchandise present that 
you give and take between you oil The key 
phrase here is;,. ý L.,.. ;. j L.:!., - Ii teral ly present trade 
It is understood by Sarakhsi to mean 'local trade' and 
by (literally, 'absent trade') which he 
opposed to the former, he means 'long-distance trade', 
and he tells us: 
; J-4 tri l-! -j uj ;. L4 Lri ; j.. i, L. c) LPg-; ;j L"-: j Li 
L-ý-0,4 L- 
V- cx-- .ýjL; -P; 
- 
I 
(Trade is of two types: local (;., AL. ) in a man's 
own town, and long-distance ( Lt-oU ) in another towns 
and a man cannot directly engage in both these types 
by himself). 12 
According to SarakhsT. therefore, not-only is long- 
distance trade impossible without the use'of credit but 
a credit sale is the surest, if not always the swiftest, 
method of achieving profit - why this is so is explained 
by SarakhsT in another passage where he states that a 
thing is sold-on credit for a larger sum than it would 
be sold for in cash, 
13 
which means that there is a greater 
profit to be derived from credit transactions which, as 
we have seen above, play an important role in evasion of 
11. Arberry, A. J., op. cit. p. 70. 
12. Sarakhsir, op. cit. 
13. Ibid. 
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the law of interest. The difference in price between 
a credit transaction and a hand-to-hand transaction 
also helps explain why the prohibition of interest 
did not exercise any crippling restriction on the con- 
duct of commerce. For, while the difference between 
the price for which one sells on credit and the price 
for which one sells for cash does not legally con- 
stitute interestq it does fulfil, from the point of view 
of its economic function, the same role as interest by 
providing a return in the transactions and compensating 
for the absence of capital. 
Credits howevert played a very important function 
in minor as well as in major economic needs of medieval 
trade. The credit transactions acknowledged in the 
Qur'; n (2: 282), perhaps provided a legal basis for 
evading the rules and it is acknowledged by SarakhsT 
that the written documentsq as comprising the agreement 
of several credit transactions between the interested 
parties, which were perfectly legal in themsel"Vess Often 
form an essential element of the devices. 
14 
Another form of device challenged by Shific'I is the 
credit partnership in which the capital of the parties 
14. Ibid. 40.. ---M 
95. 
consists not of cashýor merchandise but entirely of 
credit. It is the one form of partnership for which 
ready cash is not required for the validity of the 
Cr contract. According to Shifi 1 the chief function and 
purpose of the institution of the partnership is the 
augmentation of the capital investment. This can be 
achieved, in his view, only with a tangible investment 
c- such as cash, but not credit. For this reason Sh; fi i 
rejected the validity of credit partnership. 
15 KasinT 
counters ShificPs, 'obJection by arguing that people have 
been engaging in this sort of credit partnership for 
15. Sh; ficT, op. cit.; (Sh; ficT does not recognise 
the credit partnership which the HanafT doctors 
do. SarakhsT names it 'the partnership of penniless' 
L-ii I (a partnership without any 
capital) or 'the partnership of good reputation' 
aS., z); and says that credit is extended 
only to him who has a good reputation among people 
(Mabs5t, Vol. XI, p. 152). This reflects two situations; 
one in which traders without sufficient resources 
seek financing and hire capitalt second in which the 
capital is seeking a profitable investment outlet and 
hires the traders. 
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centuries without rebuke from anyone, and that surely, 
as the Prophet himself said, 'His community would not 
unanimously agree on an error. ' 
16 
Ibn al-Ukhuwwa al-Shifici in his work written as 
a guide for the official responsible for the enforce- 
ment of the Sharirca in the markets of the 
great cities of Islam points out the prevailing devices 
as follows: 
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(Money changers and drapers practise this 
(the charging of interest) in another fashion: 
16. KasinTi. op. cit., Vol. VI, p. 57. 
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They will give a man a dinar as a loan, then 
sell him a garment for two dinars so that 
three dinars will be due to them on a definite 
time, and it will be witnessed that he owes all 
those. This is also prohibited, it is not law- 
ful because it is a loan bringing benefit (to 
the lender). If the borrower had not received 
the dinar he would not have purchased the 
garment from him for two dinars). 
17 
Other devices to avoid restrictive rules concerning 
interest were also frequently used, e. g. selling a 
future date crop at much less than its normal price, 
which is called 'salam'. 
18 It was often used as a 
device, for the immediate payment of a small price will 
be accepted by a person in urgent need of cash, for the 
future delivery of a considerably more valuable quantity 
of dates, etc. 
17. Ibn al-Ukhuwwi, op. cit. 
18. Salam is a contract of sale of goods in the future 
limited to things which can be replaced (e. g. so 
many bushels of wheat) and must be actually described, 
and also the place and the time of delivery. For 
details see: Hughes: op. cit-9 
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Bayc al-wafP o L;.. tJl t. *. -! was also a form of con- 
ditional or redeemable sale which was somewhat similar 
to the mortgage, whereby an advance of money might be 
obtained, not only on the security of land or a house, 
but by the provision of what virtually amounted to 
interest out of its produce or rental. The usual 
practice was for the creditors to retain the property 
on lease from the borrower, the rent representing the 
interest on the loan; it was judicially declared that 
Q; dTs had repeatedly upheld this transaction to enable 
persons needing money to obtain credit without in- 
curring the possible guilt of dealing in a transaction 
that formally involved interest. 19 
It is also reported that in the time of the 
Abbasid Caliph al-Muqtadir (295-320 A. H. ). the Diwin 
al-Jahbad ( ! -. h I. *. .) emerged as a state 
bank, which in 
addition to its common functions was liable to advance 
huge sums to the Caliph, the ministers and other court 
officials on credit terms. 
20 The officials of the 
Diwin were appointed mostly from among Christians and 
Jews by a special decree issued in 295 A. H. by the 
19. Bralwi,, op. cit. p. 82. 
20. Encyclop aedia of Islam, New Edition,, 'Djahbadh'; 
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Caliph. By virtue of their c-aQaSaR: a--L financial 
resources these Jews and Christian merchants and 
bankers were considered the pillars of the financial 
administration of their time, and they established 
the first state bank in Islamic history through which 
the urgent financial needs of the state could be 
satisfied. 
21 
We have also reports that these bankers were given 
interest on their loans and securities in the form of 
the tax revenue of the province of Ahwiz; and under 
the successors of Al-Muqtadir the Diwin continued to 
play the role of banker not only in Baghdid but also 
in Basra and other cities oIf the Abbasid Empire. 22 
0 
Opinions Regarding the Legal Devices 
The Ahl al-Had'ith regarded as legal only those commercial 
transactions which are prescribed by the Qur'in and the 
ýadith, and only in the manner in which they are pre- 
scribed. They claim that formal traditions from the 
Prophet, even though they were transmitted only by isolated 
21. Ibid. 
22. Ibid. 
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individuals. supersede sunna, litihid and QiySs. 23 
Milik strongly disapproved of hiyal for the evasion of 
the religious law, and particularly outlawed the device 
of doub'le sale. 
24 Al-Tirmidhi and Nasi'T followed him. 25 
Al-BukharT, one of the highest authorities on Hadirth, 
devoted a whole book of his sahih to combating the pre- 
vailing custom of evading th; law of interest. 
26 
cAbd All; h b. Mubirak fiercely attacks Ab; Ha'nifa and,, 
considering him the writer of Kitib al-Uiyal, says that 
he and the users of it were unbelievers and apostates. 
27 
Ahmad b. Uanbal strongly upholds the view of the invalidity 
of Hiyal. 
28 
It is generally assumed that the Hanafi doctors 
0 
were inclined to Justify the validity of the devices and 
produced the first special work about Hiyal in commercial 
0 
transactions. 
29 In the opinion of some, Ab5 Hanirfa is 
0 
directly responsible for the institution of Hiyal while 
0 
some say Ab5 Y; suf produced the, first special work on 
23. ShaficT, op. cit. pp. 199 32s 46. 
24. M; lik, o p. cit., Kitib 
25. AlmTirmidhi, op. cit.; 
Al-Nasi9i, op. cit. 
26. Al-Bukh; rT, op. cit. 
27. Khati'b almBaghdadi, Ta'r-ikh, Vol. XIII, p. 426. 
28. Ibid. p. 428. 
29. Ibid. p. 427. 
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hiyal and held that to practise hiyal on theground 
0 0- -- 
of necessity was a good deed. 
30 After that followed 
the treatise of Shaybinir, which incorporated long 
extracts from that of AbG Y5suf, which was edited and 
commented upon several times by SarakhsiT in his work 
- 31 Kit; b al-Mabsut; then another HanafT doctor, the 
00 
court lawyer of the Caliph Al-MuhtadT, Al-Khassif, 
followed his predecessors by writing a book legalising 
hiyal in civil transactions. 
32 
Shifici and his followers in the first generations 
after him regarded as illegal and rejected the hiyal 
concerned with monetary matters. Muhammad b. al-Hasan 
almQazwini collected and distinguished legal and illegal 
hiyal, but the legal-'validity of all hiyal was strongly 
and definitely upheld by the prominent ShificT authority, 
Ibn Hajar al-cAsqalinl'. 
4. 
The Hanbalites remained opponents of Hiyal; Qidir Ab5 
Yaclio composed Kitib Ibtil al-Hiyal, and the great scholar 
Ibn Taymiyya, in a special work, Iqima al-Dal'il fir Ibtil 
al Tahlils declared them illegal. 
0 
30. Bralwi, op. cit. p. 92. T 
31. Sarakhsi,, op. cit. Vol. XXX, p. 52. 
32. Bralwi, op. cit., p. 91. 
102. 
We may conclude that the concept of interest 
expounded by the early exegetes of IslamLCw"-a-s-a-a-44h-I* 
idealistic character-a had been developed to a degree ý9 
of systematic rigour totally unrealistic in commercial 
dealings. 
The hiyal system was introduced by specialists in 
0 
law who saw this as the only method by which the doctrine 
could retain some semblance of control over actual practice. 
We have also obserced that they utilised and manipulated 
the existing law and created a system to achieve purposes 
fundamentally contrary to the spirit of the SharTca; 
despite the prohibition of the practice of charging 
interestq they made possible, by simple expedients, a loan 
with interest in such a way that the mutual obligations 
arising thereunder would be enforced by a -Sharica 
court. 
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CHAPTER V 
Further Development in India 
So far we have discussed the theory of Interest as 
developed, systematized and finally settled in the 
second century of Islam. After this formative period, 
jurisprudence Was confined to the explanation, appli- 
cation and interpretation of the theory laid down once 
and for all, within the framework of the accepted prin- 
ciple of the particular school of law. In other words, 
it was an end to independent thinking and the beginning 
of unquestioning adherence to received views. 
Since as, we have seen, it was the Hanafi` School 
who were more concerned to codify this theory of interest, 
it is natural that we should look to India for the 
effects of this theory, this being the principal area 
where this school held sway. 
The Mughals were Hanafi Turks from Central Asia. 
0 
Long before the establishment in India of their political 
state based on HanafT jurisprudence, there are references 
to the presence of Muslims there, mainly from cIriqg K; fa 
104. 
and Basra, at Qannawj, Badiil5n, Baniras and Ajma'ir. 
1 
0 
By the beginning of the eighteenth century the vast 
7 majority of Muslims in India followed the Hanafi School 
0 
which had been the official state school S ince the 
2 
establishment of the Tughluq dynasty in 1320. Two 
classics of HanafTi jurisprudence were compiled during 
the reign of FTr; z Shih Tughluq (1351-88): Fiqh-i-FiTr5z 
Shihi, a test book for the administration; and 
Fatiw; -i Titir Khiniyya, structurally modelled on al- 
Marghin; ni's Hid5ya, compiled in 1375, by CAlim b. cA15 -T 
3 
under the. patronage of a nobleman, Titir Khin. 
cAbd al-Jabbir Khin, Mahb; b_al-Watan, DelhT. n. d., 
40; 
Qudima ibn Jacfar, Kitib al-Kharij MS. No. 1076, 
NizimT. K. A. 9 Salitirn-i-Dehl'i Kay Madhhabi 
rujhinit, DelhT, 1958, pp. 338-45. 
2. Ab5-l-Qisim Firishta, Gulshan-i-IbrihTm'l (Ta*rlrkh-j- 
Firishta), English translation by J. Briggs, 
London, 1829, vol. I. p. 402. 
3. Amir Khurd, Siyar al-Awliya_, Delhi, 1884, p. 529; 
Rahman c Ali,, Tadhkira-i c Ulam; '-i Hind, Lucknow, 
19149 p. 130; 
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Another comprehensive work of jurisprudence, 
Fatawa-i-lbrahim Shahi, was compiled under the patronage 
of Sultin Ibrihi'm Sharqiv (1402-36), at Jawinpur. 4 
The growth of Hanafi thought continued under 
a 
the Mughals. Neither the electicism of Akbar (1556-1605) 
nor his heresy appears to have interfered with the con- 
tinuance of the predominance of this school which was 
reinforced by the scholarship of cAbd al-Haqq Muhaddith 
DihlawT (1551-1642). 
5 The state was run again as a 
theocracy by the Mughal emperor-AwrangzTb CAlamgTr 
(1658-1707) and the law of his Government was entirely 
based on HanafT jurisprudence. Another outstanding. work 
on Hanafi Jurisprudence was written by Muhibb Allah 
Bihiri'-(d. 1707), entitled-Musallam al-Thub; t. 
6 "nder the 
personal supervision of AwrangzTb, Fatiwi-i cAlamglriyya 
4. Nihiwandir, cAbd al-Biqirs Macithir-i RabTmT, MS. in 
Asiatic Society of Bengal, f. 21. 
5. CAbd al-Haqq Dihlawl'. al-Makitib wa al-rasilil, 
DelhT, 1879, p. 127. 
.CT 6. Rahroan All op. ci t. 
0 
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was edited by Shaykh Nizim al-DTn Burhin puri and 
twenty four other c Ulama' including §haykh WajITh al- 
DTn Gopimawl', Shaykh Jalil al-Di`n Muhammad Machli'shahrT. 
0 
r Mulli Hami'd Qid I Muhammad Husayn Jawinpuri and 
v7 Jawanpuri . All these followed the trad; tional 
pattern in the collection of the Hanafiv rulings. The 
cUlami9 did not-attempt to break any fresh ground in 
jurisprudencet and consequently the theory of TaqlTd 
remained unchanged. 
Until this time, the Mughals dominated the land 
as well as the commercial resources of the country 
through their control over the military and bureaucratic 
apparatus of the empire., A large proportion of the 
national'wealth was concentrated in the hands of the 
8 Muslim community, and it was for a huslim 
family to be in such a state of penury as could lead him 
to borrow on interest. 
9 Consequently the enforcement of 
7. Wali Allah, Shah, Anfas al-cArifTn, DelhT, 1817, P. 24. 
Nizimli, op. cit. 
8. Bernier, F., Voyages, translated by Irvine and annotated 
by A. Constable, London, 1891, pp. 154-192; 
Manucci, Storia do Mogor, translation by Irvine-John 
Murray, London, 1907, Vol. II, p. 150. 
9. Hunter, W. W. 9 Our-l'ndian Musalmans, p. 131. 
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the prohibition of interest remained possible through- 
out the country. 
After the death of Awrangzl? b in 1707, the MuLhal 
empire began to decline rapidly, being damaged by 
internecine wars among the higher dignitaries and 
nobility. Awrangzlvb, although faced with acute financial 
difficulties, 10 entirely depended on his usual sources, 
and Hind6 bankers had no power during his reign. His 
successors, however, in order to meet the expenses of 
constant warst took loans from the great Hindu bankers 
at a ruinous rate of interest. This crippled the 
borrowers and when debts were repudiated, the creditors 
were forced to conspire against their authority and 
support their rivals. 
11 
There are widespread references in contemporary 
works to the large amounts of wealth being hoarded by 
the muslim nobility. Had the muslims been allowed to 
accept or pay a reasonable rate of interest, at a time 
r 10. Niziml, op. cit., p. 113; 
Sarkir, Sir Jad; nith, Fall of the Mughal 
Empire, Calcutta, 1949, p. 64. 
11. Sarkir, Ibid; 
O'Malley, L. S. S., Modern India and the West, 
London, 1941, p. 28; 
Detailed discussion follows in the next Chapter. 
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of necessity, instead of contracting loans at an 
exceedingly high rate of interest, muslim sovereignty 
in India would have certainly proceeded on entirely 
different lines. 12 
The disintegration of the Mughals decreased the 
economic prosperity of the muslim community. Loss of 
political power in a province meant that the muslims 
lost the benefits from that province and reduced the 
amount of opportunity open to them. Every new loss 
meant an additional loss, and the already narrow field 
of employment was still further contracted. 
13 
Although Shih Wallp All; h (1703-62) realised the 
need for the re-interpretation of Islamic law in the 
light of the specific social, economic and legal re- 
quirements of society, and declared that Taql-i-d without 
any attempt at understanding was a characteristic of the 
lowest type of mind, 
14 this did not disturb his fixed 
12. KhwifTi Khan, Muntakhab al-Lubab, Calcutta, 1869, 
Vol. I,, pp. 13-269 53; 
Tripathi, R. P., Some Aspects of Muslim Administration, 
Allihb; d n. d., p. 63. 
13. Sarkar,, op. cit; 
Hunter, op. cit. p. 18. 
14. WaIT All; h Shih, Al-Insif fTI Bayin f7i Asb; b al- 
Ikhtilaf, Delhi n. d., p. 70. 
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belief in the innate perfection of the theory of 
interest as it had come to be understood. 
He divided the discussion of Ribi into two sections: 
(1) Ribi al-nasi9a (an additional payment made by the 
borrower to the lender on a loan, at a fixed date) - 
the ribi prohibited by the Qur'in; (ii) Ribi al-Fadl 
(an additional payment made by one of the contracting 
parties in an exchange of certain articles) - the rib; 
prohibited in the hadTth. It was still prohibited for 
0- 
the creditor to receive and for the borrower to give 
either kind. This was summed up in a tag: 
0 (the receiver and the giver are equally 
guilty). 
15 
Here Sh; h WalT Allih ignored the possibility of the 
fact that changing fiscal circumstances might affect the 
attitude of muslims towards morality and law. His theory 
which he taught with great enthusiasms assumed that the 
muslims were living in accordance with a fiscal system 
that could not be improved-upon, and therefore, should 
not be changed according to the change in circumstances. 
In other words, his approach to economic questions lacked 
15. WaIT All; h Shah, Hujjat Allih al-Bili2hat Lahore, 
1953t pp. 113-115. 
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an evolutionary outlook, and seems to have been 
operated on the assumption that economic phenomena had 
been reduced to certain hard and-fast rules,, to which 
the situations of real life must fit themselves as 
best as they could. 
Soon after in 1803, the Mughal emperor Shih 'Alam 
gladly became a pensioner of the East India Company; 
and the real power passed into the hands of the 
British, the Marlithis and the Sikhs. The muslim 
community had thrown itself on the mercy of Hind; and 
Sikh money.!: lenders for its existence. 
16 Shih cAbd 
c al- AzTz (1746-1824). son of Sh5h Wall Allih, declared 
India Dir al-Harb, 'the abode of war', for the muslims17 
and on the basis of a fatw5 attributed to Ab; Han-Ifa, he 
also declared that since India had ceased to be 
Dir al-Islims interest was no longer prohibited, and it 
was perfectly legal for a muslim to invest his capital, 
or borrows on interest. 
18 
This fatw5 was designed to help the community. 
Those who had capital acquired during their governmental 
16. Discussion follows in Chapter 7. 
17. cAbd al-cAz'iz Shih, FatM-i- cAzTzTyya, D6109 
19049 p. 17. 
18. Ibid. p. 21. 
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connections with the Mughals, and who had been pro- 
hibited t: o investý/it, were now thrown out of their 
employment by the new rulers, 
19 
and were permitted to 
invest it in trade, industry, agriculture or other 
programmes of capitalistic development originated 
by the British, without infringing the prohibition 
of interest. Those who were forced to borrow for 
their existence could borrow from a muslim at a much 
lower rate of interest than that charged by the Hindu 
money-lenders. However, religious factors weighed so 
19. William Hunter says: 'With regard to the first 
great sources of Muhammadan wealth, viz, the Army 
and the higher administration of the Revenues, we 
had good reasons for what we did, but our action 
has brought ruin upon Muhammadans ....... the 
third source of their greatness was their monopoly 
of judicial, political,, or., in brief, civil 
employ. It would be unfair to lay much stress on 
the circumstances, but it is nevertheless a 
significant fact, that, none of the native gentlemen 
who have won their way into the Covenanted Civil 
Serviceg or up to the bench of the High Court, are 
Musalmans. The Muhammadans are now shut out 
equally from Government employ and from the higher 
112. 
heavily with the muslims that even a fatw5 from a 
leading authority failed to persuade them to 
participate in interest-carrying commerdial trans- 
actions. They did little in this direction and 
the entire field of fiscal operation remained in 
the hands of non-musl ims. 
20 Darling stated: 'there 
is one other feature that must be noted in regard to 
debt ..... almost the whole of it has been advanced 
by Hindus and Si. khs, neither being debarred by religion 
from the taking of interest. '21 Buchanan believed 
that 'the muslims inherited the early Christian 
attitude towards the taking of interest, and although 
this feeling is dying out, it probably helped to keep 
them poor ..... and due to this they had been one of the 
occupations of non-official life ..... they have 
now sunk so low, that, even when qualified for 
governmental employ they are studiously kept out 
of it by government notifications. Nobody takes 
any notice of their helpless condition, and the 
higher authorities do not deign even to acknowledge 
their existence. ' (op. cit., pp. 163-64. ) 
20. Buchanan, D. H., The Development of Capitalistic 
Enterprise in India, London, 1966,, p. 142. 
21. Darling, M. L., The Punjab Peasant in Prosperity 
and Debt., London n. d., p. 213. 
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least productive business groups in India. ' 
22 
Had the community not been debarred by earlier religious 
leaders, it was unlikely that it would have suffered 
from the monopoly of the Indian money-lenders, and 
have sunk into such depths of despair and general 
penury. 
23 The prohibition, in fact, had prevented them 
from investing further and hindered the creation of 
credit transactions and mutual co-operation among the 
community. The, nobility decided to live on their re- 
sources, and when their hoardings ran dry, then on 
money borrowed from non-muslims. Hunter describes their 
past and present condition: 'of such families I have 
personally known several ..... their mosques and 
countless summer pavilions glittered round the margin of 
an artificial lake, and cast their reflections on its 
surface, unbroken by a single water-weed. A gilded 
barge proudly cut its way between the private staircases 
and an island in the centre covered wi th flowering shrubs. 
Soldiers relieved guard on the citadel; and ever, as the 
sun declined, the laugh of many children and the tinkling 
22. Buchanan, op. cit., p. 18. 
23. Darling, op. cit. 
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of ladies' lusters rose from behind the wall of the 
Princesses garden. Of the citadel nothing now 
remains but the massive entrance. Their houses swarm 
with grown-up sons and daughters, with grandchildren 
and nephews and nieces, and not one of the hungry crowd 
has a chance of doing anything for himself in life. 
They drag on a listless existence in patched verandas 
or leaky outhousess sinking deeper and deeper into a 
hopeless abyss of debt, till the neighbouring Hindu 
money-lender fixes a quarrel on them, and then in a 
moment a host of-mortgages foreclose, and the ancient 
Musalman family is suddenly swallowed up and disappears 
for ever). ' 
24 
The titular emperor, Bah; dur Shjh II followed this 
fatwi and raised funds from the public. He offered 10% 
per month to his creditors until he paid off the 
original loan, and in 1857 used these funds-7for the 
restoration of his sovereignty but was arrested and con- 
demned to exile in Rangoon, where he died in 1869.25 
24. Hunter, op. cit., pp. 152-153. 
25. For further development see note at the end of 
the Chapter. 
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Note 
The major theoretical development in the definition 
of interest occurred in the second half of the 
nineteenth centurys when Sayyid Ahmad Kh; n, founder 
of the Naturi school of thought rejected the classical 
theory of Taqlld, and laid down what he termed the 
criterion of conformity to nature for judging the 
contents of systems of belief and practice. Thus 
reason in accordance with nature became his overriding 
principle for explaining the situations of real life. 
This method of approach gave him so much independence 
in interpretation of religion that he rejected the 
traditional definition of interest understood in the 
relevant passages of the Qur'in as an additional pay- 
ment made by the borrower to the creditor over and 
above the original loan. He contended that the 
qurlin prohibited excessive rates charged on a loan in 
the pre-Islamic period. The compound interest operated 
in India by the Hindu and Sikh money-lenders might be 
considered as prohibited but simple interest on loans 
for productive purposes, especially bank interest or 
interest on government bonds, insurance, etc., did not 
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come under the Qur'in ruling. 
I 
This dynamic religious approach towards the new 
problems created by changing circumstances was cer- 
tainly influenced by the nineteenth century European 
rationalism and natural philosophy which he assimilated 
during his visit to England in 1867-70.2 This 
approach brought the theory of interest more into con- 
sonance with the spirit of the modern worlds making it 
less rigid. It is evident that strict application of 
the classical theory of interest implied the abandon- 
ment of most fiscal operation to non-muslims. 
There was a considerable opposition to the views 
of Sayyid Ahmad Khin and his followers. 
3 but this was 
0 
insufficient to prevent the practical expansion of his 
theory of interest which eventually prevailed throughout 
the country, and was adopted as the basis of the economy 
by the majority of the muslims of the newly-born Islamic 
state of Pakistan in 1947. 
Sayyid Ahmad Khin, RkhirT MazimTni, De. 1hT n. d. pp. 143-5. 
0-- 
2. Farquhar, J. N., Modern Religious Movements in India, 
Delhi, 1967, p. 79. 
3. Ninotaw'17, Tasfiyyat al-cAqSlid, DelhT, 1901, p. 33; 
Th; nawT, Al-Intib; q; t al-Mufida can al-Ishtibah5t al 
Jadida, Lahore, 1952, pp. 33-599 98-104. 
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CHAPTER VI 
The Downfall of the Mughals 
After the death of Awrangzib in 1707, the Indian bankers 
came to control the destiny of the Mughal Empire. The 
historians describe his successors as puppets in the 
hands of their chief ministers and commanders-in-chief. 
Till 1720, Husayn cAlir and his brother cAbdullih 
dominated the affairs of the empire. 
' Fateh Chand, 
nephew and adopted son of Manick Chand, head of the 
banking house of Murshidabid was appointed to control the 
fiscal and financial matters of the empire, to which he 
advanced large loans. It is believed that he was allowed 
to keep a large amount as interest from the land-tax he 
collected on behalf of the provincial government. 
Ironically the materials of the history of this period are 
not so complete as could be wished; it is very difficult 
'The King makers' abolished Jizya, offered high jobs 
to the Hindus and the Raiputsi, made far-reaching 
concessions to the Marathas recognising Raja Shah69s 
right to levy 35% of the revenue in the six Provinces 
of the Daccan, and granted the East India Company the 
right to carry on trade free of duty in Bengal, Bihar, 
Orisa, etc. for details see: 
Wilson, C. R. (ed. )'EArly'Annals; 'of'the English in Bengal, 
London, 1895, Vol. II, p. 235. 
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to trace out the detailed effects of the money trans- 
actions conducted by the Mughal administration and the 
Indian bankers. Due to religious, political and 
diplomatic complications, the rulers did not want 
accounts of this nature to be made public. Most of 
the historical works appear to be for the most part 
court chronicles written to order to draw a veil over 
the vices of the rulers. However, it is believed that 
the Mughal, Emperor Farrukhsiyar intrigued against the 
activities of the Sayyid brothers and the banking house. 
This cost him his life. The bankers encouraged the 
chief minister, cAbdull; h and the commander-in-chief, 
Husayn cAll to depose the Emperor. They deposed and 
killed him in 1719.2 Then they, in the course of 1719, 
in turn raised to the throne, deposed and executed four 
Emperors: Rific al-Darajit, Rific al-Dawla, Neku Siyir 
and Muhammad IbrihTm. The fifth Emperor set up by them 
was Muhammad Shih Bahidur who proved more than a match 
for the two kingmakers, and Husayn cAlIT Khin 
assassinated, and in 1720, captured CAbdullih, poisoning 
him in 1722.3 
After deposing the Sayyid brothers, the Emperor 
tried to adjust the accumulated loans raised by the Sayyids. 
2. KhwifT Kh; n, op. cit. Vol. 11,153. 
Imd; d Oin, op. cit. 
Irvine, W., Later Mughals, London, 1921, pp. 58-61. 
3. Ibid. 
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He invited Fateh Chand to Delhi and conferred on him 
the title of 'Jagat Seth' (the Banker of the World). 
References to the activities of these bankers are 
numerous in the contemporary political writings and 
speeches of English statesmen. It is said that the 
'Jagat Seth' performed for the government many of the 
functions which the Bank of England performed for 
the British Government in the 18th century. 
4 
In spite of the considerable financial support 
from the bankers, the Mughal power deteriorated rapidly. 
In 1724 Niz; m al-Mulk of the Deccan, and in 1735, 
Bajir R; o of M; lwa declared their independence; and the 
Emperor gladly recognised them as independent rulers. 
In 17389 an Afghan Tribe, the Rohillas, established the 
state of Rohilkhand to the north-east of Delhi, under 
an imperial officer, CAlT Muhammad Khin. 5 In 1739, 01 
N; dir Sh; h of Persia invaded India and entered Delhi 
after receiving the submission of the Mughal Emperor. 
When the people of Delhi misunderstood his strength and 
attacked some of his troops, he ordered a massacre lasting 
4. Ibid. Kanishka: Jagat Sether KahinT, Calcutta, n. d. p. 110. 
5. Tabiltabi$ir,, Ghulim Husayn, Siyar al MutillaMbi. rTin 
Lukhnow, 1276 A. H Vol* Ies P. 139. 
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nine hours, in the course of which 209000 lives are 
believed to have been lost. 6 
c- In Bengal All WardT Khin, the Deputy Governor, 
overthrew the Governor Sarfariz Khin, and became inde- 
pendent, with the title of Nawib. He pursuaded Swirup 
Chand, a relative of the great banker Mahibat Chand, 
to advance him some money. This house advanced large 
loans to him, and, in return, enjoyed great influence 
and control over the economy of Bengal. It helped the 
Naw; b in the establishment of a mint at Murshidabad, 
received on behalf of the Government the land revenue 
paid by the Zamindarst controlled the purchase of 
bullion in Bengal and regulated the rate of exchange 
on all moneys that came to Bengal by way of trade and 
8. 
commerce. After the death of the Nawab, this House, 
however, played a crucial part in a conspiracy against 
his successor, which led not only to the downfall of 
the Bengal State, but also to the general disintegration 
of the Mughal sovereignty. 
9 
The East India Company, 
6; Ibid 
7. Ibid 
8. Ibid; Kanishka, op. cit. 
9. Ibid. 
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which defeated Nawib Sirij al-Dawla with the help 
of Omir Chand in 1757, was a hundred years later, to 
try the Mu2hal Emperor, Bahidur Shah, for rebellion 
and high treason against its authority. 
10 
In this age of political anarchy, Shih WIT Allih 
wrote letters to various rulers and generals including 
the Rohilla General NaiTb al-DIN, and the Afghin Ahmad 
0 
Shih Abdill'. and invited them to fill the political 
vacuum and to occupy India in order to protect the 
muslim position. 
" 
In 1748 Ahmad Shih AbdilT, invaded India but was 
repulsed by Prince Ahmad Shah, who succeeded to the 
0 
throne a month laterg at the death of his father. 
AbdilT renewed his attacks and compelled Delhi to cede 
the province of Punjabý2 The chief minister, Ghizi al-Di-n 
blinded the Emperor and dethroned him in 1754. Abdili 
invaded India again in 1756, sacked Delhi, seized Sindh 
and left his son, Taym5r to govern the Punjab and Sindh 
10. Irvine, op. cit. 
Niziml, K. A. (ed. ) Shah Wali Allih ke Siyisi 
Makt; bit, Aligarh, 1951, p. 106. 
12. Irvine, op. cit. 
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on his behalf 
23 The Marith5s soon followed suit and in 
1758, drove away Taymir and occupied the Punjab. 14 
Nawib c Alir Wardir Khgn died in 1756, and his grand- 
son Sirij al-Dawla succeeded him. The bankers, Mahitab 
Chand and Mahirija Swirup Ehand, approached him to ask 
him to acknowledge the loans made to his predecessor. 
He accepted the liability, but asked for more financial 
support. The bankers refused him, whereupon the Nawab 
refused to honour the outstanding loans. He also removed 
Om1T Chand, one of the representatives of the Banking 
House, from his post at, court. OmT Chand conspired 
against him with MTr ja c far Khin, his rival and the 
East India Company; he helped them very materially with 
large contributions. 
15 As a result Nawib Siraj al-Dawla 
was defeated at the battle of Plassey in 1757. The 
historians agree that the victory at Plassey, t+rely 
achieved by the conspiracy and intrigue of the great 
16 bankers, was one of the most decisive victories in4fiVstory; 
it set the British upon that imperial journey which came 
U. Tabi'tabi"T,, op. cit.,, Vol. 11, p. 15). 
00 
14. Ibid. 
15. Kanishka, op. cit. 
16. Hill, S. C., (ed. ) Bengal in 1756-571, London, 1905,, 
Vol. 11,, p. 215. 
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to an end in 1947. This made the British 
'kingmakers', and behind the front of the puppet 
Nawabs, the British extended their influence outwards 
across India. Using Bengal as base, the British 
slowly conquered the whole of Indiaý7 
Mir jacfar was made Nawib of Bengal by the 
Company, but was eventually deposed and replaced by 
his son-in-law, Mir Qisim. MI'r Qisim required finance 
for various purposes. He contacted the great bankers 
and promised them a high rate of interest. When they 
refused himt he expressed his intense displeasure by 
having Mahitab Chand and his cousin Mahirija Swirup 
Chand killedj8 
In 1759, GhizT al-DTn killed the Mughal Emperor* 
cAziz-al-DTn, in Delhi and set up his son, Princec Ali 
Gowhar, known in history as Shih cAlam II, in his 
place P 
17. Edwardes, Michael, The Battle of Plassey, 
London, 1963, p. 158. 
18. Bhatacharia, op. cit.,, p. 479. 
19. Tabi"tabi'T. op. cit. 
00 
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It is said that in Bengal the new Nawib, Mir 
Qisim imposed certain trading restr ictions on the 
20 Company and by doing this lost its favour. The 
Company tried to arrest him but he escaped and fled 
to Owadh, where he entered into an alliance with the 
Nawib Waz7iý and the Mughal Emperor against the 
Company. The allies were completely defeated by 
the Company at the battle of Baxer in 1764. The 
Nawib WaziTr of Owadh fled for safety to the neighbouring 
state of Roý#ilkhand, Mi rr Qisim died in extreme poverty 
several years later in Delhi and the Mughal Emperor, 
Shih CAlam II, made peace with the Company by the 
Treaty of Allhhb; d. He granted to the Company the 
right of collection of revenue over Bengal, Bihar and 
Orrisaq-, on condition of being paid an annual sum of 
twenty six lakhs of rupees. The Emperor, in order to 
return to Delhi, from which he was being excluded by 
the intrigues of the WazTr Gh; zT-al-D'ln, was obliged to 
throw himself on the protection of the Marathas and to 
transfer the districts of Allahb; d and Kora to their 
chief, Sindhia. The Company made the Emperor's 
weakness an excuse for refusing to pay the sum on which 
20. Ibid. 
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they had agreedFl 
The Nawib of the Carnatic, Muhammad CAIT had 
0 
borrowed large amounts from the English bankers and 
had mortgaged a considerable amount of his state to 
22 his creditors. His accumulated loan amounted to so 
much that it was unlikely that he would ever be able 
to pay it off. His state was, consequently annexed 
by the Company in 1801 ý3 
The Company annexed Maysore in 1799, defeated the 
Marathas in 1803, and the Rajputs submitted without 
striking a single blow in self defence. The Emperor 
now passed under the, protection of the Company and 
became its pensioner. Tabi9tabi9iT says 'He was not 
only a puppet but was treated like one; the members 
of his family regarded the palace as the Sultin's prison 
24 
from which there was no escape. The Emperor's poem 
translated by Captain W. Franklin, and published as an 
Appendix to his 'History of the Reign of Shah Aulum", 
goes as follows 
21. Irvine,, op. cit. 
22. Dutt, Romesh, Economic History of British India, 
Bombay, 1950, p. 99. 
23. Irvine, op. cit. 
24. Tab5ltab5*'lr, op. cit. 
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'Time wasq 0 King, when clothed in power supreme, 
Thy voice was heard, and nations hailed the theme, 
Now sad reyerse - for sordid lust of gold, 
By traitorous wiles - thy throne and empire sold. ' 
Soon after the Mughal Emperor, Shih CAlam became a 
pensioner of the Company in 1803, Shih CAbd al-cAzTz 
(1746-1824), son of Shah Wali Allah9 declared that India 
was no longer a place of peace-for the Muslims but had 
become 'Dar al-Harb', 'the abode of war'. because the 
Emperor was uttbrly helpless and the real power was 
in. the hands of the Britishý5 He also accused the British 
of wantonly demolishing mosques and restricting the 
freedom of the Muslims, and the Hindus alikeý6 
This ruling led to the great controversy, whether 
or not the Muslims were bound by their law to strive 
against the British for the restoration of their 
authority. A large majority of the orthodox 
culam59 con- 
sidered that they were, and it was only because of a 
number of technicalities that a few of them rejected this 
view. The Christian rulers had to be equated with 
25. cAbd al-cAzTz, Shih, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 17. 
26. Ibido 
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-. 27 Kafirs. This could not be done without stretching 
the law considerably; it had to be proved that they 
restrained the Muslims by force from the practices of 
their religion 
F8 It had to be proved also that the 
Mu. gjlals whom the Christians had replaced had showed 
greater regard for freedom of trade and travel, and 
provided greater security. This could not be done in 
the face of all the memories of the recent past and 
all the contemporary evidence toýthe contrary. The 
The new rulers were not idolaters. -They were indif- 
ferent, but not actively hostile. - to Islam; and there- 
fore, according to the minority group of culami9, India 
was not technically D; r al-ýarb. The opposite group 
automatically became guilty of rebelliong which was 
not only a political crime but a sin as well. Besides, 
in the context of a discussion so basically theological, 
it had to be shown that there was in existence a Muslim 
ruler who recognized the Islamic law and had the power 
to enforce it, so that the Muslims could transfer their 
27. An indispensable condition regarded by the early 
HanafT jurists: see, Shayb; n-l, op. cit., Vol. xiv, 
pp. 85,261,262. 
0 
28. Ibid. 
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allegiance to him and fight on his behalfý 
9 
otherwise 
all armed opposition could be considered as rebellion 
and not iih5d. This was summed up later as follows: 
'The Musalmans here (in India) are protected 
by the Christians, and there is no jihid in 
a country where protection is afforded, as 
the absence of protection and liberty 
between Musalmans and Infidels is essential 
in a religious war, and that condition does 
not exist here. Besides, it is necessary 
that there should be a probability of 
victory to the Musalmans and glory to Islam. 
If there is no such probability, the Jihid 
29. The same fatiw5 were' given by Jam5l b. cAbd A115h 
Shaykh CUmar al-HanafT. the MuftT1 of Mecca; 
Ahmad ZainT Dahlan, Mufti of the Sh5ficir School 
of Meccaq Husayn b. IbrghTm. Mufti" of the Milik'i 
0 
School of Mecca; and Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, the 
founder of the Naturif School in India; and others 
mentioned by W. W. Hunter in his work: 'Our Indian 
Musalmans: Are they bound in conscience to Rebel 
Against the Queen? ' 
129. 
30 is unlawful. 
In spite of the opinions of the minority, the 
British knew that India had become Dir al-Harb for 
the Muslims, and the latter were bound by their 
30. Lees W. H., Indian Musalmans, London, 1871, p. 4-6: 
Lord May posed the question: 'Are the Indian 
Musalmans bound ny their religion to rebelagainst 
the Queen? ' W. W. Hunter's 'Our Indian Musalmans' 
was written in answer to that question. The book 
was first published in 1871 in which the writer 
says: 'The, Musalmans, of India are and have been 
for many yearst a source of chronic danger to the 
British power in India. India has become a country 
of the enemy (Dir al-Harb) because the religious 
status which the Musalmans enjoy is entirely 
dependent on the will of their Christian rulers, and 
they enjoy it to only such a degree as we choose to 
grant. This degree falls short of the full religious 
privileges, which they formerly possessed. The 
British Government taxes the Muhammadans, and applies 
the taxes to the erection of Christian Churches, and 
the maintenance of a Christian clergy. It-has sub- 
stituted Englishmen for the Muhammadan Governors whom 
130. 
religion to rebel against the British ruleP 
It is believed that Shih c Abd al-cAzTz was 
desirous of personally carrying on jihid, but he was 
disabled by old age and weak sight? 
2 He chose one of 
his disciples, Sayyid Ahmad for this purposeq asked 
c his nephew Shah. Ismicil, and his son-in-law, Abd 
al-Haiy, to accept him as their spiritual leader, 
it found in charge of the districts and provinces. 
It-has formally abolished the Musalman Judges and 
law officers. It allows pork and wine to be openly 
sold in the market places. It has introduced 
English-Anto the courts. It has superseded the whole 
Muhammadan procedure and criminal law ... The stamps 
required by our courts on a plaint, our statutes of 
limitation, the orders by our Judges to pay interest 
upon money found to be due and our entire system of 
legal procedure and religious toleration, are opposed 
to the Muhammadan law, 'and are infringements of the 
full civil and religious statust' which our Musalman 
subjects enjoyed under their own rulers. ' pp. 126-127. 
31. NawshahrawT9 Tar; jim-i-cUlam; 1-i-hadirth Hind,, 
Delhi, 1938, p. 87. 
32. Ibid. 
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robed him in his own white cloak and black turban and 
sent him to enrol followers. W. W. Hunter describes 
this journey in the following words: 
'The Apostle journeyed slowly southwards, 
his disciples rendering his menial services 
in acknowledgement of his spiritual dignity, 
and men of rank and learning running like 
common servantss with their shoes off, by the 
side of his palanquin. A protracted halt at 
Patna so swelled the number of his followers as 
to require a regular system of Government. He 
appointed regular agents to go forth and collect 
a tax from the profits of trade in all the 
large towns which had lain on his route. He 
further mentioned four Caliphs or spiritual 
vicegerentst and a High Priest, by a formal 
deed such as the Muhammadan Emperors used in 
appointing Governors of Provinces. Having thus 
formed a permanent centre at Patna, he proceded 
towards Calcutta, followed the course of the 
Ganges, making converts and appointing agents 
in all the important towns by the way. In 
Calcutta the masses flocked to him in such 
132. 
numbers that he was unable even to go 
through the ceremony of initiation by the 
separate laying on of hands. Unrolling 
his turban, therefore, he declared that 
all who could touch any part of its ample 
length became his disciples. '33 
There can be little doubt that this enthusiasm of the 
people encouraged Sayyid in making his arrangements 
for a jihid. He decided to fight the Sikh Kingdom 
of the Punjab probably because the Sikh rule was 
oppressive and showed extreme intolerance towards 
34 Islam, and also because the Punjab was part of the 
area in which there was a majority of Muslims. If the 
Punjab and the Pathin territories were liberated, they 
35 would form a nucleus for further activities. 
In spite of ample contributions from his followers, 
Sayyid faced acute financial difficulties in preparing a 
well-organized expedition. The bankers promised to 
33. Hunter,, W., op. cit. p. 13. 
34. Mihr, Ghulim Ras; l: Sayyid Ahmed Shahid, Lahore, 
n. d. p. 116. 
35. (Abu Hanifa has permitted the sale of one dirham 
0 
for two in D; r al-Harb)q Al-Jassisp op. 
_cit. 000 
Vol. II,, p. 297. 
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support him if interest was paid on their loans. 
Shýh cAbd al-cAz'iz, on the basis of a fatwi attributed 
to AbZ Hani T fa, 
36 'declared that since India had become 
'Dar al-Harbl interest was no longer prohibited. 37 
This ruling of Shih c Abd al-cAzTz certainly helped 
Sayyid to make a contract with the Indian bankers 
according to which the bankers agreed to finance the 
movement. 
38 
Sayyid Ahmad chose the Path; n territories as the 
0 
scene of the action because it was necessary to ensure 
that there would be no hostile action in the rear. The 
Pathins were resisting the expantion of the Sikh5into 
their territories. They not only needed support but 
would also prove good allies. kiso the Muslims were not 
yet in a position to undertake active hostilities against 
the Britishq although an attack on the Sikhs from the 
East would be more-advantageous as the Muslim army would 
be near their homes and the lines of supply more secure, 
11 
36. C Abd al- 
c AzTz',, Shah, op. cit., p. 113. 
37. Kanijhkaq op. cit., p. 126. 
38. Mihr,, op. cit. 
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it was certain that the British would not permit 
hostilities against their ally, Ranji't Singh, to be 
based on their territory. 
The Muslim army could not reach the area by the 
direct route, because they could not march through 
the Sikh Kingdom; therefore they took a circuitous 
route through Gawiliyir, Rajputana, Sindh, BalGchistin, 
Qandhar, Ghaznir and Kabul. They reached Nawshehra in 
1826, but their financial resources were used up, and 
the Muslim rulers on their way refused to extend any 
assistance. The shortage of supplies was soon felt. 
Messengers were sent back through the Sikh territories 
for, the funds promised by the bankers but they betrayed 
them and refused to make any payment. At Balikot the 
Sikhs attacked with a better equipped and numerically 
c- 
superior armys and killed Sayyid Ahmad, Sh; h Isma il 
and six hundred Muslim volunteers. The supporters of 
the movement later sued the bankers who had failed to 
39 
make payment of the funds in the British Courts. 
In Delhi, Shih CAlam died in 1806 and his son 
Akbar was set up as Emperor, remaining titular sovereign 
until he died in 1837; he was followed by Bahadur Sh; h 119 
39. Sindhf, Shph Wali Allah Aur Aunki Siyasi Ta9rfkh, 
Lahore, n. d., p. 107. 
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who tried to restore his sovereignty. As his sources 
of income had been dried up by the British, 'the 
Marathas and the Sikhs, he decided to raise funds 
from the people. Since Shih cAbd al-cAziz had per- 
mitted the payment of interest on loans, the Emperor 
offered to pay 10% per month (120% per annum) to his 
creditors until he paid off the original loan. It is 
not known how he spent these funds but he took a very 
active part in the revolt of 1857, and acted as leader 
to both the Hindus and Muslim mutineersio Because of 
this, he was condemned to exile in Rangoon, where he 
died in 1869. On the day of his arrest his two sons 
were shot dead; this ended Mughal rule in India. 
The decline of the Mughal Empire had a direct and 
adverse effect on the economic prosperity, political 
hegenony and social and cultural dignity of the Muslims 
which they had enjoyed for several hundred years. The 
East India Company had done away with the intermediary 
Muslim nobles and jigirdirs, who used to let out their 
estates to the Hindu farmers, and dealt directly with 
these farmers whom it made hereditary landlords by the 
permanent settlement of 1793. The Company also gradually 
40. Irvine, op. cit. 
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removed muslims from their service because they were 
distrustful of those who had been in it previously. 
A large part of the community were and remained 
engaged in agriculture. The effects of the theory 
of interest on this section of the community will be 
seen in the following Chapter. 
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CHAPTER VII 
Interest and the Community 
Despite the prohibition of interest in Islam, the 
agriculturalist had occasion to borrow capital for 
his agricultural operations from an Indian banker, 
on stipulation of a certain amount of interest. 
I 
During the heyday of the Mughal administration, despite 
the indispensable role as a financier which the banker 
played in the_rural economy, he was a despised figure 
in the village, probably because of his acquisitiveness 
and greed for money, and also because of his dealing in 
interest, which Islam considered an illegal profession 
for a livelihood. 
2 Officially he was not allowed to 
live in a superior house, or to ride a horse. If he 
wanted to ride he could ride a donkey. 
3 He could 
usually outwit his borrower but, because of the manner 
in which social power was distributed in the village, 
4 
1. Khaw; fi Kh; n,, op. cit., p. 211. 
2. See above Chapter 1. 
3. Kanishka, op. cit., p. 82. 
4. Discussion follows. 
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he was unable to do so. Consequently he was obliged 
to consider himself a servant and accountant of the 
cultivator, 
5 
working in harmony with him and sharing 
in his prosperity or adversity. 
6 
'Qý- ... - t" -. -. ý)t, 
Fhe culti- tIUII of +rrtere-s-t 
Iff ý- V't'ý 
vator f4aT-4e-d to borro W/1 
7 and he rarely did so except 
to pay the state revenue or fines, in case of famine, 
failure or destr6ction of crops, or when there was 
really no food to be got in any other way, and some- 
8 times on the occasion of marriage or death. Under 
ordinary circumstances he was content to live in a state 
of poverty rather than borrow. 
9 Similarly the banker 
was careful in advancing loans. If the money was wanted 
for. extravagitnce, he would not usually lend. The common 
rate of interest was one per cent per mensem, though 
when the banker was doubtful if the loan could be 
repaid, or if he had only a small capital he might 
10 
charge 2%. There was no security for repayment of 
the loan except public opinion, which reprobated 
repudiation; no matter what interval had elapsed, even 
5. Thorburn, S. S,, Musalmans and Money Lenders in the 
Pu jab, Edinburgh, 188b, p. 48* 
6. Ibi . 
7. Taba"tabi*i,, op. cit., Vol. 11, P. 117. 
0a 
8. Ibid. 
9. Ibid. 
10. Cust, R. N. 9 fictures of Indian Lifes London, 1881, p. 36. 
13,9. 
even a borrower's heirs were bound to pay. 11 The 
banker had virtually no legal means of enforcing 
payment from his debtor. fie chiefly trusted to the 
honesty and good faith of the intending borrower, and 
advanced him as much as he felt satisfied that he 
could and would repay. 
12 He never demanded a higher 
rate of interest than was sanctioned by usage and 
public opinion. If he insisted on a higher rate of 
interestq the borrower could in any case probably not 
have maintained his regular installments. He could, 
of courset refer any case of a defaulter debtor to 
the village court ( panch; yat) but since the members of 
this institution were recruited from the cdltivators 
of the village, it was inclined to give judgements 
which showed more than a legitimate concern for the 
interest of the borrower, and the banker had no chance 
of recovering his debt unless he could persuade some 
powerful Zamindar to intervene on his behalf. 
13 More 
frequently he had recourse to throwing himself on the 
threshold of the debtor, and refusing to budge till the 
debt was settled. 
14 So the relations between cultivator 
11. The Teaching of Islam regarding the payment of debt 
can be seen in all Hadith Collections, see 
(Dayn). 
12. Cust, op. cit. 
13. Bhattacharya, H., The Cultural History of India, 
Vol. ll,, -F. 13. 
14. Ibid. 
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and banker were determined on an equitable basis. 
The cultivator provided land and labour, the banker 
assisted him, with capital, and the interest was 
deducted in kind from the produce without reference to 
outside authority. 
15 
The social order in the Indian village began to 
disintegrate with the political anarchy which lasted 
throughout the century from the death of Awrangzl: b. 
The provincial Governors became independent rulers and 
embarked on internecine wars either with the object of 
future conquest or with that of merely preserving 
usurped power. To finance their campaigns they required. 
money. Since agriculture formed a major source of 
their revenue, the cultivators were subjected to OXIM046- 
ex aAA=s=-a4; # an increasing number of new taxes. 
16 The 
Zamindars who failed to pay their fixed land-tax to the 
ruler were dismissed, and their land was re-alloted on 
a temporary basis to the highest bidder, who naturally 
wished to extract the maximum profit from it during his 
tenure. The rulers were no longer concerned as to what 
amount these intermediaries realised from the cultivators, 
15. Thorburn, op. cit. 
16. Taba'taballi, op. cit. 
00 
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or by what means they realised it. 
17 An inter- 
mediary, after acquiring a particular district, would 
relet it in proportions to several Zamindars, who again 
made over their leases, in whole or in part, to other 
18 "k- Zamindars of inferior status. New Zamindars = 
indifferent to the welfare of the society and demanded 
higher rents than the cultivators had previously paid. 
Consequently a cultivator who, as frequently happened 
was unable to pay his rent, turned to the village banker 
for a loan, and was thus forced to pay interest. The 
banker could now charge him interest at a rate anywhere 
between 25% and 150% and often kept him perpetually in 
debt, by means of false accounts. 
19 Contemporary works 
are full of denunciation of the banker, but some felt 
that he was misrepresented. 
20 He was a product of the 
political state of India at that time and probably 
behaved no worse than anyone else in similar circumstances. 
17. Sykes, W. H., Minutes of Evidence before the Select 
Committee on the affairs of the East India 
"Company in 1832. 
18. Ibid. 
19. Ibid. 
20. Stewart, Sir James, The Principles of_Money, London, 
1772, p. 81. 
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In fact, he offered a great deal of financial assistance 
to the cultivator. In the words of William Hunter, 
'he had made life possible for millions who must 
otherwise have perished or never-been born. ' 
21 
The rise of the British Power had a direct and 
adverse effect on the economic prosperity and political, 
social and cultural dignity of the Muslims. Although 
the Muqhal Power had declined long before the British 
eventually conquered the country, the village institutions 
generally remained on the broad pattern of the great 
Mughal's administration. 
22 The Rajp; ts, the Marithis and 
Sikhs who carved out independent principalities 'retaihed', 
in the words of W. Hunter, 'the Muhammadan code as the law 
of the land, appointed Muhammadan law officers to carry 
it out and in every matter acted merely in the name of 
23 
the Mughal Emperor. ' The British gradually conquered 
different territories from the Muslims, the Marith; s the 
Raip; ts and the Sikhs, which violently disturbed the 
edifice of the Muslims. The series of changes in the 
land management system introduced by the new rulers, ending 
21. Hunter, W., The Indian Empire: It's People, History 
and Products, London, 1886, ed. p. 168. 
22. Hunter, W., Our Indian Musalmans, p. 181, Nizimi, op. cit. 
23. Hunter, W., op. cit., p. 192. 
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I- 
in the permanent settlement of 1793 by Lord Cornwallis, 
virtually brought about the extinction of the super- 
fluous Muslim aristocracy. Gradually the East India 
company shut the Muslims out of the army, believing 
that their exclusion was necessary to British security. 
It was gradually removing the Muslims from civil 
services. 
24 The high handedness of the Company's 
agents and the repercussion of the Industrial revolution 
in England undermined the Muslim artisan class who 
possessed her6ditary means of production and adhered to 
the traditional system of manufacture, and forced them 
to fall back upon the land for their livelihood. 
25 
Sayyid Ghul; m Husayn Taba9tab; *-ig who in many respects 
admires and shows readiness to accord praise to the 
forceful foreigners, saysq 'the English have deprived 
the inhabitants of the country of various branches of 
commerce and benefit which they had ever enjoyed hereto- 
fore. ' 
26 
Of the Zamindars, some were left in undisturbed 
possession of their estates, but when they were called 
24. Ibid.; Tabaltabi'i, op. cit., Vol. I., p. 151. 
0 
25. Ibid; Nizgm-i, op. cit. 
26. Ibid. 
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on to pay up the arrears of revenue which were due to 
them, they resisted the demand which in most cases 
27 
ended in the confiscation of their estates. The 
cultivators were not less affected. It may be gathered 
from various minutes and official reports that i'n many 
parts of the country the assessments were made, in 
28 the first instance, at too high a rate. Due to the 
scarcity of, and great demand for, capital, the Indian 
""'Lý 
Lý6 
bankers, who eAa-tr-any=: t_v the Muslims, were allowed to 
lend on interest, were gaining enormous power over the 
Muslim community. A Zamindar, having no resources to 
pay his revenue to the Government would approach the 
money-lender for a loan. Consequently agricultural in- 
debtedness became possible on a hitherto unknown scale. 
29 
H-igh rates of compound interest ensured. that a debt not 
quickly repaid grew rapidly to the point where it could 
not be repaid from the current income of the borrower. 
30 
27. Thorburn, S. S., Problems of Indian Poverty, 
London, 1902, p. 181. 
28. Selections from Papers of Indebtedness and Land 
Transfers, Vol. I., pp. 13-15; Mi Jos, 
Minutes oT Evidence - 
before a Select 
Committee of the House oT-Commons, 1831. 
29. Ibid. 
30. Ibid. 
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Under the company rule, a new system of admini- 
stration of justice, 
31 
provided the banker with regular 
facilities, of a kind hitherto quite unknown, for en-, 
forcing the payment of debts, just or unjust. The law 
guiding the courts prescribed that agreements however. 
loose, between a cultivator and a banker should be en- 
forced, without detailed enquiry into the circumstances. 
This system was a boon to the banker who, being the only 
literate partyt kept the accounts or had the bonds 
drawn up, and it placed much of the cultivator's assets 
at his disposal. 
In India, generally speaking, the cultivator did 
not pay his land-tax direct to the Revenue officer, 
but the village headman either collected from him if he 
had anyt or arranged a loan from the village banker, and 
31. Although the new administration upheld the village 
court, 'Panchiyat', it superimposed on it an 
imposing structure of courts of law to guard against 
injustice arising out of partiality on the part of 
members of Panch5yat. This structure of courts, 
which dispensed Justice according to Western 
principles, comprised the Native Commissionership 
of Justice, the District Court and the Supreme Court; 
so that a disputant could appeal to a higher court if 
146-0 
then paid collectively the obligations of the whole 
village to the Revenue Officer. The headman had 
various other responsibilities including the maintenance 
of peace and order in the village, presiding over the 
village court, Panchayat, and above all, negotiating 
with the Revenue Officer to determine the amount of 
the land-tax for the village, determining the indi- 
vidual contribution of each cultivator. 
32 
The land-reforms introduced by the Company, which 
stenmed from the fact that the cultivator had suffered 
hardships under the old system, granted him transferable 
rights of ownership in land and obliged him to pay land- 
tax in cash directly to the Government. Under the new 
systems the services of the native revenue officers and 
he had reason to believe that he had been denied 
justice. For details see: Fawcell, Sir Charles, 
First Century of British Justice in India, London, 1934. 
32. Baden-Powell, B. H., The Origin and Growth of Village 
Communities in India, London, 1908 (ed) p. 118; 
Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government 
No. IV, R. N. Goodine's Reporton the Village Communities 
of the Deccan, 1845. 
1415* 
the village headman were retained but they were made 
subordinate to the Company's Collector of Taxes. The 
function of the headman in negotiating the amount of 
the tax with the cultivators had now beome redundant. 
Direct negotiations originated by some of the collectors 
in various parts of the country weakened the ties and 
associations between him and the cultivators, 
33 for 
the sense of solidarity which inspired the cultivators 
was largely a result of the division of the total tax 
liabilities of the village into individual contributions 
in which the headman played a significant role. 
Although the reforms were designed to promote the 
welfare of 
I 
people who were suffering under the mis- 
fortunes of an unjust judicial and agricultural system 
which subjected the many to a degrading subjection by the 
few, and to put an end to the ravages of brigands in a 
country whose government haddisintegrated, they involved 
a most important and fundamental change in village 
institutionsq through which rural society lost some of 
its cohesion and no longer flourished in full vigour. A 
33. lbid; Stokes, E.,, The English Utilitarians and India, 
Oxford, 1959, p. 281. 
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general-picture of the community is provided by a 
British observer: 
'There can be no doubt that, one by one the 
forces which have hitherto held native 
society together, are being loosened, and 
that the whole masses of the community are 
being melted as in a crucible, and are 
gradually losing the form and colour which 
have hitherto distinguished them, to take 
what new shape or to reappear in what com- 
bination it is premature to conjecture. ' 
34 
These reforms reveal the depth of the new rulers' 
insight into the judicial problems of the country. 
However, they were bound to undermine the solidarity 
of the village institutions. 'To the B anniah class, ' 
Pites Thorburn, 'the change to fixed cash assessments, 
the creation of individual rights in land, and the 
introduction of civil courts administering laws and 
procedures code framed on European models, were as 
welcome as would be the succession to a great estate 
of an impecunious Anglo-Indian, or the discovery of a 
34. Miller, J. O., Condition of Lower Classes in India 
(1881-91). India Officeg Parliamentary Branch Collection, 
p. 220. 
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gold mine on his land to an Australian settler. 
With their inherited business habits, their want of 
sympathy for Musalmans, their unscrupulous greed for 
gain, their established position as accountants and 
factors for the agricultural population, their mono- 
poly of education, of general intelligence, and of 
trade ....... most particularly of money-lending .... 
prospects of wealth and position never before attained 
in their history, were opened for the Banniah class., 
35 
The state of the rural economy and divising of 
reforms that would best ensure the prosperity of the 
cultivator presented the new rulers with an urgent 
problem. They were aware that the revenue paid by the 
cultivator which formed a major part of the state 
revenue, was largely borrowed from the bankers. 
36 
A moderate tax on land would enable the cultivator to 
meet his various expenses, while a more-severe tax 
would further impoverish him, with unfortunate con- 
sequences for social peace and political stability. 
37 
35. Thorburn, op. cit., p. 5o. 
36. Sykes, op. cit. 
37. Maine, Sir Henry, Village - Communities in the East 
and Wests London, 1876 (ed. ) p. 17. 
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Although the life and property of the cultivator 
were secured as they had never been secured before, 
arbitrary taxes had been abolished, the Zamindars and 
Revenue officers who had formerly oppressed him were 
firmly under the control of the administration, 
38 
the judicial innovations nevertheless had a direct and 
adverse effect on his relationship with the banker. 
The court had not only diminished his judicial inde- 
pendence by diminishing that of the Panchiyat, but their 
judgementss based upon principles of equity, favoured 
the banker more than him. We find the Company's officers, 
who were confronted with the practical tasks of admini- 
stration, complaining about the deficiency of the courts 
and the rigidity of the legal system which relied on 
written rather than oral evidence, 
39 
The banker was no longer obliged to trust to his 
good faith and could inveigle him into inequitable but 
legal contracts. If the cultivator failed to fulfil such 
a contract9 the banker had a civil case against him, and 
might obtain complete control of his moveable and 
38. Taba9tabPTI, op. cit. 
39, Thorburn, op. cit.; Sykes, op, cit.; Milig opo cit. 
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immoveable property. Consequently he was reduced to 
such a condition, socially and economically, as never 
to be able to regain his footing in society. 
40 
Sir G. Wingate discussed the relationship between the 
banker and the cultivator and the causes conducing 
to the enslavement of the latter by the former: 
'The grinding oppression of the ryot by the 
village Bunniah or money-lender, is familiar 
to the experience of all public officers, 
whether Revenue or, Judicial, and has become 
proverbial ....... it remains to be shown, 
how it is that the creditor in our provinces 
has acquired a degree-of, power over his 
debtor, which is wholly unknown in Native 
States. This power, it is clear to me, 
has been conferred by our laws, which enable 
the creditor to obtain a decree against a debtor, 
for whatever may be written in his bond, and 
an enforcement of that decree by the attach- 
ment and sale of whatever property moveable 
40. Ibid. 
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or immoveable, his debtor may possess or 
acquire. ' 
41 
There are references that the cultivators protested 
against the facilities provided to the banker for the 
recovery of his loan; and appealed to the Government 
to bring back the old system of resolving disputes 
concerning debts: 
'Although we live under great protection and 
prosecute our labour free of any apprehension 
or oppression, yet our families are reduced to 
a miserable condition, so much so that their 
ordinary wants, even cannot be supplied., 42 
The reason behind the pecuniary difficulties of the 
cultivators was their dependence on the banker for 
their daily life; he charged exorbitant rates and 
eventually deprived them of their belongings. 'Under 
the late Government we suffered great oppression but 
our immoveable property could not be sold and there- 
fore we were able to endure the 'oppression both of 
41. Wingate, G., Revenue Commissionerg Report - 1852s 
Selections from the records of the Bombay Government, 
Para. 22, No. CXIII. 
42. Records of the Revenue Department, Vol. 110/1194; 
petition signed by seven thousand cultivators of 
Thana District of the province of Deccan, July, 1840i 
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Government and of the banker. Under the present 
government. by the sale of our immoveable propertyq 
we are reduced to a starving condition in the same 
manner as a tree when its roots are pulled out, 
dies. ' Finally the cultivators begged that, 'our 
cases'may be referred to the Panchayat, wh'o should 
decide on the claims and liabilities of the parties, 
with reference to the circumstances of each, agree- 
ably to the ancient custom.. ' 
43 The reason behind this 
state of affairs, according to the majority of the 
British officers who were practically involved in 
village administration, was the rapacity with which 
the banker conducted his fiscal dealings with culti- 
vator. 
44, It was generally believed that if the 
present course of affairs continued, a great part of 
the property of the cultivators would be transferred 
to a small monied class which would become dispro- 
portionately wealthy by the impoverishment of the rest 
of the population. 
45 Suggestions for withdrawing legal 
43. Ibid. 
44. Thorburn, op. cit. 
45. Letter from H. E. Jacomb to C. E. Fraser - Tytter, 
December, 6.1858, Letter to the Deccan Riots 
Commission by H. B. Boswell, October, 1875; Similar 
viewpoints were expressed by a large number of the 
British Officers throughout the country. See 
Selections from Papers on Indebtedness and Land 
Transfers, Vol. 1, pp. 12,15,28,36,115, etc. 
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facilities from the banker were put forward by some 
officers, but it was also believed that exorbitant 
rates of interest charged by the banker were in 
keeping with his risk, and did not exceed the normal 
profits of his capital. 
46 
The petition presented by the cultivators was 
doomed to failure because the administrators felt that 
'though the cultivators were loud in their complaints 
against their creditors, yet they would be first to 
suffer byq and not less ready to complain against, 
any restrictions which would deprive them of the aid 
of so useful a class. ' 
47, 
The intensity of the malaiseýamong the rural 
community was perhaps painted in lurid and heightened 
colours by the cultivators in their petition. The 
facts, howeverg which were widely accepted by a--4e-i-g-e 
British Officers, remain/ that the 
cultivator rarely possessed any reserve of capital, 
46. Pringle R. K. 9 Collector of Taxest Letter to the Bombay 
Government, July, 1840: Revenue Department, Vol., 
1664 of 1844. 
47. Ibid. 
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and that he was forced to borrow for his social, 
religious and agricultural activities from the village 
banker who advanced him capital to pay his land-tax. 
48 
The laws regarding the recovery of debts were unin- 
telligible to the cultivator who was unaware of the 
implications and significance of his contracts with 
the banker for the bare necessities of daily life, 
49 
The village banker, consequently, was absorbing 
proprietary interests-in the village communities to an 
alarming extent and the body of ex-proprietors was 
enormously on the decrease. 
50 In the district of 
Ahmadnager of the Deccan, for 'instance, suits regarding 
the cultivators' indebtedness increased from 2900 to 
5900, pratticAlly 100 per cent, between 1835 and 1939; 
and a substantial share of them ended in the transfer 
of the holdings from the cultivators to the bankers. 
51 
48. Ibid. 
49. Campbell, op. cit; Thorburn, op. cit. 
50. Ibid; Also Selections from the papers of Indebtedness 
and Land Transfer, Vol. II, pp. 136-139. 
51. W. G. Pedder's Report quoted in Precis of Correspondence 
Regarding Indebtedness of Agricultural Classes in Bombay 
and Upper India. (the Deccan Riots Commission, Vol. II) 
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Since direct participation in farming was contrary 
to the style of caste and social values of the village 
banker, he allowed the cultivator to cultivate his 
newly acquired land, and appropriated all of the profits 
of his labour, after giving him the bare means of 
subsistence. 
52 In this way he became one of the greatest 
obstacles in the way of the prosperity and progress of 
53 
the cultivators, because he hindered a change through 
which the small cultivators would have given way to a 
class of capitalist cultivators who possessed large 
landed estatesq and who-possessed the resources to 
cultivate them efficiently. A British officer writing 
to his colleague, says: 
'Seldom do you see them (the bankers) improving 
any property that may have come in hand, or in 
embarking-on any speculation such as sugar 
plantations, cotton or the cultivation of silk. 
Their thoughts and speculations are confined to 
their ledger and money transactions, and in no 
instance have I ever found a bunion (sic) step 
52. Thorburn, op. cit. Sykes, op. cit. 
53. Letter from B. Frere, Assistant Collector Poona to 
R. Stewart, Collector of Poonas dated 2 
157. 
forward to aid in any work of public 
activity. ' 
54 
Many village headmen and Zamindars, who had 
previously presided over village Wairs, and had a 
privileged social position, were reduced to the 
position of tenants cultivating the lands owned by 
the bankers. 55 The cultivators, despite the growth 
of economic activities in the great cities of the 
Empire which had opened a wide alternative avenue of 
employment, - remained attached to their old style of 
life, accepting the suffering, frustration and humili- 
ation that it now generally entailed. Nevertheless, 
although normally submissiv e, if oppressed beyond a 
certain point$ they could turn fiercely on their 
tormentors as they did during the disturbances of 1857 
and 1875 and force the rulers to pass a law for their 
54. Ibid. 
55. Ibid. Selections from the Papers Regarding 
Indebtedness and Land-Transfer, Vol. 1. pp. 5-61, 
Vol. 11" P. 18-19. 
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protec ion. 
56 
The reforms which had been introduced by the 
company in Bengal and the North-Western provinces 
were extended to the newly annexed territories such 
as the Punjab and Owadh. Although a large majority 
of the British officers supported this policy, there 
were officers who did not favour it. 
57 For instance 
Lord Stanley strongly criticised it. L. E. Rees 
stated: "I speak with a warning voice, because I 
have opportunities of seeing and hearing what the 
56. ýUntil the downfall of the East India Company and 
direct British rule, there was almost no information 
available, as to the extent to which the cultivator 
was in debt. However, throughout the country, in one 
village after anothers the cultivators had been 
gradually dispossesed of their holdings by the banker 
who thrived under the new dispensation. In village 
after village the British officers observed identical 
changes. For details see Appendix at the end of the 
chapter; also Punjab Famine Report 1878-9; Report 
of Deccan Riots Commission 1875, and other later 
enquiries of this nature. 
57. Pringle, op. cit.; George Edmonstone, Richard Temple, 
Henry Davies. Phillip Sandys Melvill, Hector Mackenzie, 
J. Vibart and others, were in favour. Their opinions 
are mentioned in the Appendix at the end of the chapter. 
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people think of the policy now pursued. If this be 
the policy it will be working its own ends and 
purposes ...... Outh (sic) will be the scene of our 
national disgraces dishonour and bloody massacres., 58 
Thorburn warned: 'If these doctrines are endorsed 
throughout India, it will eventually lose us India., 59 
George Campbell in his book entitled 'India As It May 
Be, An Outline of a Proposed Government and Policy', 
suggested about the Punjab that if it was even to have 
civil courts such as those in the North-Western Provinces, 
which had transferred land in execution of decree on a 
large scale, the village communities would be destroyed, 
for no banker would ever become part of these 
communities. ' He contended that land was not so far a 
separate property that individuals could sell it to a 
banker without the consent of the community, and proposed 
that the land of those in pecuniary difficulties should 
be transferred to the community. He considered the 
establishment of the courts 'in every way most undesirable, 
pernicious, and unfair' to the village communities, that 
is 'to facilitAte their premature dismemberment by laws 
58. Rees, L. E. R., A Personal Narrative of the Seige of 
Lucknowq London, 1858, p. 17. 
59. Thorburn, op. cit., p. 88. 
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altogether inconsistent with their previous constitution 
and rights. ' 
60 
He regarded village bankers as not the least 
useful of men, accumulating capital as they did, and 
providing the village cultivators with credit and other 
essential services. Their interest might be exorbitant 
at times, and the British might decry them, but it was 
after all the persuit of self-interest which provided 
61 
the right principles of political economy. 
Howeveri the object of the Government throughout 
the country had been the creation of a valuable and 
marketable proprietary right in the land, so that the 
revenue would be secured, and capital be obtained for the 
improvement of the tax-paying capacity of the land. 
62 
The government also defended the desirability of the 
introduction of the civil courts on the social and 
political groun - ds throughout the country.. 
63 
60. Campbell, op. cit., pp. 13691789181-182. 
61. Ibid. pp. 1861,372. 
62. Abstract Principles of law circulated for the 
Guidance of Officers employed in the Administration 
of Civil Justice in the Punjab, London, 1865, Part 1, 
p. 16-17. 
63. Ibid. 
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The Government, from the experience gained from 
the old provinces, however, decided to adopt a pro- 
tective policy. The sale of land for arrears of revenue 
was restricted and a defaulter was given an opportunity 
to pay it by installments while care was taken that 
'landed property shall not unnecessarily be brought to 
the hammer. ' 64 As for the compulsory sale for debt, 
the Government decided that the land should be offered 
to the proprietary community in the first place. 'If 
it could not be sold'in this way, then it could be 
offered to bankers. ' 
65 This shows that the transfer 
of land to banker was considered by the Government as 
a threat to the unity, solidarity and prosperity of the 
village community. Alienations, however, at that time, 
were very uncommon and there was no widespread anxiety. 
Throughout the province, except for the Muzzaffargharh 
64. Parliamentary papers, 1854, LXIX, (General Report 
on the Administration of the Punjab, (1849-50 and 
1850-1 para 227) p. 528. 
65. Circular No. 38, May 3,1852, Circular Orders 
Vol. 1. pp. 178-9. 
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district, hardly over 2% of the assessed land was 
mortgaged. 
66 In 1854, Richard Temple wrote in regard 
to the regular settlement operations in the Punjab 
that 'sums began to be advanced to the peasant pro- 
prietors by the money-lending classes on the new 
security afforded by the property ...... their privilege 
was not abused, nor did any extensive indebtedness set 
in. ' 
67 This observation might not be strictly accurate 
for every district but it is consistent with contem- 
porary evidence which shows no indication of special 
anxiety among cultivators. 
Due to the political stability and abolition of 
various arbitrary taxes$ the cultivators were better 
66. Temple, R., Men and Events of My Time in India, 
London, 1882, p. 89.; Selections from the papers 
of Indebtedness and Land-Transfer, Op. cit. 
In the South-Western Punjab the sale of land for 
debt, in the CAITpur TahsTl of the Muzaffargarh 
*0 district attracted the attention of the Financial 
Commissioner. He expressed his surprise and con- 
cern at the number of transfers made to Hindu bankers, 
and noted that nothing of the kind had occurred 
elsewhere in the Punjab: O'Brien's report of 
CAli'pur, 18779 para. 39. 
67. Temple, op. cit. 
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off than under the former rule. The value of agri- 
cultural produce had considerably increased; the 
pressure of land-tax was minimal. Many of the culti- 
vators were capable of paying off their old debts with 
a rapidity which was quite unexpected. The contemporary 
politico-religious scholars had legalised the payment 
of any rate of interest on loans. 
68 Consequently the 
cultivators lost the fear of debt which originally 
restrained them. Two or three harvests would enable 
them to repay a sum which they would hardly have dared to 
borrow before. Therefore they began to borrow on much 
less weighty grounds than before, and no longer 
restricted'their borrowing to occasions of real necessity. 
69 
Their intelligence, however, did not increase with their 
prosperity. They borrowed recklessly, and accepted the 
bankers' accounts blindly. 
70 Thorburn says: 
'We converted collective into individual owner- 
ship of land, plus the right to alienate it at 
pleasure. By so doing we made an unconditional 
68. See above page. 133. 
69. Roe, Charles Arthur and Rattigan, H. A. B., Tribal Law 
in the Punjab, so far as it relates-to right in 
Ancestral land, Lahore, 1895, p. 165. 
70. Darling, Sir Malcolm, The Punjab Peasant in Prosperity 
and Debt. London, 1925, p. 21. 
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gift of a valuable estate to every peasant 
proprietor in the Punjab, and raised his 
credit from the former limit of the surplus 
of an occasional good crop to the market 
value of the proprietary right conferred. 
It is difficult for us now to realise the 
revolution effected in the status and 
relations introduced in 1849-50. Until 
then his borrowing was limited to a few 
rupees, recoverable only at harvest time ... 
In one day the old order passed away and 
gave place to a new one, which imposed 
upon this unsophisticated Punjabi a responsi- 
bility to which he was unequal, in that he who 
had never handled coin in his life before was 
required to pay to his government twice a year 
a fixed sum of money - crop or no crop. To 
his surprise and delight he found that his 
former petty borrowing powers were now practically 
unlimited, his Bania (sic) being ready to 
accommodate him to any extent., 
71 
The banker charged a high rate of compound interest 
for his debt which grew rapidly to the point where it could 
71. Thorburn, op. cit., pp. 48-49. 
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not be settled by the cultivator. The banker, 
eventually, brought a suit in the civil court and 
obtained complete control over the property of the 
cultivator. 
Consequently the transfer of land in payment of 
debt, and debt slavery, became regular features of 
village life, 
72 
which gave rise to widespread agrarian 
discontent throughout the country. 
The process continued. 1 
The bigger proprietors 
as well as the cultivators were hard hit. Every year 
large numbers of estates were put up for sale under 
the decrees of the courts in payment of debts, which 
assumed significance when it was found that in many 
places throughout the country the cultivators took 
advantage of the disturbances of 1857, and burned and 
destroyed the houses and property of the bankers to 
revenge themselves on the bankers who had robbed and 
enslaved them. 
73 The District Officers, W. Edwards of 
Bad; uhs H. D. Robertson of Sah; ranpur and M. Thornhill 
72. Debt slavery was clinched by legal provisions which 
required a borrower to work for the account of the 
person who had advanced him money, or go to jail. 
The actl,, however,, was repealed in 1925. For 
details see Fawcett, op. cit. p. 138. 
73. Edwards, W. 9 Personal Adventures during the Indian 
Rebellion, London, 1858, p. 14. 
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of Mathura observed that the first proceedings 
everywhere were to take revenge on the money-lenders. 
74 
'By fraud or chicanery,, a vast number of the estates 
of families of rank and influence have been alienated, 
either wholly or in part, and have been purchased by 
the buniyas (sic)', who could not command any influence 
over their tenantry. They practised unmitigated 
usuryq treated their debtors harshly, and naturally 
became the targets of attack. Their account books and 
their household property were thrown into the flames. 
Edward describing the cause of these attacks says, 
'The English Courts which offered facilities to the 
most oppressive money-lenders in executing a decree for 
the satisfaction, of, an-ordinary debt against an ignorant 
peasantry produced the greatest resentment amongst the 
agricultural population and a dangerous dislocation of 
the social structure. ' 
75 
. 
Thus the exorbitant rate of 
interest charged by the bankers not merely uprooted 
the ordinary people from their small holdings but also 
destroyed the nobility of the country. Both the orders 
being the victims of the repacity of the banker and the 
74. Ibid. also Thornhill, M., The Personal Adventures and 
Experiences of a Magistrate during the Indian Mutiny, 
London, 1884, p. 34. 
75. Thornhill, Ibid. p. 35. 
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operations of the civil courts took advantage to unite 
in the Revolt in a common effort to recover what they 
C- had 'invariably termed as 'Jin say az1zI 
dearer than life' 76 and were losing. During the dis- 
turbances of 1857, the situation remained fairly under 
control, and there were no widespread disturbances of 
this kind. The neighbouring villages of Siy; lkot, 
Ludhiyina, Panlipat, BalsT and Korana,, however, all rose, 
refused to pay land-tax and directed their attacks against 
the bankers and specially the auction purchasers who had 
gained possession of their lands. 
77 But in most parts 
of the province, the cultivators remained loyal to the 
government. Thorburn says: 
'That the Musalman peasant is a shortsighted 
and long suffering animal, is demonstrated 
from his history during the last twenty years. 
So long as the paternal acres remain in his 
possession and the pinch of actual poverty is 
not feltq he is content to rub along from day 
to day, deliberately oblivious of accumulating 
debts until Fate's decree removes him to 
paradise. Though a good deal of indebtedness 
was incurred within the first decade of our rule, 
76. Coo. per, F., The Crisis in the Punjabs London 1858, p. 140. 
77. Chick, N. A., The Annals of the Indian Rebellion, 
London, 1860, p. 719. 
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the area of land alienated to non-agriculturists 
in that period was small. Except in localities 
in which summary settlements had broken down in 
consequence of over-assessments, no popular 
discontent at the insidious transfer of the rights 
of the people of the soil to nerveless aliens 
anywhere manifested itself before 1860. It 
cannot be doubted that the loyalty of the Punjab 
peasantry during the Sepoy mutiny was largely due 
to the absence, in 1857-58, of good cause of 
agrarian discontent. In the older Gangetic 
districts of the N. W. Provinces, that Mutiny was 
largely taken advantage of by the agriculturists 
to wreak their vengeance on the money-lenders and 
auction-purchasers who had dispossessed them., 
78 
In Meerut, the cultivators took a more prominent 
part in the slaughter of bankers and auction-purchasers. 
'The whole country was rising; native drums, the signal 
to the villagers to assemble, were being beaten in all 
directionsq and crowds were seen moving up to the gathering 
place ahead. ' The surrounding country was soon ablaze, 
the tahsil of Sardh; na was attacked and escaped prisoners 
00 
78. Thorburn, op. cit. pp. 51-52. 
1'69 
murdered their money-lenders. 
79 
On the banks of the Eastern Jumna Canal, as 
witnessed by English refugees from Delhi, 'villages in 
flames in all directions, and their auction-purchasers 
ejected and dispersed, while their women flung them- 
selves into wells to escape dishonour. ' 
80 
In Muzaffarnagarh, the people plundered the courts, 
bungalows and destroyed the jail and the bankers were 
despoiled. The rebel 'insurgents were so furious that 
they did not even spare those of the Baniyas and 
mahajans (sic) who fled to the mosques for shelter. ' 
81 
Among the no 
correspondence, ln 
KhWn, RahTm cAlf, 
6 
WalTdid, but most 
fighting. 82 
ted leaders, mentioned in official 
this connection, were Ismiei-l Khin, MunTr 
Hurmat KhWn. C Abd al-LatTf, A'zim Olin. 
0- 
of them were killed in hand to hand 
79. Ibid. 
80. Ibid. 
81. Kaye,, J. W., A History of the Sepoy War in Indias London, 
1880,, Vol. 11, p. 506. 
82. Forrest, G. W. 9 Selections from the Letters, Despatches 
and other State Papers Preserved in the Military 
Department of the Government of India, 1857-58, pp. 353-462. 
1'70. 
In Mathura,, Agra Division, the uprisings did not 
occur all at the same time or in the same manner, owing 
to local conditions, yet in type and pattern these were 
much the same. The news of the political disturbances 
spread with great rapidity and the whole country rose 
almost simultaneously. The police and revenue 
establishments and courts were everywhere ejected, or 
if permitted to remain, 'were allowed to remain on mere 
sufferance; the Bunjahs (sic) were plundered and new 
proprietors ejected and murdered., 
83 
In Allahabad Division, the incidents of this kind 
were 'worgeA and more widespread, 'particularly in the 
Do5b Parganas inhabited mostly by Mahomedans (sic), 
whot to a man, were disaffected. . 
84 In Sekandra were 
the clashes between the ex-zamindars and the auction 
purchasers were more extensive than in any other part 
85 
of Allahabid, the excited cultivators and the dis- 
possessed Zamindars made a common cause in outstaing 
the auction purchasers and decree holders And in 
83. Thornhill, op. cit., pp. 100-6. 
84. Chick, op. cit, p. 820. 
85. Ibid; also Dodd, G., The History of the Indian 
Revolt, London, 1859, p. 157. 
171, 
plundering everything they could lay their hands on. 
The leading rebels were named as FazlcAzirm Ghulam 
86 MurtSza, Faqir Bakhsh and cAzTIm All; h Khin. 
0 
The cultivators of the neighbouring villages of 
Allihabid destroyed courts and hunted the auction- 
87 
purchasers and decree holders. 
In Rohilkhand Division, the great bankers, Misr 
BaiTn; th and Kuniatlal were repeatedly dispoi 
I led. 88 
In Benares Division, even old women and boys joined 
in plundering the money-lenders' deserted houses. 
89 In 
Brayli, the cultivators and Zamindars whose rights 
had passed into the hands of money-lenders attempted 
to regain their ancestral holdings and hunted out their 
auction-purchasers, who suffered the same fate as else- 
where. 
The village communities of the villages around 
Ham7irpur, Jalaunq JhansT. Sagar, Jabalpur committed the 
usual outrages. They directed their attacks against the 
86. Ibid.; Forrest, op. cit. 
87. Ibid. 
88. Forrest, op. cit., p. 321. 
89. Ibid, p. 521o 
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bankers, the money-lenders and especially the auction- 
purchasers 'who had gained possession of their lands, 190 
Hanging, flogging and murdering them, burning and 
destroying their houses became general. 
91 
In short, the village communities felt that they 
had been downtrodden by the bankers, who practised 
unmitigated usury under the legal protection, and naturally 
directed their attacks on them. Their account books and 
household property were thrown into the flames. 
It is generally believed that the British Courts 
which offered facilities to the money-lenders in - 
executing a decree for the satisfaction of a debt pro- 
duced the greatest resentment amongst. the agricultural 
population; and this was the sole reason why the culti- 
vators, to whom borrowing was the only resource, were 
so uncompromisingly hostile to the new rulers. However, 
the fact remains that the theory of interest, as under- 
stood by the community, played anAmportant part in the 
decadence of the Muslims. In the words of Thorburn, 
'It unfits them for-the struggle of life. '92 There was a 
90. Ibid. 
91. Thornhill, op. cit.; Further papers relative to 
the Mutiny in India of 1857-58. Vol. VII, p. 275 
92. Thorburn,, op. cit. p. 38. 
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complete ban on such fiscal activities amongst Muslims, 
the Hindu bankers charged maximum interest from them, 
and enjoyed a complete monopoly of the money market: 
'Had Islam arisen in the fertile plains of 
Hindostan instead of in the deserts of 
Arabia, its attitude towards the taking of 
interest might have been different. Financing 
the village, marketing its produce and supplying 
its necessities, the money-lender in India 
frequently stood between the cultivator and 
death. ' 9_3 
However, a number of senior administrators proposed to 
intervene to alter the bankers' attitude towards their 
clientsq and resolved that the courts should not be 
used by them to oppress the cultivators. In 1858, 
John Lawrence, the head of Punjab province, expressed his 
deep concern that the courts did not sufficiently 
protect ignorant cultivators from unscrupulous bankers. 
94 
This was certainly a significant comment from the head 
of the administration on the prevailing conditions in the 
country. 
93. Darling, op. cit., p. 132. 
94. Selections from the Papers of Indebtedness and Land 
Transfer,, op. cit. 9 p. 371 . 
17 4. 
In the eyes of the law the position of the litigants, 
the banker and the cultivator, was simply of a debtor 
and creditor. But, in fact, the cultivator in money 
matters, as described by Thorburn, 'was a crass and 
hardly-intelligible simpleton', and the banker, 'a sharp 
unscrupulous businessman whose sole interest was self- 
interest. ' 95 To ensure that the banker should not 
take advantage of the ignorance of the cultivator, 
Lawrence introduced the registration of bonds and the 
keeping of proper account books. He proposed to place 
restrictions on the compulsory sale of land for the 
payment of debt. Although such sales were placed at the. 
discretion of the Divisional Commissioner, and in this 
way, were made rare, he wanted to make them still rarer, 
for he believed that "such sales foster hatred between 
classes who will tear each other to pieces directly the 
bonds of civil order are loosened., 
96 
Despite the fact that the government followed a 
protective policy in order to preserve the proprietory 
95. Thorburn, op. cit. p. 
96. Judicial Commissioner's circular No. 103 30 October 1858; 
Proceedings of the Punjab Government, Judicial Department, 
November 1858, Nos. 40-1. 
1750 
bodies, sale of land for debt gradually increased: 
'By all means let land fetch its value in the 
market, and let people sell and buy it if it 
be their interest to do so. But experience 
shows that such transactions are not frequent 
when people are prosperous; whenever they are 
frequentg we may suspect that there is either 
some distress capable df remedy, or some pressure 
of the revenue, or some sinister influence at 
work. ' 
97 
This created a sharp antagonism in the rural society, 
led to the disturbances of 1875 in the province of 
Deccan, and forced the Government to pass the 
Deccan Agriculturists' Relief Act in 1879. In the 
Punjabt the widespread discontent among the rural 
society also resulted in the passing of the Punjab 
Alienation of Land Act in 1900. This may be seen in 
the Appendix at the end of the chapter. 
97. Parliamentary papers, 1859, XVIII, p. 469. 
Report prepared by Richard Temple regarding sales 
of Land, in 1856-1858. 
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APPENDIX- 
The decision of the Government of Bombay in the 1860's 
to revise land-tax maximised the bitterness in the rural 
society. The tax was raised by practically 50 per cent, 
and in the case of some villages, by 200 per cent. The 
cultivators who had a considerable increase in assess- 
ment were bound to become hopelessly involved in debt. 
' 
The fact that the cultivators were in a situation that 
made it necessary for them frequently to borrow for 
the payment of their dues had been confirmed by 
Colonel Sykes, who conducted a minute and extensive survey 
of the Deccan over many years, questioning between three 
and four milli on people. In his evidence before the 
select committee on the affairs of the East India Company 
in 18329 he stated: 11 am afraid they are in such a 
state of poverty, as there is a great deal of improvidence 
in the ryot. ' The cultivators either had to lose their 
land or to turn to the banker for financial assistance in 
2 
meeting their obligations. But this assistance ensured 
Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government,, 
new series No. CLI. (Report by Col. J. Francis dated 
12 February 1867); Memorandum by Sir G. Wingate, 
dated 12 February 1869. 
2. Ibid. 
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for them a fate that was even worse, for they were 
thereby reduced to becoming bond slaves of the bankers; 
this is demonstrated by a petition from the cultivators 
to the Bombay Government: 
'The monstrosity of our subordinate rulers has 
been so great that words cannot express them. 
The usurpation of our rights by the money- 
lenders, really brings to our recollection the 
jolly old times in which our fathers swayed the 
sceptre in prosperity., It really cuts one to the 
core to reflect on the past and present conditions, 
i. e. the freedom and affluence in which our 
fathers lived and died, and the serfdom in which 
we are doomed to live and die. 13 
The statement reveals the intensity of the social 
malaise which was both alarming and explosive. A British 
officerg who attempted to explain logically the reasons 
for the reassessment, wrote to his higher authority: 
'I endeavoured to reason with them and to point 
out the grounds on which it was but equitable that 
their payment should be raised. I had scarcely 
concluded my explanatory remarks, when most of the 
3. The paragraph is taken from the petition from the 
cultivators of Indapur to the Government, dated 
July, 29,1873, The records of the Revenue Department, 
Vol. 96 of 1874. 
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assembled ryots stood up .......... so excited 
and disrespectful was their demeanour that I 
felt myself bound to report the matter to you 
for further instructions. ' 4 
Consequently the Revenue Commissioner called a meeting 
of the officers of the various districts in order to 
devise measures which would relieve the tension and 
discontent in the rural community. 
5 At this, it-was 
resolved that the assessment of a group of villages 
should never be raised by more than 50 per cent or 
that of a single village by more than 75 per cent. 
It was also resolved that if a cultivator was unable to 
pay his tax, then the revenue department would, in 
the first instance, attach his moveable prope rty and his 
holdings would not be auctioned unless his moveable 
property proved insufficient to cover the full amount 
of the tax. 
6 The imposition of a limit on the extent 
to which the land tax could be increased avoided the 
4. Letter from W. Waddington, dated April 18,1874, The 
Records of the Revenue Department, Vol. 104 of 1874. 
5. W. H. Havelock, The Revenue Commissioner, Letter to 
the Collector of Poona, dated 20 December 1874. The 
Records of the Revenue Department, Vol. 97 of 1874. 
6. Resolution by Bombay Government dated 29 October 1874, 
The Records of the Revenue Department, Vo I. 97/1874. 
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hostility of the cultivator, but the initial source 
of discontent in the village remained. The culti- 
vator depended upon the capital of the banker for the 
payment of the land revenue. The decision first to 
auction a cultivator's moveable property, if he was 
unable to meet his obligations, was a concession which 
was immediately exploited by the banker. He had formerly 
advanced capital to the cultivator, for the payment of 
his obligations, in the knowledge that if he defaulted, 
then the only security which he had to offer, namely, 
his land, would be attached by the Revenue Department, 
and the debt could never be recovered. Since the Government 
now resolved, in 1874, to attach the cultivators' 
moveable property in the first instances the banker did 
not see any threat to his security and consequently 
refused to advance further funds to pay the land 
reven6eý 
7 In this way the banker inflicted unbearable 
hardships on the cultivators. The cultivators attempted 
to bear the bankers down by social szýctions against them, 
and completely severed social and agricultural relations 
7. Letter from J. B. Richey, member of the Bombay Executive 
Councils to W. G. Pedder, dated August 30,1875; The 
Records of the Revenue Department, Vol. 118/1875. 
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with them. 
8 As a result of this, the antagonism 
between the cultivators and the bankers was transformed 
into an open conflict in the village, to such an extent 
that a violent clash between the two groups became in- 
evitable. The news of sanctions against the bankers 
spread very swiftly from village to village, and on 
12 May 1875, the cultivators in the village of Supa 
suddenly rose against the bankers in order to dispossess 
them of the title deeds and the mortgage bonds which they 
looked upon as the instruments of oppression. The 
bankers refused to surrender the bonds and decrees in 
their possession. The cultivators stripped and burnt 
their houses and shops, but no physical harm was done 
to anyone. 
9 In a few days the disturbanceýspread and 
bankers' everywhere faced murderou's assau - lts. 
10 On the 
whole, the main object of the cultivators was to seize 
and to destroy those legal documents which proclaimed 
their bondage to the bankers. According to the Deccan 
Riot Commission r'eport: 'It was not so much a rebellion 
8. An Agreement by the cultivators of the village of 
Kalas in Indapur area, dated I-lay, 7.1875; Report of 
the Deccan Riots Commission, Vol. II, P. 13. 
9. Report of the Deccan Riots Commission, Vol. II. 
10. Ibid. 
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against the oppressor, as an attempt to accomplish a 
very definite and practical object, namely, the dis- 
arming of the enemy by taking his weapons (bonds and 
accounts) and for that purpose mere demonstration of 
force was usually enough. ' 
11 
We have seen that the poverty bf the cultivator, 
the rapacity of the banker and the rigidity of the 
judicial administration were the main factors in the 
outbreak. Despite their awareness of the magnitude 
of the evil, the administrators, who controlled the 
province, were far too committed to laissez-faire 
principles to intervene between debtor and creditor. 
Although the cultivator was free to deal with the 
banker of his choice, he was entirely dependent upon 
the capital of that banker. Moreover he was needy, 
thoughtless and ignorant, and the banker, who was 
shrewd and sophisticated, enjoyed a complete monopoly 
of the money market. 
12 This state of affairs undoubtedly 
revealed the irrelevance of the application of laissez- 
faire to the rural economy. The question was now whether 
the concept of legality which guided the newly established 
Ibid. 
12. Sykes, op. cit. 
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courts of law required modification in view of its 
adverse effect on the prosperity of the cultivator. 
Bartle Frere, confronted with the practical tasks of 
administrationt showed strong doubts about the rele- 
vance of laissez-faire principles in the village 
13 
society and pressed the authorities to fix a ceiling 
on the rates of interest which the banker could charge 
the cultivators. 
14 The Revenue Commissioner of the 
Southern Division, J. Vibart, despite his belief 
that the banker charged exorbitant rates of interest, 
15 
objected to this proposal, and said 'However injurious, 
in some respects, the perfectly free traffic in money 
may be to the advancing prosperity of the country, any 
interference on the part of the Government, in the way 
of limiting the legal, rate of interest, would be of 
doubtful tendency*' 
16 
13. B. Frere, Assistant Collector of Poona, op. cit. 
14. Ibid. 
15. J. Vibart, Revenue Commissioner of the Southern 
Division, to the Bombay Government dated February, 28 
1840. The Records of the Revenue Department, Vol. 
1664/1844. 
16. Ibid. 
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P. Stewart, collector of Poonag agreed with Vibart, when 
he objected to the decrease ofinterest rates. He 
believed that an attempt to lower the rates of 
interest would have precisely the reverse effect to that 
intended. It would encourage the banker to evade the 
law by raising his rates of interest in order to insure 
himself against the risks involved. 
17 
Fixing a maximum rate of interest might be a help 
to the cultivator but it would hardly solve the real 
problems the prime cause of his pecuniary difficulties, 
his need for cheap credit for his daily life and for 
fulfilment of his obligations to the state. His position 
could only be improved by providing him with an alter- 
native source of cheap credit, so that he could reduce 
his dependence on the village banker. To provide such 
facilities P. Stewart proposed the establishment of a 
financial institution to 'Protect the helpless and 
needy from being plundered by irresponsible persons like 
the village banker. ' 
18 This was rejected by Vibart on 
the ground that the government was under no obligation 
to assume the responsibilities of a banker. 
19 
17. Stewart,, op. cit. 
18. P. Stewart, op. cit. 
19. J. Vibart, op. cit. 
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The banker's reluctance to advance loans and the 
absence of an alternative source of credit placed the 
cultivator in so desperate a position that J. B. Richey, 
a member of the executive council also directed the 
attention of the Bombay Government to the need for 
such a source. 
20 The cultivator had no money of his 
own. Richey proposed that the Government should assist 
him in paying out. 5tanding debts to the banker, so 
that he could renew relations with the banker with a 
clean slate. 
21 W. G. Pedder, the Secretary of the 
Bombay Governmentq supported this idea, and, in a 
memorandum about its implications, he pointed out that 
the Government would have to finance cultivators who 
were not badly involved in debt. They, in return, 
would mortgage their crops to the Government till 
their debts were paid. 
22 Pedder pointed out that it 
would involve a considerable financial risk, but the 
benefits gained from it would be most substantial. 
23 He 
concluded, 'We shall have to spend a great deal more 
than this if we have a famine in the Deccan and shall 
then only save life, instead of providing the rise of the 
20. J. B. Richey's letter to the Bombay Government, op. cit. 
21. J. B. Richey, op. cit. 
22. Memorandum by W. D. Pedderg date 31 August, 18759 The 
Records of the Revenue Department, Vol. 118 of 1875. 
23. Ibid. 
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, 24 people as well. 
This proposal resembled Stewart's proposal but 
reflects a more sensitive understanding of the rural 
problems. It was, however, rejected by Sir. Phillip 
Wodehouseq the Governor of Bombay, on the ground that it 
would virtually oblige the state to take upon itself the 
role of the banker, who provided the cultivator with 
advances for the cultivation of his land, and for the 
payment of the land tax. It would be impolitic for the 
Government to assume so heavy a responsibility. 25 He 
concluded, 'Our aim must be to maintain friendly re- 
lations with the Sowcar'(banker) to satisfy him that 
while we will do our best to prevent extortion, we will 
throw no obstacle in the way'of the reasonable involve- 
ment of his money., 
26 
Since the proposal to provide some other source of 
credit to the cultivator was rejected and ruled out 
by the Governor, a remedy had to be found by reforming 
the legal system so that the relations between the 
cultivator and the banker could be improved. 
24. Ibid. 
25. Minute by Sir Philip Wodehouse, Governor of Bombay, 
dated 17 September, 1875. The Records of the Revenue I 
Department Vol. 118 of 1875. 
26. Ibid. Also see his minute dated 19 October 1875 in The 
Records of the Revenue Department, Vol. 118 of 1875. 
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The Governor also believed that if the Government 
upheld the right to private property, it was also 
incumbent upon it to enforce; -the repayment of debts 
which had been justly contracted, even if such enforce- 
ment resulted in the large-scale transfer of landed 
property into the hands of the banker. 
27 In other 
words he opposed drastic changes in the legal system. 
However, a commission was appointed to enquire into 
the outbreak and proposed remedies for the rural 
problems within the terms of reference set by the Government. 
The commission reported that the ignorance of the 
cultivator placed him under a, grave handicap in his 
dealing with the shrewd and grasping banker. The removal 
of the cultivator's ignorance would of necessity be a 
slow and laborious process, and it concerned issues which 
fell outside the commission's terms of reference. But 
until the cultivator's ignorance was removed, the 
Government bore a moral responsibility to see that his 
lack of sophistication did not put him at a disadvantage 
in the courts of law. 
28 The commission recommended the 
compulsory registration of bonds by public notaries, 
29 followed by a minute record of subsequent proceedings. 
27. Ibid. 
28. Deccan Riots Commission Report, vol. 1, para. 13-14. 
29. Ibid. 
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The commission also found the cultivator unable to 
attend the courts situated at a great distance from 
his villages and recommended the establishment of 
courts of circuit which would tour the country districts 
to try civil cases., 
30 The commission also recommended 
increasing the strength of judicial officers. 
31 
The recommendations proposed by the commission 
wereq perhapsq to secure the approval of the Governor, 
Sir Phillip Wodehouse. Before any further action was 
taken, Sir Phillip was succeeded in 1877 as Governor of 
Bombay by Sir Richard Temple, who proved to be more 
concerned for the prosperity of the cultivator than his 
predecessor. He looked to a vision of India consisting 
of a 'community of strong and independent yeomen farmers', 
who had to be protected from the corrosive influences-of 
a commercial society. 
32 As a result, the judicial 
administration was radically changed in, favour of the 
cultivator. 
Previously the courts of law had investigated cases 
of debt without reference to wider problems of social 
30. Ibid. 
31. Ibid. 
32. Stokes, op. cit., p. 244. 
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equity. When a judge was presented with a bond which 
was properly executed, he immediately decided against 
the debtor who had executed the bond. The bonds however, 
could be unjust. 
33 The money originally borrowed by 
a cultivator was in most cases only a small fraction 
of the sum for which he was sued, and the rest of his 
debt was made up of interest which was added to the 
principal at successive renewals of the bond. 
34 It was 
also possible that the debt had since incurred not by 
the cultivator himself but by his ancestors. The 
Governor strongly recommended that the judges should 
examine the detailed history of the debt. He also re- 
commended changes in legal administration which would 
help the cultivator. Although the, draft bill did not 
question the principles which were favoured by the 
British Administration, it was opposed by the Government 
of India on the grounds that it would cast upon the 
courts a burden of work which it seemed questionable 
33. SYkes 9 op. cit. 9 Darling, op. cit.. p. 1369 Thorburn, 
op. cit., p. 53. Taba'tabi'i,, op. cit., Vol. 11, 
p. 17, Minute, by Sir Richard Temple, dated November 12, 
1877. Bombay Government Selections, No. 157. 
34. Ibid. 
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whether they could, as then constituted, get through; 
it would afford many opportunities for fraud and evasion 
by dishonest debtors; and it might be an incentive 
to reckless borrowing. 
35 
Although the Government of India did not see any 
reason to amend the legal system, the Secretary of 
State felt that the system in fact, induced a condition 
of helplessness in the cultivator which could be 
resolved only by far-reaching reforms, so that the 
cultivators could achieve justice according to their 
notion of social equity. 
36 He wrote to the governor 
'Your Government has dis. tinctly perceived that the courts 
of justice we have constituted and lawlthey administer, 
operate most hastily and frequently with injustice, on 
debtorsq who form the bulk of the population. Here, 
therefore, is an opportunity for the beneficial inter- 
ference ....... of extending the power of judges to modify 
the contracts entered into between man and man. 
37 
35. Letter to Bombay Government dated July 1.1878, Bombay 
Government Selections No. 157. 
36. Letter by Lord Cranbrook to Bombay Government, dated 
20 December, 1878, Bombay Government Selections, No. 157. 
37. Ibid. 
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The new admi'nistration granted the cultivator 
transferable property rights in land, developed a 
rational policy of land revenue under which every 
cultivator was obliged to pay his due cirectly to the 
State; and established a modern system of justice. 
Its efforts were rewarded with success38 but at the same 
time it created acute tension between the cultivator 
and the banker which led to the Riots of 1875. Lord 
Lytton in the discussion preceeding the passing of the 
Deccan Ryots Act in 1879, asked his council the following 
question: 
'Is it not obvious that if in any part of 
India the actual cultivators of the soil 
see not only the proceeds of their labour, 
but actually their personal freedom passing 
from them into the hands of a class whom, rightly 
or wrongly, they regard as the authors of their 
ruin, and under the protection of laws which, 
rightly or wrongly, they regard as engines of 
it, the bitterness of sentiment, the sense of 
hopelessness and irremediable wrong engendered 
by such a state of things must be a chronic 
38. Dutt, op. cit., Taba9tab; 9T. op. cit. Sir Sayyid 
Ahmad Khan, op. cit. 
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incentive, if not to social disturbances, at 
least to personal crime? ' 
39 
The Bombay Government in a decisive attempt, answered 
the questions and passed the Deccan Relief Act as a 
remedy, to restore the cultivator to his former position. 
According to this all disputes concerning debt were to 
be resolved through the panchWyat. The parties could 
however resort to litigation, if the panchiyat proved 
abortive, by approaching newly created officers known 
as munsifs. The courts of the munsifs were situated within 
easy reach of villages. The District Courts which heard 
the appeals made against the awards of the munsifs, were 
generally supervised by a special judge appointed for 
the purpose. Above all, all courts of law had to in- 
vestigate the history of each case, for the bond signed 
by a cultivator was considered no more value as a proof 
of debt than the confession of a man under torture of the 
crime he was charged with. The judge had to establish 
firmly the extent of a cultivator's responsibility for a 
loan before giving judgement. 
40 
. _Pý 
39. Lord Lytton before the Legislative Council dated 
17 July 1879, Bombay Government Selections No. 157, 
new series. 
40. The Agriculturalists Relief Act of 1879: Bombay 
Government Selection No. 157, new series. 
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While the cultivator warmly welcomed the act as 
a measure for his protection and a hopeful augury for 
a prosperous future, the banker considered it as some- 
thing designed to undermine his position. He was aware 
of his importance in the rural economy and of the fact 
that the cultivator was still his dependent. So, as 
a protest against the 'iniquitous' provisions of the 
act, he refused to 'attend to agricultural work, ' and 
asked the Government to point out a way in which the 
agriculturalists would be enabled to get 'timely 
pecuniary aid. ' 
41 Later on, the bankers proposed an 
Agricultural Bank. 42 The system of credit before 1879 
had brought about the dominance of the bankers over the 
cultivators in the village; equally, the Act of 1879 
had amended the law in favour of the cultivators and 
had, the bankers believed, undermined their own position. 
The bankers thought that the bank would avoid both of 
these evils. For if the bankers were organised in 
banks with the blessings of the Government, then they 
would not aspire to dominate the cultivators, since 
the banks would be able to protect their interests 'without 
involving them in litigation of dubious morality. ' 
43 They 
41. Petition presented by the Poona Bankers mentioned in 
A. D. Pollen's Report, dated June 7,1880; Deccan 
Agriculturalist's Relief Act, Vol. 1. pp. 223-6. 
42. Ibid. 
43. Ibid. 
: 
suggested that the Government should undertake the 
payment of the amount owed by the cultivators, and the 
cultivators should pay it off to the Government by 
annual instalments. 
44 In return the bankers agreed to 
purchase shares in the proposed bank equivalent to the 
amount of money which the Government would agree to 
45 
give them as a pyament of the debts of the cultivators. 
The whole matter, it seems, was a fictitious transaction, 
and the bankers wanted the Government to accept the re- 
sponsibility of collecting their loans on their behalf. 
The Government, however, rejected this idea and replied: 
'It is desirable for the Government to render 
some assistance to capitalists or bankers who 
undertake to advance money to the landholders, 
and to exercise some control over their business. 
But in deciding to what lengths the Government 
should go .......... the former must be left to 
private enterprise and if this private enterprise 
is to be floated with cork-jackets by a Government 
guarantee, it will not be private enterprise, but 
a spurious form of state interventionism. ' 
46 
44. Ibid. 
45. Ibid. 
46. Memorandum on the question of State Assistance to 
Agricultural Banks in India by W. Warner, dated 
20 April, 1882. The Records of the Department of 
Revenue proceedings, No. 13/20 of June 1884. 
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The Act was aimed at reforming the law in conformity 
with the principles of social equity which had pre- 
vailed before British rule, and to provide a basis for 
a healthy relationship between the banker and the 
cultivator, by throwing the weight of the administration 
in favour of the latter. The establishment of an 
agricultural bank however, was seen by the Government 
as an undesirable step. The Secretary of State stated: 
'There is a strong presumption that 
Government cannot directly do much more 
for the relief of the agricultural debtor 
than take care that in disputes between 
him and his creditors the law shall 
provide, and the courts shall administer 
speedy, cheap and equal justice, and that 
the ryot shall be as little liable as 
possible, from his ignorance, his poverty, 
or his position, to be defrauded or 
oppressed. ' 
47 
Although it was certain that the bank would not be 
able to dominate the cultivator in the way the banker 
had previously done, but would act on behalf of the 
banker, and collect his dues, accepting the complex job 
47. Parliamentary Papers, Vol. LXII of 1877, 
Dispatch to the Government 6f India dated 23 October 1884. 
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of providing the cultivator credit for his daily life 
was not so easy, at that time, for the British Adminis- 
tration. The administration, therefore, refused at this 
time, to provide him with this alternative source of 
credit, and confined its reforms to the judicial system. 
But the attitude of the banker towards the rural economy, 
and his rapacity in his fiscal dealings with his debtor, 
eventually forced the Adihi-nistration to solve the pressing 
problem of the scarcity of cheap capital for agriculture 
by establishing agricultural banks, co-operative banks 
and co-operative societies. The introduction of co- 
operative farming, the development of a modern irrigation 
system, the building of railways, roads and other means 
of transport and communications raised the cultivator 
to a state of considerable prosperity. 
48 In 1918 The 
Deccan Riots Assdciation demanded for him, a position 
in keeping with his newly acquired economic status, 
separate representation in the legislatures; this was to 
be implemented under the new constitution. 
49 
48. H. W. Wolff, Co-operation in India, London 1925, p. 155. 
Ballhatchet, op. cit., pp. 125-127. Dutt, op. cit. 
49. Ibid. 
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The Punjab Land Alienation Act. 
Robert Cust, the judicial commissioner of the province 
of Punjab, believed that the compulsory sale of land 
for debt was the natural and just result of owning 
land. The restrictions on such sales could not be 
justified in terms of political economy; they were 
bound to reduce the value of landed property; they 
would raise the rates of interest and retard the 
improvement of the land. 
50 lie made it clear, however, 
to his opponents that he would never sanction the 
compulsory sale of hereditary land under any circum- 
stances. 
51 The cultivator usually gave almost all 
the produce of his farms, at the harvest time, to the 
banker and-for his own common expenses, again depended 
upon the assistance of the banker. Some officers 
opposed the Governmen, t policy and argued that a culti- 
vator who could not derive an adequate profit from his 
land should resign it and seek his livelihood elsewhere. 
52 
50. Cust, Robertq Manual for the Guidance of Revenue 
Officers in the Punjab, Lahore 1866, pp. 3,30-1. 
51. Ibid.; Proceedings of the Punjab Government, 
Judicial Deparýment, June 21,1862, Nos. 5-6. 
52. Minute by Donald Friell McLeod, Lieutenant Governor 
of the Punjab, Augustq 27,1867, para. 8,10. 
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In 1860-61, a famine year, the contraction of debts 
became possible on a hitherto unknown scale. Land 
being valuable and transferable, mortgages and sales 
for debts assumed unprecedented forms. Robert Cust 
issued a circular in October 1860, reaffirming that the 
transfer of land to the banker must be confirmed by 
the commissioner. If the cultivator was driven to sell 
or mortgage his land to the village banker by pressure of 
the revenue, the matter must be immediately investigated, 
and the assessment must be reduced. 
53 
The policy of'protecting the cultivator from the 
rapacity of the banker through various restrictions was 
sharply criticised by some British Officers. For 
instance Hector'Mackenzie, settlement officer of Gujrat 
District where a goodly number of bankers lived, opposed 
the restriction on the banker's purchasing the land from 
his debtor. He pointed out the difficulty of the 
cultivators who were forced to sell their land at prices 
lower than 
k4 . 1- 
nduced them to agree -to se 44_, 
54 
To overcome this difficulty Cust amended the regulation to 
prescribe that 'only where the price offered by a stranger 
was a fictitious and fraudulent one, should the assessors 
53. Circular No. 96, October 13,1860, Book Circular Orders, 
Vol. 3, pp. 396-400. 
54. Hector Mackenzie's Settlement Report of Gugr9t, 1859, 
para. 178. 
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be allowed to fix a lower price in lieu of it. Where a 
stranger made a genuine offer, it was the collector's 
duty to overrule any attempt by the assessors to fix 
a lower price for pre-emptors. This would enable the 
owner to obtain the legitimate value of his land, 
according to the law of supply and demand, '55 
This reveals that the Government Policy stemmed 
from assumptions that the alienation of land was harmful 
for the prosperity and solidarity of the cultivators. 
Although the banker provided great help for agricultural 
operations in the province, he was not fair in his 
dealings with his debtor, and, taking advantage of his 
ignorance and poverty, was pressing him for the sale of 
his farms for debt. The senior authorities, however, 
believed that the discouragement of such transfers was 
a measure of distinctly temporary character. 
56 The 
village communities would have sooner or later,, to melt 
away and give place to a more modern distribution of 
property. 
57 It was argued that in the evolution of a 
55. Cust, OP. Cit. P. 116. 
56. Ibid. 
57. Ibid. pp. 29,186. 
MWI 
community institutions and values which had once per- 
formed a creative role and satisfied a genuine need often 
became completely purposeless. It was foolish and even 
dangerous to oppose the abolition of such values and 
58 institutions. The measure, however, could not be 
forced through. The government, therefore, in spite of 
some opposition, controlled the money market to a certain 
extent, and did not permit the monied class to absorb 
59 
village proprietors. 
In 1866, the system of judicial administration was 
recognised. The judicial commissioner, who had to 
sanction the compulsory sale of land for debts, was 
replaced by the Chief Court, and the code of civil 
procedure (which asserted that all property was liable 
to attachment and sale in execution of a civil decree) 
was extended to the province of Punjab. Although the Chief 
Court's policy was to avert compulsory sale when the money 
due could be raised in other ways, some judges considered 
this system much less satisfactory than the protective 
measures adopted earlier, 
60 
and demanded more precise and 
58. Colebrooke, T. E., Life of Honourable Mount Stuart 
Elphinstone, London, 1884, Vol. 1. p. 6. 
59. Custs op. cit. 
60. The judges, Charles Boulnois and David Simson were in 
close agreement in their preference for legislation 
f6d. - 
definite regulations regarding the restrictions on 
land transfer for debt. Since no principles had been 
laid down to guide the courts in the exercise of their 
discretion, which was exercised in an unregulated manner 
in other parts of the country, the judges in the Punjab 
seeing the social and economic evils which resulted 
from this system expressed their preference for legis- 
lation which would provide a substantial check on the 
sale of land in execution of decrees. 
61 They rejected 
the notion that the permission for such sale helped 
credit in a rural society, and argued that compulsory 
sales of land for debt had been unknown under native rule, 
and yet the cultivators had had as little difficulty in 
attaining money as at present ..... any restriction on 
agricultural creditq because of the complete prohibition 
of the sale of land in execution of decrees, would be 
which would provide a substantial check on the sale of 
land in execution of decree: Register of the Chief 
Court of the Punjab, No. 1550 May, 10,1869. Minute by 
Boulnois, Judge of the Chief Court of the Punjab, 
March, 1869, and Minute of Simson, Judge of the Chief 
Court, no date. 
61. Ibid. 
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beneficial rather than injurious, perhaps instituting 
reckless and unnecessary expenditure on marriages and 
other social and religous functions. 
62 If the 
limitation of credit, Charles Boulnois concluded, made 
it impossible for landowners to pay an excessive revenue 
demand, the reduction of that demand was a duty which 
the Government fully recognized. 
63 These proposals were 
strongly supported by various British Officers. Lieutenant 
Colonel Coxe, the Commissioner of Jullandar Division 
expressed his entire agreement with them. He argued 
that the cultivator was entirely at the mercy of the 
banker who exploited his advantage ruthlessly. The 
banker could enter in his account almost any amount he 
pleased; and if his books had been kept according to 
law, he was almost certain to win a decree in court. 
64 
On the other hand the cultivator was ignorant and utterly 
incapable in money matters 
ý5 Arthur Brandreth, a settlement 
62. -Proccedings of the Punjab Government, Judictal Department, 
May, 1869,13A. 
63. Ibid. 
64. Abstract of A. H. Coxe, Report, No. 200, June 29,18699 
Proceedings of the Punjab Government, Judicial 
Department, November, 1869,17A. 
65. Ibid. 
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officer, also supported the protective measure advocated 
by the judges. He argued that the restrictions on land 
alienation would avoid the sort of ill feeling and 
antagonism in rural society which were a direct result 
of compulsory sales of property due to the defective 
judicial administration and faulty revenue arrangements 
which forced cultivators to borrow at high rates of 
interest. 67 Philip Sandys Melvill, the officiating 
Financial Commissioner, however, criticised the notions 
put forward by the judges. He argued that the sweeping 
away of the security of land for loans would result in 
a contraction of agricultural credit which could not fail 
to be harmful for cultivators requiring short term 
loans for various purposes. 
68 Melvill, in fact, was 
less concerned. with agricultural indebtedness than with 
the improvement and prosperity of the province. 
69 Land 
previously had had little value, but now its value had 
increased considerably. The cultivators had freed them- 
selves from the overwhelming burden of debt which had 
67. Abstract of A. Brandreth, No. 196, August 28,1869, 
Proceedin2s of the Punjab Government, Judicial 
Departmentq November, 1869,17A. 
68. Proceeding of the Punjab Government, Judicial Department, 
November, 1869,17A. 
69.1 bid. 
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previously weighed them down. Both cultivators and 
bankers were more precise in their contracts than 
they had been. 
70 In spite of the judges' opinions 
on agricultural credit, Melvill seems to have clung to 
the views of credit frequently put forward by certain 
officers who had argued along similar lines. 
71 He 
concluded that the law should be slightly altered to 
ensure that land was not sold in execution until it 
has been shown that the debt could not be realised in 
any other way. 
72 Charles Lindsay, another judge of the 
chief court, agreed with Melvill in opposing the 
proposals advocated by his colleagues. lie argued that 
the Punjab was not in tutelage, and that the people 
were able to take care of themselves, knowing the increased 
value of land and money ..... the legislation was likely 
to make matters worse, by depreciating the value of land 
as security, and hence impairing the cultivators' ability 
to obtain a loan in time of need. 
73 He was opposed to 
maintaining a family that had 'lived its time, and 
through foolishness had ruined itself. ' 
74 He also believed 
70. Ibid. 
71. Edward John Lake, Thomas Douglas Forsyth, Captain Tighe, 
Hector Mackenzie opposed the protective policy; for details 
see Extracts from the Land Revenue Reports, 1861-2 
pp. 48,56,113. 
72. Ibid. 
73. Note by C. Lindsay, Judge of the Chief Court, Feb. 1870,4A. 
74. Ibid. 
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that the arrival of a capitalist was likely to infuse 
75 
new energy into and give life to, the decaying property. 
Donald McLeod, the head of the Punjab Government, examined 
the social and economic conditions which prevailed in 
Punjab rural society and the opinions held by British 
Officers. He expressed his entire agreement with views 
presented by the judges. He contended that the com- 
pulsory sale of land had never been recognised under 
native rule, and such sales were abhorent to the feelings 
and opinions of the majority of the people of the Punjab. 
He supported his argument with references to scenes 
witnessed in 1857 .... 'villages in flames in all directions, 
and the bankers ejected and dispersed' 
76 
0 He asked the 
Chief Court judges to prepare a draft enactment for an 
absolute prohibition of the sale of land for debt. 
77 
In 1871, Arthur Brandbreth found bankers absorbing 
village proprietors to a serious extent. Referring to 
the alienation of land as a political question of extreme 
75. Ibid. 
76. Proceedings of the Punjab Government, Judicial 
Department, February, 1870 4A. 
77. Secretary to the Government, No. 227, February, 
1870. 
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78 importance he requested a solution from the authorities. 
The political danger outlined by Brandbreth was denied 
by the Lieutenant Governor, Henry Davis. He criticised 
Brandreth's views, and expressed his regret that an 
officer in such a responsible position should have put 
on official record opinions which could not be supported 
by admitted fact or reasonable argument. 
7 9 This was in 
February, 1872. In June 1872, Philip Sandys Melvil who 
had opposed the restrictions on land alienation, and 
maintained that cultivators were able to take care of 
themselves, protested against the great amount of 
injustice done by transferring the land from cultivators 
to bankers. He warned the Government that the pre- 
vailing conditions were bound to give rise to serious 
rural discontent, leading to political danger, just as 
had happened in 1857.80 While he was officiating judge 
of the Chief Court, a memorandum was submitted to the 
Government in which Melvill illustrated the origins of 
alienation. He believed that civil courts often, and 
78. Extracts from the Revenue Reports, 1868-9. Remarks 
by A. Brandbreth, p. 53. 
79. Proceedings of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab 
No. 162, February 3,1872, para. 16, Proceedings of the 
Punjab Government Revenue Department, February, 1872,6A. 
80. Memorandum by P. S. Melvill, June M. 1872. Proceedings, 
_ 
of the Punjab Government, Home Department, June 1872,26A. 
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perhaps generally, decreed excessive interest on sums 
due for the time that passed between the date the debt 
became due and the institution of suit; this led 
frequently to the transfer of land in execution of 
decree. 81 Sometimes cultivators against whom decrees 
had been passed had transferred their land to bankers 
without awaiting the coercive processes of court. 
82 
The cultivators who had not been brought into court 
at all were commonly selling and mortgaging their land 
to bankers, in payment of debts swollen by compound 
interest; they feared that if they were sued, the 
court would ýive no relief from the interest charged. 
Under native rule, there were customary restrictions on 
the rates of interest. 
83 flelvill urged the government 
to impose a similar restriction immediately and demanded 
a detailed enauiry into all the major issues raised in 
the memorandum. 
84 Henry Davis, who probably had little 
sympathy for the policy in favour of the cultivators, 
which he had expressed earlier, this time allowed the 
Chief Court to make the proposed enquiry. 
85 
81. Ibid. 
82. Ibid. 
83. Ibid. 
84. Ibid. 
85. Officiating Under Secretary to the Government's 
No. 2271 June 28,1872, Proceedings of the Punjab 
Government, Home Departmentq June 1872,26A. 
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In November, 1872, the cultivators of the District 
of Montgomery presented a petition in which they 
explained their pecuniary difficulties, and the rapacious 
conduct of their bankers. 
86 They begged the Government 
to help them by liquidating their enormous debts, which 
had been increased by compound interest. Their lands 
had been mortgaged and even sold, and application had 
been made for the imprisonment of some of them. 
87 
G. E. Wakefield, the officiating Deputy Commissioner of 
the Jhang District, in view of widespread discontent and 
ill feeling in the area, urged the lieutenant-governor to 
extricate the cultivators from their accumulating debts, 
88 
The growing body of opinion that the condition of 
the landed proprietors was deteriorating, the increasing 
amount of land transferred to bankers each year, and 
demands for measures to avert the danger of political 
trouble, created a distinct change in the outlook of 
the lieutenant-governor, Henry Davis. The change was 
86. Proceedings of the Punjab Government, (Revenue 
Department) December, 1872, contain the trans- 
lation of petition made by Fizil Sh; h, Sayyid 
Mahammad Shah and others. 
0 
87. Ibid. 
88. Memorandum by G. Wakefield, December, 3.18729 
Proceedings of the Punjab Government, Revenue 
Department, May, 1875,6A. 
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apparent in his review of the provincial revenue report 
for 1871/72; in January 1873, hardly a year after 
his condemnation of Arthur Brandreth, he agreed that 
the bankers were absorbing village property to an 
alarming extent, and that this required a remedy. 
89 He 
predicted that 'if the Government were to forget the 
source of its strength and left the proprietors to be 
absorbed by the bankers, the feelings of the people 
in times of uncertainty would be in opposition to the 
Government. ' 90 Colonel Coxe, who had drawn attention 
to rural indebtedness in 1869, stated that in the 
Jallandhar Division a large portion of the agricultural 
community was being ruined by land transference arisin 
from extravagance, litigation and exorbitant interest 
rates. 
91 In 1873, James Lyall, the settlenent 
Commissioner, urged the importance of preventing the 
transference of land from the hands of the cultivators 
92 into those of the monied classes. In order to slow 
89. Proceedings of the Punjab Government, Revenue Department, 
Officiating Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, 
No. 4C - 16579 1694 November 1872, May, 1875. 
90. Ibid. 
91. Remarks by H. W. H. Coxe, cited in the Extracts of the Land 
Revenue Reports, 1872-3, pp. 3-9-13. 
92. J. B. Lyall, The Settlement Commissioner,, Report 
Nos. 67, July 2,1873, and 127, October 22,1873. 
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down the process of transferences, he wanted legis- 
lation passed for extending the period after which 
the banker had the right of pre-emption in long term 
usufrunctuary mortgages. 
93 In August, 1873, Wakefield 
again asked the Government to consider the possibility 
of agricultural relief in various parts of the province. 
Owing to the poverty and ignorance of the cultivators 
and the bankers' monopoly of the money market, he 
raised doubts about the relevance of laissez-faire in 
Punjab villages, and alluded to the dangers in blind 
adherence to English theories in dealing with India. 
94 
The political danger caused by alienation, he stated, 
had been manifested in the North Western provinces 
in 1857; in the Punjab they were still 'on the right 
side of the hedge. ' He warned the Government that 'if 
the present rate of transfer of land continued, another 
twenty years would see the transfer of sixty per cent of 
the assessed land to bankers. '95 
In answer to the petition presented by the culti- 
vators of the Montgomery district in 1872, which was 
93. Ibid. 
94. G. Wakefield, No. 3079 August, 23,18739 Proceedings 
of the Punjab-Government, Revenue Departmentq January, 
1874,13A. 
95. Ibid. 
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re-presented in 1873, the district authorities reported 
that nothing could be done for them under the existing 
law because most of their debts were secured by registered 
bonds with the bankers on land morgaged as security. 
96 
In April, 1874, the Chief Court submitted the 
reports of the judges to the Government. Charles Boulnois 
proposed, as he had proposed in 1869, that the sale of 
land on a decree held by the banker for debts due from 
the cultivator should not be permitted. 
97 He also 
proposed the abolition of imprisonment for debt. 
98 
Charles Lindsay opposed the maintenance of careless 
and extravagant cultivators. Only those should be 
maintained who strove to maintain themselves ..... they 
should be taught habits of thrift, and should come to 
feel the responsibilities of property conferred on them 
by the British rule. 
99 
He also believed that if a limit 
96. Proceedings of the Punjab Government, Revenue Department, 
January 1874,13A. Secretary to the Government of the 
Punjab No. 160, January, 24,1874. 
97. Note by C. Boulnois, Judge of the Chief Court, I-larch 13, 
1874 Proceedings of the Punjab Government$ Home Depart- 
ment, August 1874,12A. 
98. Ibid. 
99. Proceedings of the Punjab Government, Home Department, 
August 1874,12A. Note by C. R. Lindsay, Judge of the 
Chief Court, no. date. 
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was set upon the rate of interest recoverable, bankers 
would find new outlets for their money, and cultivators 
would not be able to borrow in times of scarcity. 
100 
For existing indebtedness, Lindsay recommended certain 
remedies. The debtor who borrowed on the security of 
his land could be further protected by a law compelling 
the banker to produce his accounts yearly; and, in 
addition, it would be well if the courts looked more 
closely into accounts between creditors and debtors. 
101 
The minimum limit of interference which he thought 
tolerable was to lay down that the interest recoverable 
at any time should not exceed the principal. 
102 The 
third judge, Philip Sandys Melvill, who had believed, 
in 1869$ in a great improvement in the prosperity of the 
rural community, and, the decline of agricultural 
indebtednessq noted that land transfers to bankers, 
chiefly due to agricultural indebtedness, had been 
extensive. The cultivators were undergoing a gradual 
but certain process of extinction. The value which British 
rule had given to land enabled cultivators to borrow 
100. Ibid. 
101. Ibid. 
102. Ibid. 
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freely, and they had shown a great want of caution in 
making use of this credit. 
103 The banker, with his 
superior intelligence, and his rapacity and un- 
scrupulousness, took unconscionable advantage of the 
cultivators' necessity, ignorance and carelessness. 
Melvill noted that the officers consulted during this 
enquiry were almost unanimous in the view that the 
existing law regarding interest caused undue hardships 
to the cultivators. 
104 A large majority of these 
officers recommended that the law should be altered, 
that a maximum rate of interest should be fixed, that 
the court'fshould be granted the power to make an 
equitable judgement of interest, notwithstanding any 
agreement made by the parties. 
105 Melvill himself 
was not prepared to recommend any alteration in the law 
where the rate of interest had been agreed upon by the 
creditor and the debtor. He proposed however, that no 
voluntary transfer of land should be permitted in pay- 
ment of a debt to a banker, whether alien or of the 
village brotherhoodg the sole exception being a mortgage 
103. Proceedings of the Punjab Government. Home Department, 
August, 1874,12A; Minute by P. S. Melvill, Officiating 
Judge of the Chief Court, April 1,1874. 
104. Ibid. 
105. Ibid. 
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limited to the lifetime of the mortgagor. 
106 In 1869, 
Melvill had combatted further restrictions on com- 
pulsory sales by pointing to the harm which would ensue 
when cultivators were no longer able to obtain short 
term loans. In 1874, he did not ignore this problem. 
He agreed, however, that restrictions on voluntary 
transfers would not prevent bankers continuing to make 
advances to the cultivators on whose business they 
largely depended. 
107 Earlier he had anticipated that 
the sale of land to bankers would lead to the improve- 
ment of the land, at any rate in some part of the 
province; 
108 in 1874, he concluded that while this 
might be true in some cases, hitherto the bankers had 
not been in the habit of spending money on the land,, 
and confined themselýes to squeezing as much as possible 
out of their tenants. 
109 He advocated the abolition 
of imprisonment for debt, and the restriction of the 
power of the banker in regard to the attachment and 
sale of crops in execution of decrees for debt. 
110 
106. Ibid. 
107. Ibid. 
108. See above pp. 201-2. 
109. MelVill, op. cit. 
110. Ibid. 
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He concluded that 'the cultivators, having been ousted 
altogether from their farms, and having lost their 
right to cultivate their ancestral propertys would 
become disaffected and disloyal subjects. ' He pre- 
dicted, 'Let this process go on for another fifty 
years and the Government might find itself face to face 
with a serious political danger. ' 
ill 
We have seen that Melvill and Boulnois were in 
favour of, but Lindsay was against, any drastic changes 
in legislation. The Lieutenant-Governor, Henry Davis, 
after considering the arguments of the Judges, did 
not see any need for any further legislation. He 
dwelled on the probability that further restrictions on 
the transfer of land would do more harm than good, 
depreciating the value of land as a security, raising 
still higher the rates of interest, and destroying 
that self-reliance and industry which characterised many 
Punjab cultivators and which were among the causes of 
the agricultural prosperity of the province. 
112 Accordingly 
he rejected all proposals for further legislation, and 
in this way, prepared an elaborate and confident defence 
of a laissez-faire policy. In fact the protective 
111 
. Ibid. 
112. Proceedings of the Lieutenant Governor ofthe Punjab. 
in Home Department No. 4609, December, 23,1874. 
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policy adopted by the Government was a departure 
from political economy. Although the policy had made 
its mark on the administration, it did not make much 
difference, because it did not invalidate the absolute 
practicability and truth of the principles of political 
economy in the eyes of the rulers. Howeverg political 
economy had been set aside once, which might have 
provided an excuse and precedent for the Lieutenant- 
Governor's drawing up further legislation. Nevertheless, 
political economy still proved to be a barrier which 
every proposal for intervention between a creditor and 
a debtor had to overcome. Some officers had, in fact, 
attempted to persuade the Government to surmount 
the barrier erected by the laws of political economy, 
by assuming that British Government in India was the 
chief or real landlord and hence could interfere to pro- 
tect its tenants. 
113 Davis, however, rejected this view 
and upheld the British theory of non-interference. In 
fact, the key posts in the province, from the annexation, 
remained hitherto in the hands of those who had been 
associated with one or other aspect of the protective 
policy in regard to land. After John Lawrence, in 1859, 
Robert Montgomery took up the Lieutenant-Governorship. 
He was succeeded in 1865 by Donald McLeod. Edward Thornton 
and Robert Cust simultaneously retained the office of 
113. A-Brandreth, op. cit. p. 174. 
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judicial commissioners. The preservation of the landed 
community and its protection from the rapacity of money 
lenders were the remarkable feature of the policy of 
these officers. 
114 
and they had often defended in 
writing their measures for the protection of the 
cultivators. 
115 Now the key executive posts were, and 
remained for many years, held by opponents of the 
protective policy. Robert Egerton remained Financial 
Commissioner till 1877, then he succeeded Henry Davis 
as the head of the Punjab Government. He generally 
believed that alienations of land as a whole were not 
very much compared with the general increase in pros- 
perity which had taken place throughout the province. 
Arthur Brandreth, as a commissioner of the Multan 
Division, pointed out various agrarian difficulties, 
and suggested that the Government introduced legislation 
as a remedial measure, in 1875, in 1876 and again in 
1877.116 
114. Edwardes, Sir Herbert B., and Mericale, Herman: 
Life of Sir Henry Lawrence, London, 1873, ed. 
p. 153; Stokes, op. cit. p. 138. 
115. For the views expressed by the earlier administration, 
see above PP. 173,198,204. 
116. Selections from the Records of the Office of the 
Financial Commissioner, Punjab new series No. 11, 
Lahore 1887 (Egerton's opinion) pp. 837-9. 
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In spite of the general prosperity which, 
according to the Government view, was prevailing throughout 
the country, cultivators were still dependent upon the 
village banker for their necessities of life as well 
as for their farming. The banker charged them high rates 
of compound interest. As a result-the cultivators had 
become hopelessly involved in debt. There were numerous 
cases where the communities which had not yet sunk to 
this level were so little above it that unfavourable 
seasons might at any time reduce them to it; only the 
greatest economy and forethought could enable them to rise 
above'their present position: 
'The glory of the Government has been that it has 
hitherto secured to a great extent the prosperity 
of the masses; and the highest credit of our 
Revenue Survey has been that it appears to have 
settled these on a firmer basis than ever. How 
then can it but be a matter of great anxiety and 
uneasiness ..... to discover that the prosperity 
of the masses is declining and their happiness 
passing away before the encroachment of an alien 
community. ' 
117 
117. H. B. Boswell's statement cited in The Deccan Riots Cornmi- 
ssion Report, October 5,1875. 
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Septimus Thorburn, engaged in the settlement of the 
Bannu District, observed that since the annexation, 
the Hindus of Bannu were growing wealthy and becoming 
large landowners. 118 In 1878, he submitted his 
settlement report, which revealed more signs of un- 
easiness, though nothing like alarm. The people, he 
believed, though generally better off than under their 
former rulers, were not extricating themselves from debt, 
a fact which he attributed to increased expenditure on 
domestic ceremonies, on jewels, food and clothes, as 
well as to the widespread practice of gambling. Although 
his report revealed that the problem of land transfers 
to bankers had assumed a political dimension, he was 
not certain that this fear was a real one. 
119 
William Coldstreamg the Deputy Commissioner of the 
Hoshiarpur Districtq conducted an enquiry into indebtedness, 
and found, out of sixty villages, two to be free from debt. 
The rest of them were hopelessly involved in debt. 
120 
He 
believed that the next generation of cultivators might be 
better able and willing to look after itself. Yet he 
admitted that in many cases, another generation would not 
118 Extracts from the land revenue reports,, 1882-3 
(Remarks by Thorburn) pp. 148-150; also Thorburn, S. S. 
Bannu or our Afghan Frontier, London 1876, p. VII 
119. Ibid. p. 245,123,132. 
120. Remarks by W. Coldstream, Punjab Reportq Lahore 1878-9. 
pp. 432-4. 
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see them in possession of their ancestral land. 121 
The land was already changing hands to a large extent. 
The banker carried away most of the grain from the 
threshing floor, and the cultivator was forced to 
borrow again for his daily life. H. E. Perkins, who as 
the Deputy Commissioner of Rawalpindi, had supported 
the Government policy in 1875,122 in 1878, as a Commissioner 
of Amritsar Division, reported that the land transfers 
to the bankers were taking place to a much larger 
extent than had been admitted by the Government. 
123 
The Lieutenant-Governor repudiated his assertion and 
indicated in 1879 that complete statistics were necessary 
before the conclusion could be accepted. 124 
The-drought of 1877-8 gave impetus to further 
alienations. J. W. MacNab,, the Commissioner of Umbilla, 
found no village clear of debt. Most of them owed the 
equivalent of three or four years revenue, and many more 
than that. 
125 
121. Ibid. 
122. Selections from the Records of the Government of the 
Punjab, op. cit. (H. E. Parkin's opinion), p. 19-20. 
123. Extracts from the land revenue reports, 1876-7 
(Ren. arks by H. E. Perkins) p. 21. 
124. Proceedings of the Punjab Government, Revenue 
Department, June 1879,6A. 
125. Ibid. 
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There was hardly any report which did not mention 
the economic decay of the cultivator and the dominance 
of the banker over villages. In spite of the fact that 
the Punjab Government was aware of the prevailing 
conditions, it was most reluctant to eradicate the evil. 
The Government of India, in 1879, took the initiative in 
relieving cultivators from their debts; and in connection 
with this, asked the Punjab Government to consider 
the possibility of a more elastic system of revenue 
collection. 
126 Some British Officers believed that the 
origin of the debts which led to these frequent transfers 
of property was, in the great majority of cases, 9 the 
pressure of the revenue system. 
127 Although the main 
principles of that system, were sound, it had been administered 
in a 'very harsh' and 'unbending manner'. 
128 . Collectors 
and their subordinates, ' Sir John Strachey wrote, 'have 
far too much become mere machines for grinding revenue out 
of the people. ' 
129 Although James Lyall, the Financial 
Commissioner, and several other officers, supported the 
126. Selections from the records of the Government of 
the Puniabs Lahore 1887 (note by O. B. Lyall, August 30, 
1879) pp. 839-45. 
127. Thorburn, op. cit., A. Brandrath, op. cit., Melvill, 
op. cit., Colstream, op. cit., p. 17. 
128. Cited by Thorburn op. cit. * pp. 66-7. 
129. Ibid. 
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proposal made by the Government of India, the Lieutenant- 
Governor, Robert Egerton, did not think it practicable to 
relax the present system for the sake of the comparatively 
few districts that would benefit from such a relaxation. 
The Government Revenue would suffer if taxes were 
collected in kind rather than in cash, and collection in 
kind was the only means of preventing cultivators in 
these districts borrowing money. 
130 This shows that 
Egerton's opposition to the adoption of a measure which 
would diminish the dependence of the cultivator on the 
banker remained unchanged. In fact changes in revenue 
administration might have had some favourable effect on 
rural indebtednessq but they could not have provided 
any real relief so long as the cultivator was unable to 
find an alternative source of advances on reasonable 
terms. His growing poverty and dependence on the banker 
were facts accepted by almost everyone. Speaking in the 
India legislative council in July 1879, Robert Egerton 
noted that the circumstances which led to the passing 
of the Deccan Agricultural Relief Act were generally 
prevailing in the Punjab, which might lead to the same 
upheaval. 
131 The manner in which they were to be treated 
130. Selections from the Records of the Government of 
the Punjab (Egerton's opinion July 10,1880) 
pp. 837-9. 
131 Speech by R. E. Egerton, Lieutenant-Governor, July 17, 
1879, India Legislative Council proceedings, 1879. 
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in the Deccan might possibly form an example for their 
treatment in the Punjab. 132 There were many cultivators 
in the Punjab whose condition in many ways resembled the 
description given in regard to the Deccan. In 1880, 
he informed the Government of India, of his own accord, 
that, in the province, he was favourably disposed to an 
amendment of the law which would empower courts to 
investigate the circumstances behind bonds; to a gradual 
extension of rural courts and to a limitation of the 
attachment of produce in execution of decree. 
133 
The gradual deterioration of circumstances in the 
Punjab, and the Deccan legislation, had a direct influence 
on the strong opposition of Robert Egerton to the transfer 
of land. In earlier years he had helped to convince 
Henry Davis that the transfer of land posed no serious 
problems. 
134 He adopted the same attitude when he 
succeeded Davis as Lieutenant-Governor in 1877. So the 
modification of his opposition to alienation provides an 
interesting example of the importance of the time factor 
in influencing political and intellectual beliefs. In 1880, 
132. Ibid. 
133. Egerton, op. cit. 
134. Selections from the Record of the Punjab Government, 
op. cit., p. 837-9. 
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E. G. Wace, the Settlement Commissioner of LudhiYana 
expressed his great concern at the increasing number 
of land transfers to the bankers. 
135 In 1882, in an 
attempt to get to the heart of the situation, he stated 
that the root of the trouble lay in the nature of the 
society itself. A society of a rather loose moral and 
social constitution had been advanced rapidly by the 
British from a condition of comparative adversity and 
depression to one in which the cultivators had few 
anxieties, and a very considerable command of money. 
136 
In fact, the grant of transferable proo etory 
rights in land to the cultivator was 4-n innovation, and 
he had not known anything like it under native rule. 
The banker took advantage of his ignorance and pecuniary 
circumstances, and inveigled him into contracts of dubious 
equity, charged him high rates of interest and finally 
deprived him of his proprietory rights. Wace believed 
that the trouble had been aggravated by the failure to 
adopt a civil law and procedure framed on the European 
model to requirements of the cultivators. 
137 
135. Papers cOnnected with revenue rate of Hoshuarpur, 
1882, para. 7, Remarks of Edward Scorge Wace, 
July 10,1882, para. 7. 
136. Ibid. 
137. Ibid. 
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In 1882, H. E. Parkins, the commissioner of the 
Multan Division, found that the numbers of transfers 
in his division were much greater than had been 
admitted. 
138 C. A. McMahon considered the problem 
'A matter of considerable political importance. ' 
He asked himself (and probably his colleagues) why 
cultivators were getting more and more indebted at a 
time when the value of-land and agricultural produce 
had risen so much. 
139 He attributed it to the 
growing pressure of population, the sub-division of 
land and the transfer of land into the hands of the 
bankers. 140 He stated, 'Everywhere in our villages 
we see handsome new idol temples rearing their spires 
aloft, and marking the growing influence, wealth and 
supremacy of the village baniah. 1 
141 
The necessity for agricultural relief was again 
urged in 1882 by James Wilson, who proposed that the 
government should advance capital to the whole of 
North India 'to pave the way for grand reform, the 
138. Extracts from the land revenue report, 1881-2. 
Remarks by H. E. Perkins, pp. 350-6. 
139. Charles Alexander McMahon's reference in proceedings 
of the Lieutenant-Governor, Home Department 1874,18A 
(December 23,1874). 
140. Proceedings of the Punjab Government, Revenue Department, 
flay. 1875,2A. 
141. Ibid. 
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revocation of the power to alienate ancestral land., 
142 
Lyall, as a Financial Commissioner, rejected this view 
on the grounds that the government would face con- 
siderable risk in order to relieve the cultivators 
from debt ........... I as it would have difficulties 
in collecting the instalments from the cultivators 
afterwards. ' He, however, favoured agricultural banks, 
and noted that 'they seemed most desirable in the most 
indebted tracts. ' 143 
Direct financial help from the government would be 
a temporary solution while a permanent source of cheap 
advances could really eradicate the evils of usury and 
the banker's dominance over the cultivators. Probably 
on the same grounds, Charles Aitchison, the Lieutenant- 
Governor, dismissed Wilson's proposal of making a 
government loan. He argued that it would not prevent 
the cultivators again falling into the hands of the 
144 
bankers. An alternative means of credit to the 
bankers for the future requirements of the cultivators was 
necessary; this could be provided only by the government 
itself, or by the establishment of agricultural banks. 
142. Proceedings of the Government of the Punjab, Revenue 
Department (J. Wilson, Scheme for the Redemption of 
Mortgages) April 1883. 
143. Ibid. (J. B. Lyall views, 19 March 1883). 
144. Proceedings of the Government of the Punjab. 
Revenue Department, April 1883,5A (Aitchison's 
opinion - 20 April 1883) 
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On a permanent basis, the former course was out of the 
question, while the establishment of banks was attended 
by various difficulties which Aitchison saw no clear 
way of solving. 
145 
The grant of transferable rights in land to the 
cultivators, moderate assessment of the land tax, 
general peace and political stability had made land a 
valuable property. Above all the permission to borrow 
on interest by religious authorities enabled cultivators 
to borrow much more freely. But uncertain seasons and 
variability in rainfall often proved too much for the 
greatest thrift and economy. The establishment of an 
inflexible system of judicial proceeding, which in a 
way had enforced the hasty promises made by ignorant 
and needy cultivators, certainly had given the banker's 
an unfair advantage over their debtors. It was not 
fair to neglect those people who could not quickly 
adjust themselves to judicial innovations and assist 
those who could. The loss of ancestral land by debtors 
and their children was a severe penalty to impose on 
ignorance, carelessness or even extravagance. It was 
the moral duty of the government to protect the ignorant 
debtorsq who had to borrow in order to survive. 
145. Ibid. (J. B. Lyall's views, 19 March 1883). 
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Taba! tabi'T, a contemporary writer, although he 
admired the British in various respects, 
146 
pointed 
out that rather than requiring the people to adapt 
themselves to the British system, the Government 
should adapt its system to the state of society. 
147 
The Government, however, thought that the creation of 
rights. of property in land and the institution of a 
modern system of judicial administration, were 
irreversible changes, even though it was legitimate 
to assume that they heightened social conflict in the 
province. 
148 S. S. Thorburn who had urged the 
Government, during his service in Bannu, that sweeping 
legislation was necessary to avert further agrarian 
trouble, reaffirmed this in 1883. In 1884, he submitted 
a paper entitied*'The Indebtedness of the Muslim 
Cultivators of the Punjab. ' In his paper he warned the 
Government to avert the political danger caused by 
growing agrarian discontent. 
149 He proposed the 
limitation of the rates of interest, the abolition of 
imprisonment for debt, the exemption of part of the crop 
from attachment and sale, and the extension of the 
146. Taba'tabi'T. op. cit., Vol. III, p. 161. 
147. Ibid. Vol. 11, p. 17. 
148. Temple, Sir Richard, India as I Know It, London 1926 
(ed. ) p. 36; also Minute by Sir Richard Temple, dated 
November 12,1877, Bombay Government Selection, No. 157, 
new series. 
149. Thorburn's remarks in Sections from the Reports of the 
Punjab Government$ op. cit., pp. 930-55. 
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limitation period for debt. 
150 The Government dis- 
missed the possibility of usury lavis on the grounds 
that they could be evaded, and in the long run brought 
greater evils in their train, adversely affecting that 
credit which was so indispensable in a poor agricultural 
country like India. 
151 It did, however, accept the 
application of the Financial Commissioner, McMahon, 
to submit the rest of the proposals for the opinions of 
Revenue and Judicial officers. 
152 Later on, the 
Lieutenant-Governor recommended detailed studies of 
the circumstances prevailing in village society. 
A large majority of the officers who took part 
in this enquiry expressed opinions which were more in 
accord with those of Thorburn than those held by the 
superior authorities. Robert Clarke stated that rather 
than run the risk of disturbance, he would cast political 
153 
economy to the winds. Denziel Ibbetson thought that 
the root of the evil lay, not where Aitchison said it 
lay (in the nature of society) but rather in the extension 
150. Extracts from the Land Revenue Reports of the Punjab 
Government, 1882-3, pp. 148-150. 
151. Rroceedings of the Lieutenant Governor, No. 256, 
Nobember, 15,1883, para. 9. 
152. Officiating Junior Secretary to the Financial 
Conmissioner, No. 1189, October, 24,1884, Selections, 
op. cit., pp. 923-8. 
153.1 bid. 
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of a sort of law and §; ystem of Government unsuited in 
some respects to the people and their circumstances. 
154 
The majority of officers thought that the people should 
be allowed to manage their affairs in the way in which 
they, and not the British, understood them. 
155 However, 
it was believed that it was too late to go back. 
Ibbetson noted that in Ireland and in the Deccan, the 
British had retreated in this sense. 
156 Alexander 
Anderson thought that it was too late to arrest the 
transfer of land from the cultivators to the bankers, 
and that the most that could be done was to try to make 
the process gradual by introducing certain reforms in 
law. 157 Charles Roe, however, dismissed the threat of 
any future agrarian trouble and the necessity of forming 
any measures to alleviate agricultural indebtedness. In 
this he was in a minority of one. 
158 
Thorburn, who had originated the whole discussion; 
published, in 1886, another controversial work entitled 
155. Selections, op. cit., p. 836. 
156. Ibbetson, op. cit., (Selections) p. 931. 
157. Selections from the Punjab Administration, op. cit., 
A. Anderson's opinion, pp. 982-3. 
158. Selections, op. cit., pp. 967-9. 
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'Musalmans and Money-Lenders in the Punjab', in which 
he stated that land alienations in the western Punjab, 
due to the British system, were annually increasing 
and the political danger involved was very great. In 
the opening passage of his book, he stated: 
'The Punjab is an agricultural Province, a, land 
of peasant proprietors, a large and annually 
increasing portion of whom are sinking into the 
position of serfs to the money-lenders. The 
gradual transfer of ovinership of the soil from 
its natural lords the cultivators, to astute 
but influential Hindu traders and bankers, is 
directly due to a system of law and administration 
created by ourselves, which, unless remedied in 
time, must eventually imperil the stability of 
our hold on the country. 1159 
He suggested that as a 
deriving profits from a 
debarred from acquiring 
land., 160 He contended 
had placed restrictions 
remedy for the problem, 'anyone 
shop or from money-lending be 
interests in arable or pasture 
that all indigenous Governments 
on alienation, and that no 
159. Thorburn, op. cit., p. 1. 
160. 
'Ibid, 
pp. 1 6,79. 
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contemporary state countenanced the acquisition of 
land by its trading and money-lending classes, and 
he noted the disabilities of the Jews in Russia and 
Eastern Europe in this respect. 
161 Yet he did not 
place all his hopes on the restrictions on the power 
of alienation, for he went to considerable trouble to 
eludidate the reforms required in revenue and 
judicial administration: 
162 
'Without some radical charges, in the substantive 
civil law and its mode of administration, and for 
certain tracts in the revenue system, the im- 
patience which now finds expression in the 
occasional murder, maltreatment or plundering of 
an obnoxious money-lender, or in resistance 
to the attachment of cattle or grain, or other 
necessities of life, will soon grow into wide- 
spread disaffection. The fuel will then be ready 
for ignition, and a spark -a sympathetic breeze 
down the frontier from the hot-bed of Mahomedan 
fanaticism - Afghanistan -a famine, the ex- 
161. Ibid. p. 103. 
162. Ibidt pp. 106-159 139-53. 
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hortations of an agitator, whether aspiring 
Mahdi or Land-Law reformer - will kindle such 
a flame that Government will, in order to 
quench it hurriedly and fearfully pass some 
Act of Bunniah spoilation more drastic than the 
famous Deccan Ryots Act of 1879. ' 
163 
In 1887, Alfred Kingsington expressed his deep con- 
cern over the increasing number of alienations. He 
predicted that the Government within the next ten or 
fifteen years would be almost compelled to step in and 
enforce wholesale measures of relief similar to those 
adopted in the Deccan. 
164 In the same year, James 
Douie, a settlement officer, predicted that the decay 
would go on, and that the future of the Karnal and 
Umballa districts was dark unless drastic measures, such 
as the Deccan Ryots Act, were taken. 
165 In the same 
year A. R. Bulmang the Officiating Commissioner, and 
Colonel Grey, the Commissioner, both of the Delhi Division, 
expressed their absolute agreement with the advocates of 
drastic legislation. 166 
163. Ibid'. pp. 40-4. 
164. Selections. op. cit. (Remarks bY A. Kensington) pp. 990-1. 
165. Ibid. pp. 983-4. 
166. Ibid. pp. 967-9, also Charles, Lewis Tupper, (ed) 
funjab Custon-ary. Law, Calcutta 1881, Vol. I, p. 16. 
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The reports fron, various British officers who 
were practically confronted with the problems created 
by the bankers in the province indicate that the 
existence of the problem of land alienation would be 
more-likely to increase than decrease with the passage 
of time. Although some officers, Roe for instance, 
felt no anxiety whatever, and saw little need for 
the legal protection of landed proprietors, 
167 
a 
large majority was convinced that one remedy or another 
was required to deal with this unsatisfactory situation. 
This approach by the majority, reflecting some elements 
of reality, attracted the attention of the Secretary 
of State, who wrote to the Punjab Government calling 
for a report on the indebtedness of the cultivators of 
the Western Punjab. James Lyall, as Lieutenant-Governor, 
admitted that a grave situation existed in various parts 
of the province. He dismissed, however, the probability 
of legislation similar to the Deccan Ryots A ct. 
168 He 
suggested for certain tracts of the province that the 
courts should be empowered to investigate bonds; interest 
should be separated from principal; and the judges should 
167. Ibid. pp. 967-9, also Charlesq Lewis Tupper (ed), 
Punjab Customary Law, Calcutta 1881, Vol. 2, p. 45. 
168. Ibid., pp. 30-5. 
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be empowered to decree only reasonable interest. He 
thought these steps necessary to avert the political 
danger which was, according to him, by no means con- 
fined to the Western Punjab, for the alienations in 
the east were more indicative of poverty and distress 
than those in the west. 
169 Lyall had expanded the 
possibility and scope of the question mentioned by 
Thorburn, for the whole province. In 1888, the 
Government of India forwarded this dispatch to the 
Financial Commissioner and the Chief Court, to consider 
whether legislation on the lines of the Deccan Act was 
necessary; and the revenue officers were asked to 
report whether alienations were proceeding to an 
increasing ratio and whether such increases involved 
any political danger. 
170 
In response to this enquiry, 44 officers replied, 
and there was more or less general agreement among 
them that the transfers of land to bankers were increasing. 
A large majority believed that the process involved a grave 
169. Ibid; Also notes by J. B. Lyall, July 17,1888, The 
Punjab Civil Secretariate printed files, Revenue, 18, 
notes pp. 65-6,72-3,75-6. 
170. Officiating Junior Secretary to the Government of the 
Punjab Nos. 231-3, November, 7,1888, Punjab Civil 
Secretariate printed Files, 18. 
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political danger. 
171 The cultivatorst who supplied the 
man-power for the native army, represented a political 
force in the country, and they were being deprived of 
their farms by bankers, men of no political significance. 
172 
If the cultivators were discontented beyond a certain 
point and were given a chance they would certainly 
become a great danger for the Government. 
173 
Lyall admitted 'the great unsuitability of some 
parts-of-. -the legal system to the condition and circumstances 
of the agriculturalists of the province. ' 
194 
and a vast 
majority' of the revenue and judicial officers replied to 
the Government that legislation similar to the Deccan Act 
was urgently required in the Punjab. 
175 In 1889, the 
Government of India forwarded these opinions to the 
Punjab Government. The Lieutenant-Governor expressed his 
absolute agreement with the opinions expressed by the 
majority, 
176 
and proposed measures which followed the 
Deccan Act closely. 
177 
lie argued that it would reduce the 
171. For the replies submitted in 1888-9 see Proceedings of 
the Government of India (Revenue Department) December 
1891-2,10-11A. 
172. Ibid, note by Thorburn, Ommanney, Miller, Clarke, 
Ibbetson. 
173. Ibid. 
174. Proceedings of the Government of India, op. cit., Notes 
by J. B. Lyall, Lieutenant Governor, June 1891, para. 1. 
175. Proceedings of the India Government, op. cit., December, 
1891. 
176. Ibid. 
177. Ibid,., Lyall proposed empowering courts to go behind 
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huge number of suits instituted by the- bankers against 
the cultivators. It would discourage those bankers 
who deliberately aimed in the conduct of their business 
at getting possession of their clients' land and who 
used the courts to that end, and those who 'lent reck- 
lessly at high interest to improvident cultivators, 
trusting to make their business pay by prompt recourse 
to the courts. ' 
178 The bankers, he predicted would 
be forced to report to the more old fashioned course of 
business ..... trying to get a good interest on their 
capital as a whole, but not trying to acquire cultivators' 
land, and disinclined to resort to the courts. 
179 
Lyall had never been entirely in agreement with the 
notion that the land alienation involved political danger. 
It was just that he was now fully convinced of the- 
probability of political danger in the near future. He 
hadfa-'c'onstant opponent of all measures to check land 
transfer to the banker. In the early 1870's, for instance, 
he had proposed the extension of the law of pre-emption to 
slow down the process of land transfer. 
180 But now he 
wanted more than that, something radical and drastic, to 
prevent further decay. In August, 1891, the Punjab Govern- 
bonds,, separate interest from principal and decree only 
reasonable interest. For details see The ProceedinqS 
of the Government of India, June 1891,10-11A. 
178. Ibid. 
179. Ibid. 
180. See above p. 208. 
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ment despatch reached the office of the Government 
of India. The Government of India, in November 1891, 
appointed a commission to report on the local working 
of the Deccan Act, and on the possibility of extending 
the act to othO, parts of India. 
181 The commission 
reported in favour of the Deccan Act and its extension 
to other parts of the country. 
182 It discussed the 
restrictions on the transfer of land to bankers, which 
was not recommended for the Deccan; and recommended 
that the true remedy of the prevailing evils lay in 
the restriction of the right of transfer. 
183 
Lord Lansdowne, in December, 1893, on the eve of 
his departure, recorded his opinion that the Governnent 
of India was faced with a serious political problem which 
could be solved only by restrictions on the power of 
land transfer, political economy notwithstanding. 
184 
In July 1894 the Government of India proposed to 
the Punjab Government certain amendments of the law 
regarding usury, and of the contract and Evidence Acts 
181. Proceedings of the Government of India, Revenue 
Department 
,. 
September, 1893,46-9A; Resolution of 
November, 20,1891. 
182. Ibid. June 1893,11-1A. See Home Department Office 
Memorandum of August 25,1892, in note by E. D. 
Maclagan, May, 19,1893. 
183. Ibid. 
184. 
'Ibid.,, 
September 1894,43-6A, Note by Lansdowne, 
January 3,1894. 
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and proposed to add to the contract act that a contract 
should be voidable on account of a creditor having 
taken undue advantage of a debtor's simplicity or need. 
185 
Although the Lieutenant Governor, Dennis Fitzpatrick, 
criticised these amendments, he nevertheless accepted 
them. 186 In 1895 the Government of India again informed 
the Punjab Government that 'the Governor-General in council 
185. Ibid.,, October, 1897; 'The Home Department circular 
requested consideration of the following changes of 
law: to amend the law rpgarding usury so as to make 
it clear by a specific enactment to this effect 
that the courts, before judging stipulated interest, 
shall be bound to enquire as to coercion, undue in- 
fluence, fraud,, or misrepresentation, whenever there 
is a reasonable suspicion of any of these; to provide 
in the Contract Act that taking an undue advantage of 
a debtor's simplicity or necessities shall, equally 
with the above causes, render an agreement voidable, by 
additions to the evidence act, to enable the court 
to require independent evidence of the transaction if 
it disbelieves, or doubts the recorded consideration, and 
likewise to require proof of bona fides from the party 
who contracted when in a position of decided advantage. ' 
186. Proceedings of the Government of India, Home Department,, 
October, 1897,317-576A (Notes by D. Fitzpatrick, 
Lieutenant-Governor, January, 24,1895). 
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was distinctly of the opinion that some action in the 
direction of restriction upon the right of transfer of 
land was generally advisable, and even necessary. ' 
187 
Any prompt action on this circular was delayed 
by the famine of 1896-7, which gave impetus to 
alienations and the general decadence of cultivators. 
In 1898, the Government of Punjab nominated a committee 
of British revenue offiers to propose legislation. 
188 
The committee resolved that permanent alienation of 
land to non-agriculturalists without the sanction of 
the collector should be void, and defined non-agriculturalists 
as 'those who were neither in their own names nor in 
those of their agnate ancestors recorded as owners of land 
or as hereditary tenants in any estate at the first 
regular settlement. 
" 89 The definition was imperfect, for 
in some districts bankers had considerable areas trans- 
ferred in their name before annexation, and at the regular 
settlement;. permanent transfer of land to them, there- 
187. Ibid. The Records of the Revenue Department, October, 
1895,72-3A. Officiating Secretary to Government of 
India's circular 24/75-1, October 26,1895. 
188. Punjab civil secretarial printed files, 190 (Note by 
William Mackworth Young, the Lieutenant-Governor of 
the Punjab, June 22,1898) p. 264. 
189. Proceedings of Barnes Court Committee, July 1,2,1898; 
Proceedings of the Government of India, Revenue 
Department, November, 1898,3-22A. 
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fore, would be permissible. The committee also 
recommended that temporary transfer of land should 
be universally restricted. 
190 
which meant that all 
the restrictions would apply to the banker who owned 
landed property. It also resolved that hypothecation 
of a share of the produce of land should be prohibited 
for any term exceeding a year, and that the person in 
whose favour the pledge was made was legally responsible 
for the payment of a proportional share of the land- 
revenue. The committee also accepted the resolution 
that no alteration was required in the law and the rules 
under which land was sold in execution of decree. 
191 
Mackworth Young, the Lieutenant Governor, obtained the 
agreement of its members to the proposition that it 
was not desirable or safe to adopt any more. stringent 
measures. 
192 He remarked that he was personally opposed 
to legislation, but that if the government of India were 
determined to adopt general and stringent measures he 
would support the proposals of his committee to the 
193 
maximum. In other words, the Punjab Government wanted 
190.1 bid. 
191.1 bid. 
192. Ibid, November 1898 (Note by W. M. Young, the 
Lieutenant-Governor, July, 20,1898) 3-22A. 
193.1 bid. 
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to keep the power of transfer of land to itself. 
The Government of India, whichq influenced by the 
rising tide of opinion, was determined to make un- 
limited restrictions on land alienation, wanted either 
that the power of exemption given to the local govern- 
ment should be subject to its own sanction - otherwise, 
a Lieutenant-Governor like Young, who had half-heartedly 
supported the proposals, might nullify the whole 
measure - or that the sale of land in execution of 
decree should be entirely abolished. 
194 
The Government of India carefully considered the 
Punjab Government's recommendations. It made some 
minor additions,, and further suggested that all permanent 
transfers made without official sanction should be void; 
no document purporting to transfer land permanently 
would be submitted to registration without a certificate 
of sanction. When the transferee was an 'agriculturalist' 
holding land in the village or descended in the male line 
from the same ancestor as the alienator, sanction would be 
given as a matter of right; in other cases sanction 
would be at the discretion of the revenue officers, guided 
195 by executive instructions . In July 1899, the members of 
194. Ibid. Home Department 274-439A. 
195. Government of India, De partment of Revenue and 
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the India council approved the proposals. The proposal 
to impose restrictions on permanent alienation by non- 
agriculturalist proprietors was defeated. yet it was 
not of the most material importance because the bankers 
were unable to improve the tax-paying capacity of this 
land, and it was good for the Government if the 
cultivators would redeem their land. 
Agriculture's dispatch to Secretary of State No. 59 
of 1898,3 November 1898, para 26, and notes by 
T. W. Holderness, Secretary of Revenue Department 
21 October, 1898. 
(The Government of India outlined the executive 
instructions by which it proposed to regulate the 
grant of sanction. There would be three classes 
of cases. When an agriculturalist or non- 
agriculturalist proprietor proposed to transfer land 
to an agriculturalist in the same village or to an 
agnate, the Tahsi: 'Id; r would sanction the transaction eo 
as a matter of course if he was satisfied that the 
purchaser was really buying for himself. When a 
non-agriculturalist proprietor wanted to transfer 
land to a person outside these limitso enquiry would 
be made whether any agriculturalist in the village 
was willing to purchase at a fair full price. If so, 
the proposed transfer to the outsider would be dis- 
allowed; if not, the transfer would ordinarily be 
permitted, even if the alienee was a non-agriculturalist. 
Power of sanction in this class of cases would rest 
with the Deputy commissioner. In the most important 
class of cases, those in which an agriculturalist 
wanted to transfer land to a person outside the original 
24.3. 
In September 1899, the Bill was introduced into 
the Governor General's Legislative Council. The pro- 
ceedings were postponed till the next session, for 
Lord Curzon.. the Governor General, thought that, in the 
interim, he would be able to gauge public opinion. 
196 
stock of the village or the agnates, the same pro- 
cedure would be allowed, sanction being refused if 
an agriculturalist of the village was prepared to 
buy. If not, and the proposed transfer was to an 
agri, culturalist of the same tribe as the alienor, 
sanction would ordinarily be given. If the proposed 
transfer was to an agriculturalist of the same tribe, 
enquiry should be made as to whether an agriculturalist 
of the same tribe as the alienor was willing to buy. 
If such a man was found, permission to the proposed 
transfer would be refused; if not, permission would 
be given, unless it looked as if the proposed alienee 
might become a mischievous element in the village 
community. If the proposed transfer was to a non- 
agriculturalist, permission would be refused save only 
in very exceptional cases of real necessity where no 
agricultural purchaser of any sort was forthcoming. 
In the third class of cases the power of sanction 
would be exercised by the Deputy Commissioner, except 
where, the transfer was to a non-agriculturalist in 
which the Commissioner's sanction would be required; 
for further details see Government of India, Department 
of Revenue and Agriculturelsdispatch to Secretary of 
State for India, No. 59 of 1898, November, 3,1898, 
para. 26. ) 
196. Curzon Papers, Volume 158, Part 2. No. 43. 
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The bankers raised a loud outcry against the 
Bill, and considered it something designed to under- 
mine their position. They attacked it not so much as 
an interference with their rights to acquire land, 
but as an imposition on the cultivators. The 
arguments that they put forward against it were 
presented in the language of the laissez-faire political 
economy. They argued that if the Bill was passed, 
agricultural credit would be restricted. 
197 In fact, 
in Jehlum district, the bankers had already restricted 
credit facilities to the cultivators, which imposed 
hardships on them, and gave rise to widespread dacoities 
and murderous assaults on the bankers. 
198 They also con- 
tended that if the Bill became law the rate of interest 
would be higher; the value of land would fall; more 
land would have to be pledged to obtain the same amount 
of money; mortgagers would be ejected from their land; 
sales would rise; the cultivators would be impoverished 
and rural crime would increase; and the Government would 
197. Punjab Correspondence of 1899-1900, and petition 
pamphlets, letters, etc., in Legislative Papers; 
Selections from Punjab Native Paper, 1899-1900 
(Chiefly sections under heading 'Punjab Land 
Alienation Bill). 
198.1 bid. 
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find it difficult to collect its revenue or enlist 
its soldiers. 
199 They formed Land Alienation Bill 
Committees in various districts, which had petitions 
signed by a large number of cultivators and sent to 
the Government. 200 
In June 1900, the legislative council referred 
the Bill to a select committee. The Parliamentary 
report of the select committee was presented in 
August and did not propose any fundamental changes. 
201 
The Bill was passed in October 1900. It was originally 
designed to secure the preservation of the cultivators 
by restricting their credit, and thus decreasing their 
opportunities for reckless expenditures, and to decrease 
sales and mortgages. In the case in which a cultivator 
was forced to sell, through the sub-division of the land, 
extreme thriftlessness or poverty, it would ensure 
that his land would pass to another cultivatorg instead 
of to a banker. The Act was undoubtedly effective in 
preventing the permanent acquisition of land by the bankers. 
199.1 bid. 
200.1 bid. 
201. Legislative Papers, op. cit, -9 1900; Report of 
Select Committee, August, 6,1900. 
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The decrease in the area of land sold and mortgaged 
each year appeared to be directly traceable to the 
Act. At first the area of land redeemed also decreased, 
not surprisingly, as often land had been redeemed 
only to be re-mortgaged. 
202 After a few years, with 
rising agricultural prices, redemption increased. 
Every year, the cultivators redeemed more land than 
they'mortgaged, and the provincial percentage of 
cultivated area under mortgage began to fall. The less 
provident cultivators continued to lose land, though 
perhaps not as quickly as before, and the more provident 
cultivators continued to acquire it. 
203 The decrease 
in the value of land, predicted by the bankers and 
many British Officers, did not occur. There was a 
temporary depreciation, but after a few years, it began 
to rise again. By 1908, it certainly stood at a higher 
level than ever before. 
204 The Government did not see 
any difficulties in collecting the land-tax. A significant 
202. Selections fron, Punjab Native Papers, 1901-7. 
(Sections headed 'Punjab Land Alienation Act') 
203. Ibid., Also, Articles by Miean Muhammad Shafi C 
Qizi Muhammad Aslam, W. M. Young, The Progress of 
the Punjab. 
0 
204. lbid. 9, pp. 162-70. 
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decrease in extravagant expenditure on litigation was 
apparent. The bankers began to show greater care in 
lending. The Act did not greatly increase the work of 
the revenue authorities, it rather decreased it with 
the decreased litigation. The Bankers found their 
investment in land restricted, and as a result there 
was widespread discontent and illfeeling among them. 
They thought that they had been unjustly dealt with. 
205 
The cultivators looked on the Act as 'the charter of 
their rights' in preventing the acquisition of their 
land by the despised Hindus. 206 Since the Act laid 
the basis for a healthy relationship between cultivators 
and bankers by throwing the weight of the administration 
in favour of the former, it successfully achieved its 
immediate purpose. It failed, however, to fulfill all 
the expectations, such as averting the political danger, 
with which it had been sent forth. For, like the Deccan 
cultivators, the Punjab cultivators sought to transform 
their prosperity into political power. They demanded 
communal electorates, but in 1919, under the leadership 
of MohandYs Karanchand Gindh"T they became nutinous and 
attempted to gain further autonomy by their commission of 
political crimes of violence, to an extent unknown in other 
205. Selections from the Punjab Native Papers. 
206. Young, op. cit., p. 159. 
248. 
parts of the sub-continent, and thereby began to shake 
the foundations of the whole of the Indian Empire. 
249. 
CONCLUSION 
The Qur'an prohibited interest on mere loans, but 
Muslim scholars gradually extended this prohibition 
to every credit transaction, even if it did not in- 
volve any interest. Since credit plays an essential 
role in successful business, and there was a con- 
siderable demand for loanable funds in the great 
cities of the Muslim empire, commercial elements 
managed to devise certain methods to overcome the 
rigidity of the theory. 
Abu Hanifa and his companions emerged as the 
first to accept the justification and validity of 
hiyal, which found outspoken opponents in the founders 
of other schools of law. This period was, of course, 
unique in the history of the formation of Muslim legal 
thought, in that it was one of independent thinking 
and the expression of individual opinion. It ended 
with the establishment of the various schools of law, 
and it was followed by a period in which unquestioning 
adherence to these prevailed, and affiliation with one 
of them became mandatory. TaqlTd held sway until the 
second half of the eighteenth century, when Shah Wali 
All; h, in view of the changing political social and 
250. - 
economic circumstances, felt the need for reconsideration 
of the basic principles of Islamic law. Sir Sayyid 
Ahmad Khan's contributions were made during the 
0 
c losing stages of this period. 
In fact, no historical period can ever be visualised 
in absolute terms because scholars differ one from 
the other, and respond in different ways to similar 
stimuli; there will also always be individual exceptions 
to general rules. What one has to discover above all 
is the major influences on the minds of the protagonistss 
who are, in legal matters, the scholars. 
In'the present context, it was social, political and 
economic influences which were to the fore. A great 
demand for loanable funds in the commerce of the second 
century, led'the HanafT doctors to recognise and even 
to establish the 
; 
nstitution of hiyal. In India, the 
decaying political social and economic conditions of the 
Muslim community and changes in the possession of 
agricultural land were exerting their influence in a 
number of ways. The opening stages of this period saw 
a gradual acceptance of the notion that distinct changes 
in the political,, social and economic circumstances of 
the community were taking place. The continuation of 
251 . 
these changes stimulated the thinking of various 
scholars throughout the period and attampts to re- 
evaluate the classic theory, in order to control 
these changes, marked its closing stages. 
Scholars such as Sh; h c Abd al- c AzTz and 
Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khgn re-explained the conventional 
theory. But conservative orthodoxy played a very 
considerable role in the whole process. In the 
opening years of the last period, it hindered the 
recognition of the need for the re-interpretation of 
the theory, in view of changing conditions. Through- 
out the period its effects were apparent. Even at 
the end it had much to say about the views of 
Sir Sayyid Ahmad Kh9n. So one may conclude that it was 
the strong conservatism of the orthodox Muslim, and his 
consequent commitment to the doctrine of TaqlTd, 
that was responsible for most of the evils associated 
with interest'; but for this the problems could have 
been quickly solved. It was orthodox Muslim conservatism 
which ensured that a new revolutionary explanation of the 
theory would not have an easy success. Shah cAbd alSAzTz's 
attempts were in vain and even the attempts made by 
Sir Sayyid did not succeed for many years. 
252. 
The British Government, due to its commitment to 
individual property and laissez-faire, was loth to 
amend the legal system. This produced widespread 
anxiety throughout the country, and a rising tide of 
opinion that it was necessary to intervene in the 
relations between debtor and creditor. As time went 
on, general opinion favouring legislation became 
steadily stronger and, as a result, the Government 
passed such legislation in favour of the debtor and 
against the creditor. 
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